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chapter 1
Encounters, Intrusions:  
Denis, Levinas, Nancy
. . . for me, cinema is not made to give a psychological explanation, for 
me cinema is montage, is editing. To make blocks of impressions or 
emotion meet with another block of impression or emotion and put in 
between pieces of explanation, to me it’s boring . . . [A]s a spectator, 
when I see a movie one block leads me to another block of inner emotion, 
I think that’s cinema. That’s an encounter . . . I think that making films 
for me is to get rid of explanation . . . you get explanation by getting rid 
of explanation. I am sure of that.
Claire Denis1
The issue of intrusion has resonances for so much in life – phobia, rejec-
tion, desire. Intrusion is always brutal. There’s no such thing as a gentle 
intrusion.
Claire Denis2
intrusions:  encountering ethics  in  the f ilms 
of  claire  denis
This book is about encounters: between philosophy and cinema, specta-tor and film, characters on screen, sound and image, body and text. The 
encounter is always also an intrusion, undermining the supposed discrete-
ness of any body and offering us an ethical way to position ourselves towards 
one another. In what follows, intrusions generate a feminist cinematic ethics 
through the encounters staged amongst the work of Claire Denis and of 
two philosophers, Jean-Luc Nancy and Emmanuel Levinas, although other 
voices interrupt throughout. Denis is one of the most challenging and distinc-
tive filmmakers working in France today. Despite the significant amount of 
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scholarly  attention that her filmmaking has received, the contribution that 
she makes to a cinematic ethics has not received any sustained analysis. Yet, 
my argument in what follows is that the ethical facet of her work is one of 
her main contributions to a cinema of ideas. I title the two permutations of a 
feminist cinematic ethics an ‘ethics of sense’ and an ‘aesthetic of alterity’, the 
former the result of an encounter between Denis and Nancean ethics and the 
latter between Denis and Levinas (these are dealt with in Chapters 2 and 3, 
respectively). Both an ethics of sense and an aesthetic of alterity are intimately 
connected to spectatorship as a bodily encounter that challenges dominant 
Western conceptions of subjectivity. I elaborate on the affective and visceral 
valences of this encounter in Chapter 4.
It is significant that the two books in English focusing exclusively on Denis 
(by Martine Beugnet and Judith Mayne, both titled Claire Denis) identify her 
filmmaking as ‘ethical’, yet never unpack the term ‘ethics’ itself to explore the 
sense in which this complex category is deployed.3 Referring to Denis’s resist-
ance to discussing her films in terms of political motivations, Mayne writes, 
‘This suggests that she is less interested in making films with a particular polit-
ical perspective than in making films that explore the very possibility of a range 
of (cinematic) perspectives . . . A scene that Denis decided not to shoot in 
Beau travail suggests that perhaps it is more appropriate to think of the politi-
cal dimensions of her work in terms of ethics.’4 Mayne is referring to a scene 
where a local woman would have been depicted in a way that could have con-
sequences for her safety once filming was over.5 Here it is implied that ethics is 
located at the level of the director’s relationship to the practice of filmmaking 
and the content of her work. Near the end of Beugnet’s monograph she writes 
of Denis that ‘her work reveals a strong sense of ethics’.6 What ethics means in 
the context of her films and whether it refers to the relationship between spec-
tator and film, between director and characters or subject matter, or is situated 
at the level of form or narrative content, is never put under close scrutiny or 
generalised to a theme in Beugnet’s book. Yet her classification of Denis’s 
work through the themes of transgression, exile and difference suggests a fruit-
ful direction for thinking about the ethical dimension. So does her comment 
that ‘Each time, the primacy of the suggested over the stated allows for the 
characters not to be trapped into categories and stereotypes, even if this means 
abandoning certitudes and conclusions’.7 Moving away from the certainties 
of identity and focusing on difference is entailed in the ethics I elaborate. 
Unlike the books by Beugnet and Mayne, however, this monograph is not an 
overview of Denis as an auteur. I select specific films in her oeuvre to examine 
various facets of the ethics I see at work in her unique visual and narrative 
style.
Putting philosophy in contact with cinema gives flesh – both metaphorically 
and also literally, in the sense of centring the material body – to the concept 
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of ethics. This is not an ethics that is conveyed didactically or in a straight-
forward narrative manner, since Denis’s films persistently avoid a moralis-
ing tone. There is no ‘moral of the story’ in a Denis film. For example, as I 
discuss in Chapter 3, in the film I Can’t Sleep (1994), which deals elliptically 
with the story of a serial killer, we are not brought to an easy conclusion about 
who is a bad person or a good person within the narrative, nor how we ought 
to view life or the world as represented in the diegesis. Instead, we are made 
aware of complexity, ambiguity and disjunctive connection. We are given a 
window into a world coloured in shades of grey and left to sit with otherness, 
as opposed to feeling able to clearly distance ourselves from the characters and 
images on screen via moral judgements.
Ethics is a slippery term, in that it is used so commonly in everyday speech 
that we all have some sense that we know what the word means. Like many 
terms used in philosophical or theoretical discourse, the term ‘ethics’ as I 
employ it must be first emptied of its conventional semantic associations and 
then re-semanticised through the concepts expounded in this book. Unlike 
deontological, consequentialist or virtue-based systems, what I elaborate in 
this project is a less normative understanding of ethics.8 By less normative 
I mean that it does not enumerate fixed principles for action (i.e. ‘Do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you’) and that it is based in a non-
foundational, non-autonomous subject. It requires a practice of sensitivity, 
unlearning and encountering that guides our ways of being with others, in 
modes that work against systems of dominance, stereotyping and violence. It 
is also an ethics that is material and embodied – felt in the encounters between 
bodies, privileging a level of experience prior to the cognitive or apprehensive. 
As I will show, Denis’s work stages these types of open and visceral encounters 
between film and spectator.
The ethics are feminist in their commitment to seeking a more inclusive and 
relational conception of existence and their basis in a non-identitarian body. 
As Victoria Hesford argues in her archaeology of the ‘second wave’ of femi-
nism, the radicality of the women’s liberation movement was precisely due to 
the ways in which it challenged normative identity categories.9 This includes 
a dedication to practices of unlearning expectations and questioning received 
knowledge about the world and those who populate it in order to open us up 
to new and unforeseen futures that are more equitable for all. In her writing on 
Levinas and postcoloniality Sarah Ahmed links an ethical mode of encounter 
to the possibility of future transnational feminist collective building. She asks 
us to consider ‘how feminism involves strange encounters – ways of encoun-
tering what is already encountered – in order to engender ways of being and 
acting in the world that open the possibility of the distant in the near, the 
unassimilable in the already assimilated, and the surprising in the ordinary’.10 
Denis’s films sensitise us to the limits of identity, offering us a series of strange 
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encounters. Key to this is an ethical disposition towards the world, a sensibility 
that resonates both on screen and off.
The bigger claim that is implied here is that we desperately need new forms 
of attachment, new dispositions and new ways of seeing to meet the challenges 
of our contemporary moment. For this reason an account of ethics that chal-
lenges the meaningfulness of any claims to identity and sensitises us to what 
remains other in each of us may cultivate a heightened awareness of the facil-
ity with which the past repeats itself, or, put differently, of our own capacity 
to commit a myriad of micro-oppressions on a daily basis. The respect for an 
unmasterable alterity, combined with a commitment to the difficulty of reveal-
ing sense outside of fixed semantic signification, is key to Denis’s cinematic 
ethics.
Alongside Denis, Nancy and Levinas offer a way to conceptualise an ethics 
that is less normative and works against violence, dominance and totalitarian-
ism. In a Levinasian framework, the other is absolutely so, meaning that I 
cannot understand the other or relate her back to myself in any way that would 
result in systems of labelling or prejudice. Furthermore, my encounter with 
the other is formative of any selfhood and happens in an ethical realm that is 
prior to the ontological. What this means in practical terms is that I cannot 
represent the other or my encounter with her in a way that will ever capture 
or do justice to her. The necessarily failing attempt at representation, along 
with a deeply unknowable other, is central to Denis’s complex, oblique and 
non-psychologised screen worlds. Nancy also prioritises a sense that both 
precedes and exceeds signification. The attempt to remain faithful to an origin 
that is always plural and that resists an integrated subject, people or world and 
instead insists on the differential and the fleeting is present in both Nancy’s 
and Denis’s work. For all three there is a movement of the other’s singularity 
that always eludes our grasp and it is through becoming aware of and attentive 
to this that I argue Denis’s work can teach us about this off-centred ethics. 
Although Levinas and Nancy may seem odd bedfellows, I am interested in 
the generativity and new possibilities that are opened by staging encounters 
between the three idea-makers in this project – the two philosophers and 
Denis herself. The thematic of ‘intrusion’ given in the chapter’s title can apply 
to the ways in which the ideas of each interlocutor intrude upon or interrupt 
one another, preventing this account from providing a totalising or closed 
description of what ethics might mean or do in cinematic practice. In this way, 
my methodology mirrors the very practice of the ethical that I articulate in this 
work. I am staging an encounter, then, not only between two quite different 
philosophers and a filmmaker, but also more broadly between philosophy and 
cinema.
Intrusion is a major trope in Denis’s body of work. One can find it in her 
films from the colonial presence in Cameroon in her debut film Chocolat 
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(1988), to her acclaimed Beau travail (1999) in which the disruptive intru-
sion of a young legionnaire called Sentain proves unacceptable to his superior 
Galoup’s existence; from Katja’s arrival in Paris from Lithuania at the begin-
ning of I Can’t Sleep to the unwanted child inside Nénette’s body in Nénette 
and Boni (1996). The multiple others who come and go in Denis’s films offer 
encounters with alterity that centre on the body and sensation, and that refuse 
any easy knowledge of psychological motivation or character interiority. Her 
films display a persistent interest in difference and in bodies and the connec-
tions amongst them. Likewise, Nancy has stressed in his own writing that 
the body is always other to itself and that our birth into the world is always 
preceded and exceeded by any timeline of our existence. We are profoundly 
with others; we are singular plural at each moment and each time differently. 
Intrusion, then, is a human condition. For Levinas it is by virtue of the ethical 
relation – our responsibility to and for the other – that we come into being 
as a subject. The other constitutes us and Levinas constantly emphasises the 
bodily ways that this responsibility is felt – even to the point that being preg-
nant with the other becomes a major metaphor of the ethical condition. Denis 
introduces intrusion narratively and thematically, as suggested in the examples 
above, but also through strategies of parallel editing, through her exploration 
of bodily boundaries in films such as I Can’t Sleep and The Intruder (2004), 
through her use of marginal and interruptive scenes that refuse to close or fix 
the meaning of the film, through her inclusion of sensuous dream sequences 
and through her eschewal of dialogue in favour of music, sound, touch, smell 
and taste, which intrude upon the viewer’s own body and allow the body to 
intrude upon the cognisable meaning of the film in favour of an unthematis-
able encounter.
Although there are other filmmakers in whose work can be found strains of 
what I define as the ethical, I contend that Denis is a primary exemplar of it, 
and her work shapes my understanding of a feminist cinematic ethics.11 The 
unique visual language and elliptical narrative structure that she develops 
challenge a notion of film as a medium of narrative comprehension and closure 
and open us up to encounters with difference that refuse full thematisation. 
In her work, ethics becomes that which reveals our interconnectedness in a 
visceral way and works against any notion of a self-sufficient and immunised 
subject. Denis’s concern with intruders, with the body and with the connec-
tions between us suggests a feminist and ethical filmmaking that provides a 
counter to dominant Hollywood film language.
Within this framework, I do not mean to designate Denis as an ethical 
filmmaker over and against other ‘unethical’ filmmakers, such that the latter 
would be a negative value judgement. Ethical is meant in a descriptive sense, 
although it can be taken prescriptively in that there is definite value to films 
that operate in a counter-Hollywood manner akin to Denis’s.12 This however 
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is not to say that all films ought to (normatively) espouse the strategies I 
discuss. Additionally, films can be morally driven rather than concerned with 
the ethical as I define it. A moralising filmmaker, in contradistinction to an 
ethical one, would focus narratively (and formally their work would support 
these narrative conclusions) to establish a maxim or moral principle(s) within 
the film. For example, a character has a profound realisation about how her 
life choices have been wrong, or we are made to see the evils of an issue, such 
as child labour.13 There is undoubtedly a time and a place for these movies, 
but they are not what I am concerned with here. Instead, I look at an ethical 
attitude or disposition that film can help cultivate or develop in us. This is not 
the result of didactic storytelling but has to do with the film’s formal strategies 
and how it approaches its subject or the kinds of encounters it fosters between 
viewer and film. It is possible that the kind of ethics I am proposing here could 
result in a way of acting in the world that is perhaps more just or sustainable 
and less selfish – that is, it could lead to more normative claims – but my work 
is not focused on developing normative principles. What I am concerned 
with is an ethical awareness that stems from a particular understanding of our 
own subjectivity and inter-relationality and that challenges an autonomous 
intentional knowing subject who enacts, for example, moral imperatives. The 
subject, in my account, starts at a place that is much more in question, and 
more passive, as opposed to willing or intentional, before she moves into the 
capacity to act from the spaces of ethical awareness. I am inspired by Levinas’s 
commitment to thinking difference in such a way that the sense of the ethical 
relation sets a foundation for action such that it would be almost impossible 
to oppress the other if we were acting from that sensibility.14 If we challenge a 
sense of ourselves as immune from and able to recognise the other, if we learn 
to privilege other ways of knowing than seeing as knowledge, we act from a 
place that is much less likely to dismiss or dehumanise the other based on onto-
logical categories of difference (such as sexuality or ethnicity, for example).
My emphasis on otherness resonates with an explicitly feminist attention to 
difference and the ways in which systems of knowledge and categorisation con-
tribute to the marginalisation and oppression of peoples.15 Denis’s films share 
feminism’s investment in keeping foundational categories such as ‘the human’ 
fluid and open.16 Part of their radicality is that they depict bodies in such a way 
that our stereotypes or labels no longer hold and we are asked to be vulnerable 
to these images. Consequently, we must explore the bodies on screen without 
the interpretative ‘safety net’ that categories such as race and gender provide. 
In contrast with the dominant Hollywood mode of telling stories, which I 
elaborate on below, Denis’s films explore difference without trying to master it 
or make it a known quantity. For example, in Chapter 4 I discuss her filming 
of love scenes. Instead of a more conventional style of filming, the body is shot 
in fragments, emphasising textures and senses, tactility and exploration. The 
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viewer cannot find her bearings in images that become increasingly difficult 
to discern, which emphasise the sharing of flesh over gendered sexual norms 
or fetishised shots of breasts, muscles or thighs. The montages of bodily frag-
ments in films such as Trouble Every Day (2001) and Friday Night (2002) privi-
lege an exploration of otherness that refuses a position of visual supremacy. 
This staging of bodies has feminist overtones in its refusal to objectify, its 
offering of new and badly needed images of sexual intimacy that do not reduce 
women and men to conventional sexual scripts, and its critique of ‘able-ist’ 
notions of the body as a space of unity and autonomy from others and from 
technology. Denis’s insistence on opacity as opposed to psychological disclo-
sure further adds to the sense of curiosity and blind probing that we participate 
in with her love scenes.17 The exploration of difference also occurs through 
Denis’s interest in characters who are not white (in contrast to the vast major-
ity of European and North American cinema), in teenagers with little hope for 
the future, in criminals, in underdogs and in those whose desires render them 
deviant, all of which resonates with feminism’s interest in opening up the cat-
egory of the human to make it more inclusive to those who are subject to the 
violence of marginality, invisibility, or stereotypical and stock representations.
Given Denis’s ongoing engagement, however elliptical, with France’s colo-
nial history, it would be remiss not to think intrusion also in relation to the vio-
lence and instability of borders in a postcolonial and global capitalist context.18 
Denis’s preoccupation with borders and the refusal of clearly demarcated 
identities is a product of her interest in the legacy of colonialism as it shapes 
her characters. This concern has autobiographical dimensions: Denis spent 
the greater part of her childhood in various African countries, as the daughter 
of colonial administrators who themselves were highly ambivalent about their 
role in Africa. Not belonging in Africa but neither feeling at home in France, 
Denis’s interest in displacement and intrusion is resolutely influenced by her 
materially and historically located experiences of colonialism.19 Postcolonial 
theory shares common ground with feminism in its interest in thinking about 
otherness and representation. However, historically postcolonial theory has 
been limited in addressing issues related to gender and sexuality, even at times 
committing to notions of nation and culture that occlude feminist or queer 
positions.20 In her work, Denis troubles the borders of gender, age, language 
and nation in the aftermath of colonialism.
Nénette and Boni, discussed in Chapter 2, centres on racially ambiguous 
characters living in Marseille, an ethnically mixed and classed city, and subtly 
points to the geopolitical past of France as well as to contemporary immigration -
-based (often xenophobic) discourses. The subplot of stolen phone cards and 
clandestine international communication further emphasises the network of 
interruptions and transnational border crossings that produce our world. I 
Can’t Sleep, the focus of the third chapter, introduces diasporic brothers who 
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relate to their homeland in different ways. Théo creates an imaginary utopia 
out of Martinique, to which he longs to return. Camille rejects this fantasy, but 
his marginalisation and isolation, racially and also sexually, cannot be viewed 
in exclusion from the violence he commits. Existing alongside these brothers is 
the well-networked Lithuanian community in Paris that we encounter through 
Daïga, extending the film’s concern with borders to contemporary patterns of 
immigration that may be unlinked from colonial histories. Finally, in Trouble 
Every Day, the focus of the final chapter, Paris is haunted and victimised 
by her own history of economic and epistemological colonisation. A disease, 
originating in the former colonies, undoes the European fantasy of immunity 
and autonomy. Western science and religion are impotent in the face of what 
cannot be assimilated within available discursive frameworks. Whereas Nancy 
and Levinas do not adequately address that theorising the subject as open, 
porous and vulnerable speaks to a Western construction of the subject, Denis 
makes this dimension visible and gives it weight. She brings a historical, mate-
rial specificity to the ideas she communicates through her films and this makes 
her better able to address contemporary ethical and political issues than Levinas 
or Nancy. As I argue, the ideas she shares through her time-images reveal the 
power of film to speak back to and with philosophy, giving a greater role to the 
medium than a mere example of certain philosophical concepts.
Denis’s films undermine a hegemony – cinematic and otherwise – that 
privileges white European bodies and subjects, without attempting to speak 
for or from the position of the ‘other’. In her film Reassemblage (1982), femi-
nist filmmaker and theorist Trinh T. Minh-ha repeats the phrase ‘Don’t speak 
about. Speak nearby’. Trinh is critiquing the ethnographic film and its collu-
sion with a patriarchal and racist history of attempting to know, categorise and 
master (to ‘speak about’) the other. Denis tends to ‘speak nearby’ her subjects, 
in fact hardly speaking at all – preferring image and sound to propositional 
language – yet she does so while offering a model of cinema that is more 
accessible than something like Trinh’s work, which is more avant-garde in 
its strategies of alienation. The visual pleasure of Denis’s films brings them 
to a larger audience and engages the spectator’s body, rather than distancing 
it from the image. Though her films are visually stunning and often pleasur-
able objects (contra Laura Mulvey’s now infamous statement that feminist 
filmmaking should destroy pleasure), they nonetheless encourage a mode of 
seeing that is sympathetic to feminist aims.21 In this way Denis carries on an 
important tradition of critiquing dominant representational systems, while 
maintaining a broader appeal through her desire-fuelled images. Her work, 
then, gestures towards an ethical feminist filmmaking practice that is both 
sensual and challenging.
Many commentators have noted the sensuality and tactility of Denis’s 
films.22 A turn to the body, emotion and affective sensation has been a femi-
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nist strategy for correcting a Cartesian tendency to denigrate the (feminised) 
corporeal in favour of the (masculinised) mind, both to revalorise the body 
as a source of knowledge and meaning and also to undermine a mind/body 
dualism. Affect and haptics (or a focus on tactility and touch) have been 
influential in recent feminist film theorising.23 I connect the affective and 
haptic element of Denis’s films to thinking about ethics, as one valence of the 
meaning of ethics as it unfolds in this project. The body is a necessary concern 
of ethical theory and is central to the films under consideration. From Béatrice 
Dalle’s erotic mutilation of her would-be seducers in Trouble Every Day, to 
the unwanted child living in Nénette’s adolescent body in Nénette and Boni, to 
the foreign heart that Louis Trebor needs to survive in The Intruder, Denis’s 
output has both represented bodily intrusions on screen and has potentially, 
through an emphasis on extravisual sensation, intruded haptically and affec-
tively into the bodies of its spectators.
Cinema has the power to take the account of the body and the bodily inti-
mation of the ethical that can be found in both Levinas and Nancy and give 
it colour and flesh. In this respect, it illustrates in material terms the reality 
of bodies as they are situated according to race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality 
and age, even while it undermines these categories’ explanatory power. These 
categories are easily flattened in the abstract language of philosophy but are 
really felt in the encounter with the image. This is further reinforced by film’s 
synaesthetic nature – it communicates so much to the viewer that is extravis-
ual and the use of music adds a bodily and non-cognisable affective layer of 
‘sense’.24 Denis furthers Levinas’s and Nancy’s discussions of the body by 
staging an encounter with difference through which we can feel the reality of 
our bodily openness and vulnerability and that makes the tension between 
identity categories and their denotative insufficiency more evident.
A feminist approach need not explicitly be concerned with gender. In its 
sometimes uneasy overlap with queer theory, feminist theory has always nego-
tiated the difficult necessity of claiming shared experiences of oppression and 
understanding that the same practices of oppression are in many ways rein-
forced by the very identity categories that must be claimed in resisting them. 
Put differently, feminism has always been invested in the deconstruction of 
categories and in challenges to oppressively normalising systems of represen-
tation, while realising the political need for claiming these categories (what 
theorists such as Gayatri Spivak have called ‘strategic essentialism’).25 While 
approaches that analyse how representations of women operate in culture 
are undoubtedly useful, at the level of theory and visual culture it is equally 
important to further deconstruct these identity categories whether or not we 
need them in a political and pragmatic sense. The tension between identity 
and its deconstruction and the creativity this tension engenders is part of what 
makes feminist theory so groundbreaking and generative. While reiterating 
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identity categories can be a feminist approach, in Denis’s films they are made 
strange. Thus her work both visually registers ‘difference’ or the classifications 
of gender and race that we use to understand the world, while also empty-
ing them of their assumed or expected content. This process of unworking 
categories is another kind of feminist practice. Although this book does not 
constantly invoke gender or ‘women’, it reflects a feminist commitment to new 
ways of thinking about bodies and the images that populate our daily lives in 
a way that is less limiting for all. This would be a world where we are resensi-
tised to the surprise that the other should be for us, where we operate less on 
identity-based assumptions and search for the unknown in others. It would be 
a future where we ask new questions that get closer to the heart of our shared 
existence.
Just as Denis’s own work challenges identity-based ways of understanding 
character and plot, I resist positioning her cinema exclusively under the rubric 
of women’s films. She herself refuses any tidy categorisation as a ‘woman 
director’, or any approach that would read her work always in relation to other 
female directors.26 In interviews where gender is explicitly discussed, Denis 
problematises the reduction of women’s creative work to a unique and essen-
tial female perspective, maintaining the broader artistic integrity of her and 
her fellow female cineastes’ output. In this way her position with respect to her 
craft parallels that which she cultivates in her films, whose characters refuse to 
be limited by our expectations, even as they may be constrained by the larger 
social structures/cultural contexts in which they act. This, however, does not 
preclude us from treating Denis as a feminist filmmaker, as feminist projects 
are not defined by a creator’s self-identifications but rather in the meanings 
the work produces or the kinds of encounters it facilitates. Judith Mayne reads 
Denis as a feminist auteur. However, she notes the ways in which the French 
tradition of auteurism has enabled French women to be directors to a unique 
degree, with its ‘vision of the cinema as personal, intimate, and more open to 
the concrete experience of everyday life’.27 This may contribute to Denis’s 
reluctance to explicitly identify as a ‘woman director’.28
One of the effects of not overtly thematising gender is to gesture towards 
a future where gender will no longer be a category for controlling bodies and 
their possibilities. This is not to say that gender has not also been a productive 
category for feminism, but rather that other futurities are opened up when 
we attempt to think with alternative frameworks. As Wendy Brown cautions, 
we must be aware of the ways in which the very categories we use to claim 
inclusion commit us to certain paradigms – in the case of identity politics 
those paradigms include particular constructions of the sovereign subject and 
notions of equality that occlude singularity.29 In her sophisticated treatment 
of the historical and material particularities of the encounter combined with 
the more general ungraspability of the encountered, Denis’s work gestures 
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towards the ways in which the categories that we rely on in the present shape 
the futures possible to us. Bodies still act in excess of the categories of race, 
gender, ability and age in which we place them, despite the continued pre-
scriptive and material power of these categories at our historical moment. The 
performative non-identitarian body is one place where feminism and queer 
theory share concerns with one another. The gaze in Denis’s films cannot be 
read through dominant identificatory models. As Geetha Ramanathan argues 
with respect to Chocolat, ‘The unsettling of the male colonial gaze is no longer 
the issue in Denis’s work, the politics of post-coloniality being accepted. Denis 
seeks to map out an aesthetic that would not depend entirely on looking power 
for specifying its politics.’30 Mayne concurs, stating, ‘Women don’t have to be 
central characters to have an impact on the stories that Denis tells. Watching 
those characters, they quietly mark the charged boundaries of politics and 
gender, and subtly undermine the paradigm of the man who looks and the 
woman who is looked at.’31
While the two philosophers I discuss in this project, Nancy and Levinas, 
do not overtly engage with feminism in any meaningful way, Levinas makes 
sexual difference central to his early theorising on responsibility and Nancy 
offers accounts of embodiment that are often surprisingly ‘queer’ in their 
implications. Part of my project involves mining these thinkers for the ele-
ments of their thought that are useful for a feminist cinematic ethics. I am 
preceded or guided in this respect by Denis but also by several philosophers. 
Diane Perpich is central to my account of alterity aesthetics as I elaborate in 
Chapter 3. Her reading of Levinas in terms of a politics of alterity, rather than 
recognition or identity, makes Levinas available to my analysis. Perpich has 
also been useful in providing one of the few feminist interpretations of Nancy 
– her insights have influenced my reading of the Nancean body in terms that 
are queer and disability-positive (see my elaboration of this in Chapter 4).32 
Anne O’Byrne’s reading of Nancy through the role of birth in his philosophy 
is also crucial to my analysis of Nénette and Boni in terms of an ethics of sense 
in Chapter 2.33 I elaborate on and contribute to these interventions by relating 
them specifically to film and exploring how Denis challenges and builds on 
the potential in Levinas and Nancy. I explicitly articulate the ethics of their 
projects in terms of feminist concerns, as I argue that the aspects of their work 
that are useful to thinking a feminist cinematic ethics are brought into relief 
when they are put in conversation with Denis’s cinema.
an interruptive  ethics
Interruption is a thematic thread throughout this project, sharing a conceptual 
proximity with my interest in intrusion. I take the notion of interruption from 
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Nancy’s writing on myth, where myth stands for the kinds of totalising or 
complete accounts of the world that I align with more traditional filmic nar-
rative and visual language. For Nancy, interruption is associated with litera-
ture, which I extend here to the kinds of practices Denis’s filmmaking enacts. 
Interruption is the intrusion of the singular and fleeting in that which pretends 
to universality and permanence. It prevents meaning from being fixed and 
insists on that which is always in excess of any attempt to create an unchang-
ing, all-encompassing narrative about existence, the world, or humanity. In 
my extension of Nancy’s concepts of myth and literature to different ways of 
doing film, I maintain both the necessity and the impossibility of representa-
tion. This tension between the desire to witness the other, to glimpse other 
perspectives, or to draw attention to injustice, and the limitations that are 
imposed on the world and the other in the name of telling a story are present 
throughout the ethics and films discussed in this work.
Typically when we think of ethics we think of a system that will tell us 
how to act. In this vein, a good ethical framework addresses questions that 
range from our daily behaviour to more extreme (and usually unlikely) ethical 
quandaries (for example, a bridge is collapsing and one must make a choice 
amongst lives to save). Whether ethics takes the form of utilitarianism, a set of 
principles (be it a deontological or consequentialist model), the cultivation of 
virtue, or addresses questions of the good life, it tends to take the subject as a 
given. The subject is not herself called into question, but is presumed in giving 
an account of the proper conduct of the subject.
Both Levinas and Nancy radically shift the terms of the discussion. Far 
from a system of clear values, norms or principles, ethics becomes something 
much more difficult to grasp. It shifts down to the very constitution of the 
subject herself. Ethics is interruptive. For Nancy, the myth of the subject 
is a dominant Western story that is interrupted by the ongoing singularity of 
each one, each time. I argue that ethics read through three creators – Levinas, 
Nancy and Denis – comes to centre on a bodily encounter with otherness, 
which reveals our originary relationality – in other words, our sense of self-
sufficiency and discreteness is interrupted in every way by our relatedness 
to others and to the world.34 In this vein, both Nancy and Levinas radically 
think through Heidegger’s claim that being (Dasein) is originarily being-with 
(Mitsein). For Nancy, construing the origin and our being as always plural 
has meant a deconstructing of the autonomous subject, rendering existence as 
porous, infected with alterity, and, importantly, always shared.
Levinas argued for ethics as first philosophy, meaning that the ethical rela-
tion comes before the ontological. Put differently, for Levinas my relation to 
the other is what inaugurates me as a subject. The other is absolutely other. 
As prior to and conditioning of my existence, she cannot be represented or 
rendered known in her difference. This concept of the radical alterity of the 
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other has been useful to many feminist philosophers, specifically for think-
ing through sexual difference, but also about otherness in general.35 I use 
Levinas’s thinking of difference to develop what I call a feminist aesthetic 
of alterity, which is one branch of a feminist cinematic ethics, elaborated in 
Chapter 3. From a Levinasian standpoint, ethics interrupts being from within 
Being itself. The trace of the other intrudes within our daily life and this trace 
refers to a pre-ontological ethical relation. It is sensed in the body – a meaning 
that cannot be put into the language of experience but which forces us to 
recognise the impossibility of not being concerned with the other. Levinas’s 
concept of the saying over the said bears structural and conceptual similarity 
to the myth/literature distinction found in Nancy. I elaborate on this concept, 
which I find particularly useful for thinking about film and ethics, in Chapter 
3. The saying, as that which unworks the fixity of representation by expos-
ing an ungraspable alterity, is the ethical. It is the singularity of the other that 
interrupts my plenitude and autonomy or my attempt to control or know the 
world. In film, as I conjecture, it is the movement of the unknowable other that 
denies, or interrupts, the film’s plenitude.
For Levinas, our relational constitution is dyadic – I exist in the accusa-
tive, through being called to ethical responsibility for the other. For Nancy, 
the origin is plural: I am constituted in a world of difference that precedes and 
exceeds my coming into being. In both cases, this generation in difference 
means that the subject never achieves a stable location – others constantly 
interrupt her claims to identity.
Levinas and Nancy reveal ethics as a refusal of totalities. In declining to 
formulate principles, or produce a systematic framework, they respond to their 
historical moment – what we need is an ethics that doesn’t establish borders, 
nations or subjects in need of defending. What they imagine is an ethics that 
refuses a clearly fixed referent, so that we approach the other with wonder 
and receptivity rather than a standardised action plan. As Jane Bennett argues 
in her own writing on wonder and ethics, wonder at the everyday world may 
inspire the kind of affective attachments that are necessary to ethical disposi-
tions and sensibilities.36 Counter to narratives of postmodern disillusionment, 
Bennett sees in wonder a fleeting and affective ‘foundation’ to a concern for 
and investment in the world. As I argue, Denis’s films stage wondrous and 
sensual encounters that tune us in to different modes of perceiving and being-
with. Nancy’s and Levinas’s philosophies also privilege an ambiguity that asks 
us to sit with it and to relinquish the need for knowledge as cognition and 
mastery. This in itself begins to enact a practice of ethics, as it is reimagined 
in their writing.
In my reading of Levinas and Nancy, the bodily also becomes central to 
how we understand ethical subjectivity. While several authors have written 
on the use of bodily metaphors or concepts such as the caress in Levinas, 
14  towards a  feminist  c inematic  ethics
less attention has been paid to the viscerality of the ethical subjectivity he 
describes. By viscerality I refer to the bodily immediacy of Levinas’s account 
of ethics – the shuddering and the trembling as affectively undergone, as 
opposed to the body as a source of metaphors or conceptual language.37 This 
visceral dimension comes to prominence particularly in his last major work on 
ethics, Otherwise than Being, and it provides an important point of connection 
amongst Levinas, feminist concerns about embodiment and subjectivity, and 
theories of spectatorship. In Levinas, the bodily intimation of responsibility 
is an inversion of the seeing, active intentionality of the phenomenological 
subject. The body is affectively charged with responsibility. In this definition, 
the subject is passive in its affection by difference. In fact this affection is what 
gives rise to the subject. The body bears traces of the encounter with the other 
and our responsibility for the other is a physical burden felt from the inside 
out. Our bodily affections belie any notion of ourselves as immune from others 
or as able to not concern ourselves with them.
Nancy has also given touch and the body a central role in his thought.38 
He works against a notion of the body as a space of propriety and collapses 
the clear distinction between body and mind, organic and technological, and 
privileges fragmentation and becoming over progressive development. His 
writing on embodiment resonates with queer and critical disability studies 
perspectives, as I elaborate in Chapter 4. Although Nancy is not thought of 
primarily as a philosopher of ethics, this facet of his thought emerges alongside 
the major themes in his work – his emphasis on a co-existential understanding 
of being, his interest in community, and his deconstruction of Christianity.39 
While few feminists have taken up Nancy in a sustained way, his work offers us 
a conception of the body that overcomes the mind/body dualism characteristic 
of Western metaphysics.40 His non-essentialist account of the body provides 
a contrast to both Deleuzian and phenomenological accounts of the body, as 
outlined in connection with theories of film spectatorship in the following 
section. Furthermore, as Diane Perpich points out, Nancy’s emphasis on 
bodily fragmentation provides us with ‘significant resources . . . directly ben-
eficial to critiques of prevailing gender norms and that permit us to reconsider 
the theoretical adequacy and critical and political power of discourses of bodily 
integrity’.41 In Nancy’s work, a lack of bodily integrity is a positive rather than 
negative thing, an ontological condition to celebrate. I connect the fragmenta-
tion of the body in Nancy to the fragmentation of narrative and image present 
in Denis’s films. Her films enact the practices of anti-identitarian pluralisation 
theorised in Nancy’s texts. This bodily valence of the ethical is part of what 
makes Levinas and Nancy so useful for approaching film as a sensuous and 
material medium – an encounter with difference between the body of the spec-
tator and the film itself.
While Levinas never addresses film as a sustained theme, Nancy engages 
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with it at length, particularly the work of Denis and Iranian director Abbas 
Kiarostami. In his monograph on Kiarostami, he emphasises film’s ability to 
show the real in its unrepresentability. He writes,
. . . evidence becomes that of passage rather than some epiphany of 
meaning or presence. Cinema is truly the art – in any case the technique 
– of a world that suspends myths. Even if it has put itself in the service 
of myths, at the limit, it finishes by taking them away; it carries off all 
epiphanies of meaning and of immobile presence into the evidence of 
movement. A world that links by going from one film to the next, and 
that learns thus, very slowly, another way of producing meaning.42
Here we see the privileged role that film plays in the interruption of myth and 
also the ways in which film’s foregrounding of movement and duration aids 
in its ability to represent the failure of representation, or to unwork its own 
pretensions to meaning. I elaborate on these facets of film, but do so through 
Nancy’s extra-filmic writing. I choose not to engage at length with his writing 
on film, in part because this writing has been dealt with elsewhere, and in part 
because it is his writing on other themes that speaks productively ‘nearby’, 
rather than about, Denis’s films.
Nancy and Denis have an ongoing relationship, collaborating and comment-
ing on each other’s work in print and in film.43 This has resulted in a subsection 
of Denis scholarship that discusses her work in relation to Nancy’s philoso-
phy.44 Most of these discussions focus on shared concepts found in Nancy and 
in particular films of Denis, often centring on notions of the body and touch. I 
contribute to these ongoing discussions by turning to Nancy’s under-examined 
writing on ethics and developing through Denis’s films what I term a cinematic 
ethics of sense, the other branch of a feminist cinematic ethics.
Levinas himself has almost nothing to say about cinema, and never takes 
it up in his work as a sustained theme. Furthermore, I am not aware of any 
known connection between Levinas and Denis. A small body of Levinasian 
film scholarship has developed over the last decade, almost none of which 
deals with Claire Denis and which lacks any in-depth account of the body and 
affect in Levinas as it relates to ethics and cinema. Levinas’s critique of the 
phenomenological tradition’s emphasis on vision as knowing provides a useful 
tension with phenomenologically based accounts of (embodied) film spectator-
ship, which tend to reinscribe more traditional notions of subjectivity.45 Yet, 
by pulling out the affective traces present in his account, I argue that we can 
come to a non-phenomenological while still bodily account of film. Levinas’s 
embodied ethics sheds light on how Denis’s cinema of mysterious others, 
whose bodies we can feel but whose minds we cannot know, resonates on a 
level that is read as ethical.46
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The most notable work on Levinas and cinema includes Sarah Cooper’s 
book Selfless Cinema? Ethics and French Documentary (2006), Joseph Mai’s 
book on the Dardenne brothers (2010), Sam Girgus’s Levinas and the Cinema 
of Redemption: Time, Alterity, and the Feminine (2010) and Clint Eastwood’s 
America (2013), and a 2007 issue of the journal Film-Philosophy, which 
applies Levinas’s thought to a range of cinematic offerings from action films 
to Tarkovsky to Shoah.47 By way of situating myself in relation to this work, 
my focus is in part on the aforementioned bodily dimension of the Levinasian 
encounter. Rather than elaborating on how certain films suggest Levinasian 
concepts in their narratives, I examine the ways in which particular formal and 
narrative strategies engage the spectator in an ethical encounter with other-
ness. Additionally, I enumerate in detail the aspects of Levinas’s thought that 
are helpful for thinking through his relation to cinema, attempting a more sys-
tematic engagement with his philosophy – one that also addresses his critique 
of vision and the paradox of applying his work to film.
Levinas and Nancy produce valuable insights for feminism and for femi-
nist film studies in relation to each other. Both make the body central to the 
encounter, both emphasise the relation(s) that constitute us, and both resist 
the urge to answer questions, to provide easy definitions and to fix reality 
into tidy representations. Levinas’s emphasis on the singular other provides a 
needed counter to the plurality of others that tend to blur together in Nancy’s 
philosophy. Levinas reminds us of the danger of assuming that seeing is 
knowing and Nancy inserts joy and surprise into our limitlessly intercon-
nected  co-existence. Read together, they can teach us what it means to be 
intruders in a world where we ourselves are exposed to the gift of constant 
intrusion. Denis reveals this world of intrusion in a way that refuses spectato-
rial mastery and relies on affective connections. By bringing together Denis, 
Levinas and Nancy I work towards a theory and practice of non-colonialist, 
non-masculinist and ethical filmmaking. Film, when it shares these principles, 
engages us in an ethics of spectatorship that fine-tunes our ethical sensibility 
with repercussions beyond the cinema doors.
Anyone familiar with the writing of Levinas and Nancy will recognise 
that bringing them together involves negotiating their considerable differ-
ences. Foremost amongst these differences is their position on transcendence. 
Levinas gives the other a transcendent position, while Nancy is concerned to 
avoid precisely that. For the latter, there is no external grounding or founda-
tion to this existence: he uses the term ‘transimmanence’ to convey a notion 
of difference that can allow for space and movement within an immanent 
world. These choices reflect varied theological commitments; where Levinas’s 
thought remains tied to a Judaic tradition, Nancy has undertaken a decon-
struction of Christianity in his body of work. However, in what follows the 
focus is on how they can be read nearby each other in productive ways.
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Emphasising the similarities between Nancy and Levinas rather than their 
(significant) differences is a conscious methodological choice.48 Rather than 
their incompatibility, my focus is on what bringing them together enables or 
does, including how they both highlight the relative strengths and weaknesses in 
each other’s accounts. Denis’s films are included in this notion of the productiv-
ity of staging encounters around ideas that don’t always perfectly line up. These 
imperfect alliances are a strength in this account, as they reflect a commitment 
to a practice of openness and play, to creativity over truth, that is precisely what 
is central to the ethics elaborated here. Frameworks are there for us to use, 
and certain frameworks may do more justice to our contemporary moment, to 
urgent issues, or to our shared existence at any given moment. What matters 
is the kinds of questions they allow us to ask or how they enable us to better 
approach the field of problematisation out of which our projects arise.
Watching Denis with Nancy and Levinas opens up many new pathways of 
thought, most notably a way of thinking about the ethical in relation to spec-
tatorship, and film’s formal and narrative qualities. In addition, it highlights 
the bodily dimensions of the ethical as found in Levinas, making them avail-
able to feminist scholarship, and brings out the concepts in Nancy that share 
an unexplored affinity with queer and disability perspectives on the body. 
Reading them in conversation with Denis also connects the philosophers to a 
more radical notion of identity and embodiment than perhaps has been recog-
nised within feminist theorising – both offer new tools for thinking about the 
tensions between the categories of identity and difference as they operate in 
our daily lives.
f ilm,  embodiment and spectatorship
Historically, within debates about spectatorship, film theory has been centred 
on notions of subjectivity, representation and language. As Steven Shaviro 
writes in an early contribution to affective approaches to thinking about film,
It is odd that semiotic and psychoanalytic film theory – in striking con-
trast to Benjamin and Vertov – remains so preoccupied with the themes 
of ideology and representation, that it associates visual pleasure almost 
exclusively with the illusion of a stable and centered subject confront-
ing a spatially and temporally homogeneous world, and that it regards 
editing primarily as a technique for producing such an illusion, by 
‘suturing’ the spectator and perspectivising the gaze. A wide variety of 
cinematic pleasures are predicated explicitly upon the decentered free-
play, the freedom from the constraints of subjectivity, that editing and 
special effects make possible.49
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Psychoanalytic film theory has focused on how film relates to the psychic for-
mation of the subject, be it through negotiating unconscious fears and desires, 
and/or operating akin to the mirror stage in activating Imaginary relations.50 
In this framework, spectatorship tends to be reduced to a psychic phenom-
enon. These approaches typically focus on the individual subject, desire and 
identification and tend to have a less robust conception of the affective or 
bodily aspects of viewing. Because psychoanalytic models are committed to 
an understanding of the psyche that is based in sexual difference (even when 
a bisexual attitude is posited on the part of the viewer), they start from a spec-
tatorial position that is ultimately sexed and which adopts a psychic attitude 
toward the film. Furthermore they read the film in terms of significations both 
conscious and unconscious, that is, as a text whose deeper psychic meaning 
can be brought to light and understood. Semiotic models similarly tend to 
privilege significance or meaning and focus on representational and language-
based readings of films.51 Critiques of semiotic and psychoanalytic models 
have focused on their inability to account more fully for non-representational 
bodily pleasures, the anarchic and sensual de-subjectified experience that film 
can offer the viewer.52
Writings based on a phenomenological model, such as that put forth by 
Vivian Sobchack in The Address of the Eye, were important attempts to bring 
the body into our understanding of spectatorship. In Sobchack’s narrative, 
the film is not a series of flickering images interacting with a disembodied 
psyche, but rather, ‘Dependent upon existence and embodiment in the world 
for its articulation as an activity, the act of viewing as the commutation of 
perception and expression is both an intrasubjective and intersubjective per-
formance equally performable by filmmaker, film, and spectator.’53 The body 
in her writing is deeply imbricated in how we make meaning at the movies. 
Furthermore, the film itself is given intentionality as a viewing subject, where 
the relation between spectator and film ‘is a dialogical and dialectical engage-
ment of two viewing subjects who also exist as visible objects’.54 Somewhat 
problematically, we can see here that her explanation depends on a relatively 
coherent subject, where processes of recognition and communication between 
viewer and film are emphasised.
Phenomenological accounts after Sobchack have continued to fall short of 
truly challenging the hierarchy of mind over body in describing the viewing 
experience, still relying as they do on notions of intentional consciousness 
and subject/object splits. An additional limitation is that phenomenological 
models commit us to thinking about film in terms of structures of meaning. 
What I seek in the account I give here is based less on signification than on 
moving toward the affective and sensory. I also replace notions of recognition 
with those of alterity and uncontainable difference. That is, I am interested in 
what must remain unrecognisable and cannot be interpreted, ‘read’ or given a 
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clear meaning, although it may be deeply felt. Jennifer Barker’s phenomeno-
logical account in The Tactile Eye makes a valuable contribution to thinking 
about film and the body and the film as itself a body. Yet Barker describes 
the film/viewer relationship as intersubjective, where the film is structured 
according to a human model – it is constructed to be empathetic to our under-
standing, to give us music when we need music or a close-up when we need to 
see more. Like Sobchack, in Barker’s elaboration even the film is given inten-
tionality. She writes, ‘it is through the tactile experience of the film that we 
come to understand. Through the skin, we gain a clearer picture of ourselves 
in relation to others and to history, and we come to recognize that relation-
ship as one of mutual permeability.’55 The film, then, becomes an occasion 
for the phenomenological subject to move towards a greater understanding of 
her world. Although the spectator is here given a body that haptically engages 
with the image, the medium and viewer are seen as two separate entities, which 
realise their mutual ability to be affected by one another.
The problematic notion that the viewer has a stable, discrete subjec-
tivity is left intact by phenomenological models. I move towards a post- 
phenomenological and material account that offers more useful vocabularies 
for thinking about cinema and ethics. Understanding every image in relation 
to a larger whole becomes less of a goal. Rather, Denis’s films emphasise our 
inability to make meaning. I argue that Denis’s films show us the meaning that 
the world is, outside of linguistic or other sign systems that work to fix its ever 
shifting and dynamic existence.56 Meaning, then, is in the act of signifying 
itself as the opening of sense onto the work.57 Sense, as elaborated in Chapter 
2, is a key concept for my approach to film. Sense operates in excess of any 
referent of a given sign or representation – it is the material sharing out of 
singularity. Philosophically, we simply are meaning and do not have to find 
meaning in any referential or comprehensive system.58 Film can show this 
meaning, be this meaning, by offering encounters with the sense that the world 
is. In a Nancean framework, cinema is thought of less in terms of representa-
tion and rather as an exposure or an interruptive contact that alters without 
mastery. It is not that representation is irrelevant to films, but rather that rep-
resentation when thought of in terms of meaning and language always limits 
or misses something of what film is about. It so happens that this relational, 
extra-linguistic and felt dimension is what may matter most when we think 
about ethics. This is not to denigrate the intellectual engagement with a film 
in favour of a purely affective account, but rather to gesture to the reality that 
the affective pull of a film may disturb our attempts to cognitively master it. 
Moreover, the subversion of total meaning is important, because it makes the 
film available for a less hierarchical and scripted encounter.
Deleuzian models have offered one response to the limitations of phenom-
enological approaches. These approaches centre the body, sensation and the 
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proliferating pleasures, the non-human becomings and machinic assemblages 
that film makes possible.59 In his work, Shaviro gives a Deleuzian account of 
film perception:
The dematerialized images of film are the raw contents of sensation, 
without the forms, horizons, and contexts that usually orient them. And 
this is how film crosses the threshold of a new kind of perception, one 
that is below or above the human. This new perception is multiple and 
anarchic, nonintentional and asubjective; it is no longer subordinated 
to the requirements of representation and idealization, recognition and 
designation.60
What I argue through Nancy and Denis is that this model of perception need 
not be situated at a pre-personal level. In other words, we do not necessarily 
need to move beyond the human to shift our understanding of perception to 
that which is always mediated, is often non-intentional, asubjective and mul-
tiple. In this vein, in critiquing the subject that classical film theory constructs 
as its viewer, Shaviro assumes that subject and then dismisses it as ‘human’, 
and in need of displacement. Therefore, in his account, we need to move 
above or below the human level to cross to a new form of perception. In this 
way he leaves the subject of classical theory intact and moves elsewhere for 
an account of film perception. Rather than completely shifting away from the 
human, however, I argue that the human is not limited to the ‘subject’ that 
film addresses, nor does classical film exhaust the reality of human percep-
tion or definitively account for what is ‘natural’. The concept of the human is 
contingent, mutable and flexible. It can stretch to encompass changing notions 
of modes of perception, new ways of understanding the body, and challenges 
to false dichotomies such as natural/technical or human/animal. Neither 
above nor below the human, we need to think the human itself as not subor-
dinated to the requirements of representation. Furthermore, we do not have 
to escape the category of the human to get a perception that is always already 
becoming-other, technological, often non-intentional, and without guiding 
consciousness.61
Like Deleuzian models, I argue for a way of thinking about film using con-
cepts that focus not on cognition and referential meaning, but instead on forces 
and material encounters. In contrast to a Deleuzian approach, however, I think 
through these encounters in terms of subjects. But in my reading the subject 
is constituted inter-relationally or in alterity. This understanding works to 
dismantle oppressive formulations of the subject that have been historically 
dominant in Western thought. The subject is not thought of as autonomous, 
discrete or as having mastery over her environment. She is not easily able to 
separate self and other or to categorise others on the bases of various adjectives. 
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This de-subjectified subject makes it difficult to operate in ways that are domi-
nating or that reduce others to a known quantity. In contrast to Deleuzian anti-
humanism, I formulate here an ethics that uses humans, but humans refigured 
or thought otherwise. Operating from the standpoint of ethics and wanting to 
hold on to a notion of responsibility, the particular perspective I am moving 
towards here maintains a notion of a subject, however interrupted.
Paradoxically, models of ethics that try to completely move away from the 
subject often in fact become solipsistic – and the web of relations in which we 
are enmeshed and act recede from view. Here I refer specifically to Deleuzian 
formulations and their roots in Spinoza and Nietzsche. From Spinoza the 
emphasis on positive affects as a basis for forming adequate thoughts from 
which to act in the world, while inspiring, requires a great deal of elaboration 
to convincingly argue that it can address the ways in which our responsibilities 
and relatedness may often diminish our powers to act or undo us in necessarily 
painful ways. The Nietzschean emphasis on an active forgetting of the past 
and a willing singular affirmation in the present, while it absolves us of our 
guilty consciences in ways that can be affectively liberating, may let too many 
off the hook in terms of our ethical accountability and responsibility. I worry 
that it may absolve precisely those who have played the greatest role in past 
atrocities that have diminished and continue to diminish the power of particu-
lar peoples. A considerable amount of work must be done to make a convinc-
ing argument that Deleuze and Guattari’s ethics can encompass a notion of 
responsibility, although their focus on desiring productivity and lines of flight 
provides needed resources for thinking about resistance to the dogmas of late 
capitalism. Tamsin Lorraine attempts such a reworking through her argu-
ment that Deleuzian assemblages can be read as larger groups or communities, 
extending their framework beyond the individual-as-assemblage, to which it 
falls prey conceptually.62 Lorraine further reasons that by limiting others’ lines 
of flight, I limit my own, therefore my power to act is dependent on the ability 
of all to act. While these modifications help to broaden a Deleuzian ethics and 
give shape to a related world of beings, for the purposes of my project here, 
Nancy and Levinas offer a framework that I find more productive. Whatever 
the category of the human may mean, there is a way in which the life form 
that has been given that title is uniquely responsible to and for the world. By 
world, I mean to other beings, including animals, to their histories and to the 
environment. It is the case that ‘humans’ seems to be particularly adept at 
damaging the environment, animals and each other. This is the category of 
life, however historically contingent, that I mean to address as potential spec-
tators. Although a traditional notion of subjectivity is undone by both Levinas 
and Nancy, there is still a subject, just one that is dependent on, vulnerable 
to and constituted with others. There is also room for animals and plants 
and even rocks (particularly in Nancy). For these reasons, I find Levinas and 
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Nancy more compelling than Deleuzian approaches for thinking through the 
ethics of film.
Finally, in contrast to Deleuze-and-Guattarian models, which tend to 
move away from the language of difference and towards that of becoming, 
my account is still invested in formulating how to conceive of difference. 
The model developed in Chapter 3, drawing on Levinas, emphasises differ-
ence based on the unknowability of the other as opposed to a recognition or 
identity-based model.63 The feminist perspective offered here attempts to 
forge a complex middle ground between approaches that are entrenched in 
sexual difference as the key to understanding spectatorship and Deleuzian 
approaches which may miss sexed identity altogether in their emphasis on 
flows and molecular becomings. As Elena del Río writes in her book on Deleuze 
and the Cinemas of Performance, ‘A Deleuzian model of the body as an imper-
sonal flow of forces may arguably fall short of meeting the political needs of a 
feminist position that still finds it necessary to differentiate between the sexes, 
and to maintain a distinct notion of female subjectivity as individuated molar 
identity.’64 Rather than completely doing away with identity, I acknowledge 
the tension between real and materially productive categories and their inad-
equacy with respect to accounting for the world and our capabilities. Chapter 
2, for example, discusses Nénette and Boni’s depiction of teen pregnancy and 
the ways in which Denis challenges stereotypical images of motherhood to 
move us towards something else entirely; that is, a focus on an exposure to 
the other’s singularity, a sensory and dynamic encounter that cannot be fully 
understood or finalised. This is in contrast to a notion of representation that 
enables clear meaning and completion. Rather than turning to Deleuzian forces 
and syntheses at the pre-individual level, the focus is on how we encounter the 
other through cinema. As Adrián Pérez-Malgosa writes in his book on affect 
and intercultural cinema, he wants to ‘theorize film and cinematic reception 
as areas of cultural tension where the subject both emerges and is constantly 
questioned’.65 In a sense, the emergence and interrogation of the subject is a 
process that my project echoes – cinema participates in producing particular 
forms of subjectivity, and is also a site where it is continually brought into 
question and reconfigured. The ongoing solidification of the subject and its 
paradoxically tandem dissolution applies both to the spectator and to the char-
acters within Denis’s filmic worlds. The tension between identities and their 
limitations with respect to accounting for our interrelated and complex experi-
ences are key to the model put forth here.
In contrast to the film theoretical approaches discussed, my project moves 
towards a different vocabulary that is more useful for understanding Denis’s 
cinematic work in particular and the account of ethics I derive from it. I am 
teasing out the subtle distinctions between the approach offered here and 
phenomenological, psychoanalytic and Deleuzian frameworks because no one 
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model should always be adhered to or is inherently better than the others. Each 
has its utility and explanatory power. Psychoanalytic and other approaches 
have been and continue to be extremely valuable for analysing film, and each 
has added important feminist insights into how we understand cinema. From 
an understanding of how sexual difference operates in classical cinema to an 
account of embodied meaning, each framework captures one facet of the com-
plexity of film viewing. Particular approaches are certainly more or less relevant 
to specific films. Denis’s work itself demands a trans-theoretical model that 
combines theories relating to affect, feminism, postcoloniality and ethics. I have 
outlined the gaps or tensions that Levinas and Nancy help to address and aim 
to provide, with Denis, a model that puts forth a particular notion of the ethical. 
This ethical model is the most illuminating way to think with Denis’s oeuvre.
c inema and ethics
Film is a medium that has the potential to access large audiences and which 
engages us in many processes of meaning making that are largely uncon-
scious.66 In addressing us as spectators, film also constructs us as spectators 
– it not only caters to desires, it creates them.67 As a form of mass culture that 
plays a ‘key role . . . in the profound restructuration of subjectivity’, film is 
an important site for examining different ways of seeing and for encourag-
ing a more ethical sensibility.68 Additionally, cinema offers us a sense of the 
possible. Often it is only when we see uncommon images that we realise the 
extent to which our expectations about the world are shaped by what we are 
exposed to. For example, images of fearless and technically proficient women 
of colour in science fiction or crime dramas still provide a refreshing counter 
to the majority of roles for black, Hispanic or Asian women in television and 
film. Cinema is able to challenge our way of thinking about the world and to 
address us differently, making possible different senses of ourselves as viewing 
subjects. Earlier theories of spectatorship such as those offered by Raymond 
Bellour, Jean-Louis Baudry and Christian Metz analysed film in terms of the 
ideological or psychic modes that catered to the desire for or illusion of specta-
torial supremacy. Denis’s films, however, undermine the (illusory) supremacy 
of the viewer by offering partial and fragmentary glimpses, and refusing char-
acter psychology and causal plot motivations. They drift away from what we 
may think is important in the diegesis to show us something else, reminding 
us that the story world of the film is always incomplete. In their interruptive, 
fragmented and non-linguistic way of unfolding, Denis’s films work against 
ideology rather than reproducing it. In the process they address us as differ-
ent kinds of subjects – as porous and feeling the world more than rationally 
knowing it.
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Additionally, cinema occupies a privileged role here because of my focus 
on the encounter with singularity as key to ethics. Film is a relational space; 
we are receptive to the images on screen because viewing is a matter of being 
open to encountering what we cannot anticipate in advance. In its capacity to 
alter us, film breaks down the clear boundaries between self and other. Cinema 
takes place over time – it is a medium of duration.69 It has the potential to 
foster a relational space of encounter that is multisensory and can cultivate an 
awareness of things that are pre-thematic and never fixed, because the image 
always exists through time. As a partly visual medium, film registers difference 
but also has the power to challenge our assumptions about what that difference 
will mean or look like in practice. As Denis states, ‘I think in fact, if my films 
have a common link, maybe it’s being a foreigner – it’s common for people 
who are born abroad – they don’t know so well where they belong. It’s not the 
kind of thing you find in literature, music or photography – being from abroad 
makes you look different.’70 Presumably, it is the way in which cinema acts in 
duration that separates it from photography. In contrast to literature, cinema 
is able to immediately register an impression of bodies without relying on lan-
guage for its affective power. This, Denis shows, is one of the reasons why film 
has such potential for exposing an ethics of sense and an aesthetic of alterity.
Cinema offers us multiple encounters with alterity that can help us in 
honing an ethical sensibility. It shows us things that alter us and exposes us to 
that which we cannot know in the traditional sense of knowledge (for example, 
in the sense of formulating logical propositions that give us factual informa-
tion about the world or about various situations). In contrast to the kind of 
bodily encounter available in the films I consider here, the dominant tendency 
in Hollywood cinema has been towards characters’ psychological legibility 
and full narrative closure.71 Affective responses tend to be channelled towards 
clear judgements such as evil and good, which are easily identifiable, and all 
loose ends are resolved and tied together by the end of the film. Shots and 
editing function to create a comprehensible narrative and to make sure that 
the viewer understands what she is looking at. Many older Hollywood films 
(such as the pre-code films from the early 1930s, or even many generic b-films) 
appear less ‘finished’. They introduce plot elements that are left unresolved 
at the end of the movie or characters who seem important in the narrative 
only to suddenly disappear without explanation.72 The sense that some of 
these earlier films do not quite work is based on the fact that they haven’t yet 
mastered the Hollywood formula, formally and narratively. Shots are confus-
ing, the editing doesn’t make sense spatially or temporally, or the narrative 
seems incoherent in places. Conversely, Hollywood films that consciously play 
with the entrenched film language codes are seen as clever or more artistic. 
For example, cheeky uses of slow motion or long takes, the inclusion of more 
experimental montage segments, or unconventional uses of sound all func-
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tion to make a film seem ‘edgy’ or even ‘experimental’. These exceptions to 
the well-worn patterns of Hollywood cinema serve to prove the ubiquity of 
conventions for making meaning in film that are largely unconscious to most 
spectators.73 Our common sense tells us that movies should make sense – that 
is, we should know whose side we’re on and we should feel some kind of a 
cathartic resolution, be it a couple united or a child saved from danger. By 
bringing everything into the light, more conventional film language typically 
denies the viewer the chance to experience a world that exceeds cognition and 
labels. By contrast, Denis offers us a counter practice where sense comes from 
the body before any cognitive act and resides in images, in music and in frag-
mented glimpses of characters who touch each other through intrusions both 
physical and emotional.
When film offers the illusion that we can know the other – that the other 
is capturable, rather than complex, opaque and singular – or when it strives 
to make legible who characters are and what we need to know about them to 
understand the plot, it works against the ethics I elaborate from Denis’s own 
practices, which interrupt any illusions of fullness, completion or spectato-
rial control. She privileges the fragment both narratively, in her inclusion of 
marginal and unexplained scenes, and visually, in her filming of the body as 
a collection of tactile parts. She refuses psychological and plot motivation in 
her choices of scenes for inclusion and her ordering of those scenes. Her films 
interrupt the narrative to privilege a song and/or a body dancing or to expose 
a sensual visual and auditory dreamscape. They challenge the viewer’s expec-
tations by offering feelings and encounters other than the sort they have come 
to expect at the movies. The belief that people can be neatly classified into 
categories is present in forms of nationalism, fascism and neocolonialism, all 
of which rely on self/other distinctions for their efficacy. From the standpoint 
of ethics, we must move away from the belief that we can accurately represent 
or know through representations and be open to difficulty and unknowability 
in order to start from a place of openness rather than anaesthetised knowledge. 
Ethics involves sitting with the difficulty of the world and, eventually, not 
being afraid to take responsibility within that complexity.
philosophy and f ilm
I had never thought about a heart transplant. But the idea of the trans-
plant, of a graft, is something that has always interested me. In my work 
I talk often about grafting. It is as if, for me, cinema is only interesting if 
it is grafted. I don’t think that there is literature on one side and cinema 
on the other – something is grafted. It is cinema that is grafted.
Claire Denis74
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Film is not merely an example for or of a philosophical system. It is an inter-
locutor in its own right, and one that is able to touch on that which exceeds the 
limits of philosophical language. One of the main problems with the attack on 
so-called ‘Theory’ expounded by scholars such as David Bordwell and Noël 
Carroll is that it gives no allowance for the film itself as an expression of ideas. 
In their reading Theory is guilty of using individual films as mere examples of 
some convoluted universalising concept. As Carroll writes in his contribution,
Like classic essentialist theory, Theory is an obstacle to authentic theo-
rizing, because it is presented as a unified or totalizing system. Under its 
aegis, the film theorist sets out to subsume every aspect of cinematic phe-
nomena under the putative laws and categories of his or her minimally 
customized version of the reigning orthodoxy. Theorizing becomes the 
routine application of some larger, unified theory to questions of cinema, 
which procedure unsurprisingly churns out roughly the same answers, 
or remarkably similar answers, in every case. The net result, in short, is 
theoretical impoverishment.75
Here we see that little room is left for the generation of ideas that may not 
be applicable to every film but may be raised by the film in question. In this 
schema, if the film communicates its own ideas, ones that resonate with extra-
cinematic elements of thought, it is irrelevant to the study of cinema. Rather 
scientifically, the goal of film studies is to discover general patterns that define 
cinema at large. In this sense, what particular films or approaches to filmmak-
ing have to offer is deemed irrelevant if it can’t be generalised. In place of 
Theory, they suggest that
What is coming after Theory is not another Theory but theories and 
the activity of theorizing. A theory of film defines a problem within the 
domain of cinema (defined nondogmatically) and sets out to solve it 
through logical reflection, empirical research, or a combination of both. 
Theorizing is a commitment to using the best canons of inference and 
evidence available to answer the question posed. The standards ought to 
be those of the most stringent philosophical reasoning, historical argu-
ment, and sociological, economic, and critical analysis we can find, in 
film studies or elsewhere (even in science).76
Bordwell offers examples of proper objects of study, from the evolution 
of continuity editing to female film audiences in early cinema. Again, no 
room is left for films as themselves transmitters of ideas both calculated and 
uncalculated or as having the capacity to speak back to or in relation to their 
moment of emergence. While the kinds of research advocated by Bordwell 
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and Carroll are undoubtedly important to particular areas of film studies, they 
foreclose important facets of the film experience. Rather than solving research 
problems, I am more interested in asking the right questions – and my argu-
ment is that in the case of ethics we should be wary of any claims to ‘correct 
answers’. This is in no way to diminish historical, archival or interview-based 
research, which is crucial to the field. But these forms of research need not be 
mutually exclusive, just as film and theory are not mutually exclusive, where 
that latter can only be violently imposed onto the former. Many films them-
selves are engaged in this question asking. They are not objects from which 
to establish general patterns – there is no one-to-one correlation between a 
formal device and its meaning; rather, they are participants in their own right 
in the theoretical conversation. The assumption that filmmakers, scriptwriters 
and editors do not approach their material with something to say and that it 
is not the job of film studies to make visible the way that the medium com-
municates these concepts excludes some of the crucial questions we can ask of 
films.
Films do make arguments, but they do so in their own language. Gilles 
Deleuze’s ‘What is the creative act?’ (1987) is helpful in thinking through this 
connection.77 In this lecture, Deleuze asks what it is to have an idea in cinema. 
More broadly, he asks what it is that philosophers do when they make philoso-
phy and what it is that filmmakers do when they make cinema. Importantly, 
he emphasises that philosophy is no less creative or inventive than is cinema 
or the other arts. When we have an idea, it is always an idea in something, 
whether that something is philosophy or mathematics, a novel or a film. For 
Deleuze, philosophy creates concepts, whereas cinema thinks in what he calls 
blocks of movement-time.
As the lecture proceeds, Deleuze shifts to the question of adaptation – he 
focuses on the question of Kurosawa’s shared concerns with Dostoyevsky. 
While I am less concerned here with how Deleuze assesses the similarities 
between the protagonists of the Russian novelist and the Japanese auteur, what 
interests me is thinking the relation between literature and cinema as akin to 
the one between cinema and philosophy. In this framework, Denis and Nancy, 
for example, also have a shared concern. Unlike Kurosawa and Dostoyevsky, 
they are contemporaries of one another and interlocutors. They share ideas, 
but whereas Nancy’s emerge in philosophical concepts, for Denis they are 
manifest in blocks of movement-time. This is perhaps best illustrated in my 
discussion of Denis’s short film Vers Nancy (2002) that begins the second 
chapter, but is also very evident in her film The Intruder, which adopts Nancy’s 
essay of the same name. This does not mean that their ideas are the same. As 
I aim to show, Denis often pushes us further in examining real bodily differ-
ences and their affective and material impact on us. Because she works with 
moving images rather than words on a page, she is able to stage a different sort 
28  towards a  feminist  c inematic  ethics
of encounter, although not necessarily one any more creative or altering than 
we may have with a philosophical text.
Although Levinas and Denis do not have any documented connection, they 
share concerns, just as I find sympathetic moments in the thinking of Levinas 
and Nancy. In all cases, the three thinkers (or idea-makers) connect and 
diverge in ways that are productive rather than simply inconsistent or incom-
patible. As such, in everything that follows, the question of the relationship 
between philosophy and film is one of overlapping or divergent concerns. Put 
differently, my focus is on the generative encounters amongst these ideas, be 
they Levinasian or Nancean concepts or Denisian blocks of movement-time. 
To borrow Denis’s language from the epigraph, philosophy and film are here 
grafted onto each other, two living entities that, brought together, create the 
possibility of the new, that undermine clear borders, and that intrude into one 
another to produce something unanticipated. The notion of adoption or idea 
sharing as grafting also brings to the fore the focus on the bodily in Denis’s 
work and that I highlight in Levinas and Nancy.
The methodological goal of creating a balance between the ideas the films 
express through blocks of movement-time and the philosophical concepts 
has required a selective process with regard to the philosophical texts used. 
Particularly in the case of a thinker as prolific as Nancy, detailed engage-
ments with every potentially illuminating aspect of his philosophy are not 
practicable in a study of this kind. Therefore, this book is hardly exhaustive 
with respect to the possibilities contained within any one thinker’s work. The 
attempt to balance the film analyses and philosophical exegeses has meant 
a significant amount of curatorial work in terms of what is focused on from 
each philosopher. For example, I chose not to include a rather long section 
that engaged in detail with Levinas’s writing on art in favour of a concise 
summary. Additionally, I have omitted a longer engagement with Nancy’s 
writing on Trouble Every Day in the fourth chapter, because it digressed from 
the substance of my own argument. The guiding principle in this has been 
Denis’s films themselves, which have pointed to the (often unexpected) places 
in the philosophers’ work that are most fruitful for thinking towards a feminist 
cinematic ethics.
While my writing at times shifts emphasis between, on the one hand, the 
philosophy and, on the other, the films, overall neither medium is more privi-
leged than the other, nor do they exist in a neatly delineated binary. They offer 
ideas that converge and sometimes contrast but that are better for coming into 
contact with and being tested against one another. As I argue in the following 
chapter, film and philosophy touch each other at their limits, and together 
reach towards meanings that exceed either one when read in isolation. Again, 
the rough edges or places where any two of my interlocutors differ are spaces 
of opening, which undermine any claims to having defined or mastered the 
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notion of cinematic ethics in this project, itself a reflection of the ethical 
 position I formulate.
a  feminist  c inematic  ethics :  overview
In the following chapter I develop the concept of an ethics of sense. This 
works towards exposure and encounter rather than representation, cultivating 
a curiosity about the world that refuses mastery and opens rather than closes 
meaning. Focusing on Nénette and Boni, I look at how the film does not take 
up the social issues that it touches on in a moralising way. Its approach is non-
normative, asking us to encounter the bodies on screen before we fix them 
into a controlling framework. Denis employs many strategies for exposing the 
limits of meaning and privileging sense in her work, emphasising movement, 
and including marginal or seemingly irrelevant scenes and people. These high-
light the porousness and lack of closure in each film, further stressed by her 
intertextual use of actors. These techniques are all practices of interruption. In 
place of cinematic myth, Denis interrupts. This ethics of sense continually rup-
tures the viewer’s illusion of control over the image or of a completed content 
by inserting a difference into the film that refuses to be pinned down. I connect 
the surprise of the other to feminist philosophers of natality and wonder – a 
curiosity towards the unknown of the other and the world as an ethical stance 
enables us to move beyond normative identity categories, including those 
based on sexuality and reproduction. In front of Denis’s lens, natality is freed 
from biological essentialism. At the same time, natality reframes the dissolu-
tion of the subject as an affirmative and creative possibility, rather than a cause 
for crisis or despair. This wonder at the unknown of the other is also central 
to the second term introduced under the rubric of a feminist cinematic ethics, 
the aesthetic of alterity.
This alterity-based approach is the topic of Chapter 3, where I examine I 
Can’t Sleep and focus on three aspects of Levinas’s philosophy read through 
Denis’s filmmaking: his concept of the saying before the said, his treatment of 
the erotic, and what I term a Levinasian poetics, which uses Levinas’s own 
writing style as a representational model. In I Can’t Sleep, the aesthetics of 
alterity are evident in Denis’s use of ambiguity and opacity which refuse char-
acter psychologisation, the dynamism which she inserts into the plot through 
shifts amongst characters, the inclusion of inexplicable scenes with respect 
to narrative development, and a sense of perpetual becoming. The notion of 
alterity aesthetics carries forward from the second chapter the theme of repre-
sentations that fail or that expose their own limits.
This cinematic ethics cannot be separated from the body, both as it signi-
fies and as it refuses signification. This is the topic of the final chapter. Ethics 
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works through an affective engagement with the world. The pre-thematic felt 
encounter is uniquely cultivated in Denis’s work. While the bodily openness 
and non-immunity I highlight carries both risk and pleasure, it is a condition 
that must be recognised so that we can begin to start acting from a place of 
mutual vulnerability rather than a notion of an autonomous self from which 
the other can be easily separated and protected. Through Nancy and Levinas 
we have access to additional tools for thinking creatively about the body as it 
relates to cinema and the encounters film offers. Denis’s use of dance offers an 
opportunity for a highly affective Levinasian encounter with the other, which 
highlights process and singularity over comprehension and solidity.
Film can engage us in an ethics of spectatorship that fine-tunes our ethical 
sensibility with repercussions beyond the cinema doors. Cinema can alter 
our way of seeing and being in the world. Watching can be a kind of ethical 
training. Unfortunately, our codified ways of viewing tend to shut down an 
opportunity to encounter the unmasterable in the world and to see the other, 
for whom we are responsible, in all her singularity, surprise and wonder. I 
offer these thoughts on Denis’s work as a way of thinking about not only what 
happens when we watch her films, but how different forms of exposure to the 
other, or new modes of encounter, can affectively reorient us towards different 
and more just futures.
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chapter 2
Film Interrupted: Denis, Nancy 
and an Ethics of Sense
Astudent (Ana Samardzija) and an older man sit across from each other in   a train carriage in Claire Denis’s short film Vers Nancy. We catch them in 
mid-conversation, while outside the window the countryside zooms past, too 
quickly for the eye to get a good hold on (Figures 2.1 and 2.2). The student 
– whose name indicates Yugoslav heritage and who is therefore probably no 
stranger to the violence of borders – discusses her foreign status in France. 
The conversation carries over periodical intercuts to an empty corridor – a 
liminal space of passage that suggests the possibility of intrusion onto the 
conversation, and also serves to remind the viewer of the limits of what the 
image exposes. As the conversation continues, the elderly gentleman initially 
dominates. He is concerned with the idea of normalising immigrants, insist-
ing rather that something within a foreigner must remain foreign – she must 
remain an intruder. The student asks who he is addressing – the host or the 
foreigner?
As they proceed to discuss the state of borders both European and, more 
specifically, French, the film cuts back to the hallway. A man (Alex Descas, a 
French-African actor and Denis regular) stands in the previously empty cor-
ridor and smokes a cigarette (Figure 2.3). His status is unclear. Is he one of 
the foreigners the film has been discussing, or is he one of the many formerly 
colonised subjects who are born and raised in France? Or is he foreign either 
way, his blackness rendering him forever other to an abstract Frenchness that is 
implicitly white?1 His image visually raises the point that the older man has just 
articulated verbally – even if he is French, this unknown man remains other: 
‘the demand to welcome foreigners in a normalising way means we end up 
ignoring their foreignness. It’s like pretending that a black person isn’t black.’
When we return to the train carriage, we begin to see closer frames of the 
faces and hands of the two interlocutors as they talk and listen (Figures 2.4 
and 2.5). While the man continues, the student becomes increasingly animated 
38  towards a  feminist  c inematic  ethics
and less self-conscious. As the two characters feel out the parameters of their 
conversation and get a sense of their own positions with respect to the topic 
and to each other, we get a better visual sense of where they ‘stand’ (or sit, 
in this case) on the train (Figure 2.6). All the while the train keeps moving 
forward, belying a sense of true stability or hypostasis. We are intruders on 
their conversation just as the train intrudes on the landscape it traverses. The 
man claims that the intruder is always threatening. He comments on the alter-
ity that we experience within ourselves,
Figure 2.1 The student discusses her foreign status in France.
Figure 2.2 The elderly gentleman initially dominates.
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what occurs at the same time in a pathological manner is also the same 
as something . . . that can be perceived as a strangeness within myself. 
Not necessarily the presence of the other but its existence. That’s not at 
all pathological. It’s what you can’t identify . . . and if conceiving means 
identifying it, then we cannot conceive it. That’s the limit of identity, 
but identity can only be found . . . by accepting some elements of this 
intrusion. Because an identity that is complete and well-founded . . . and 
incapable of accepting intrusion . . . is as stupid, closed, sealed . . . like 
a stone.
Figure 2.3 His status is unclear.
Figure 2.4 Closer frames of the faces of the two interlocutors as they talk and listen.
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The conversation turns to the theme of surprise as the student offers, 
‘For it [the intrusion] to be a surprise, I must not expect to be surprised . . . 
we’re unsettled, but something occurs that allows us to change.’ To which 
the teacher offers, ‘It’s a little like everyday life. I’m always struck by the fact 
that all the important events, the things that have proved determinant in my 
life occurred without me foreseeing them. I never foresaw anything, not even 
the job I do now . . . It’s always from somewhere else.’ The conversation has 
gained momentum and developed a verbal rhythm that the camera has echoed 
Figure 2.5 The man claims that the intruder is always threatening.
Figure 2.6 ‘We’re unsettled, but something occurs that allows us to change.’
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visually. Just as we begin to sense an increasingly spontaneous and flowing 
discussion between student and teacher, they are interrupted as the man from 
the corridor enters the carriage and sits next to the student. A slight shuffling 
occurs as the space is recalibrated to the new distribution of bodies and the ten-
sions amongst them. ‘When do we get there?’ asks the intruder. ‘Ten minutes,’ 
answers the older man. ‘Already? Very quick and pleasant,’ he says back. To 
which the man replies, ‘Yes, a bit long though, no?’ This last statement is a 
playful commentary on the film itself, which was made by Denis for a televi-
sion series in which directors were asked to make ten-minute films that address 
the passage of time. The series (Ten Minutes Older) included directors such 
as Roberto Rossellini, Aki Kaurismäki, Spike Lee and Volker Schlöndorff. 
Denis’s film, Vers Nancy (Towards Nancy), runs slightly over ten minutes – 
thus ‘a bit long, no?’
Perhaps the two travellers are heading for (vers) the town of Nancy, but the 
title also applies to the older man of the pair – the French philosopher Jean-Luc 
Nancy. The film moves towards (vers) him, but makes no attempt to summa-
rise his body of work or his biography, or to stage an encounter of heightened 
emotional intensity. Rather it is an exposure, literally and metaphorically, 
opening onto his singularity at a specific, mundane and fleeting moment in 
time – the conversation keeps moving, as does the film, as does the train. But it 
is not only towards Nancy that the film moves, as if it were possible to touch on 
someone apart from who they are in relation to others – students or strangers 
on the train. Fundamentally the film reveals a constellation of singularities, 
which unfold through their interactions – a landscape, a locomotive, a student, 
a professor and a stranger. These singularities are in motion, their selfhood 
altering through time, rather than remaining static. What could be more banal 
than a slightly abstract conversation on a train, a man who smokes to pass the 
time, or a relatively unspectacular landscape? Yet Denis, in this film as in all of 
her work, invites a curiosity towards them – here, through her slow revelation 
of the space and characters and by withholding conventional indicators of who 
the characters are or what they are doing. The frame of the film places their 
relations in a heightened context, asking us to look more closely at what we 
may overlook in our everyday being-in-the-world.
Film can invite us to be curious about the world. This renewed curios-
ity cultivates an openness to the surprise of intrusion – and this thematic 
of intrusion is central to ethics as read through the philosophy of Jean-Luc 
Nancy and the filmmaking of Claire Denis. Denis’s work shows that when 
film engages in opening up a world rather than seeking comprehension and 
closure, it conducts itself ethically and facilitates a kind of ethical contact in its 
viewer. This is what I call an ethics of sense and is the focus of what follows. 
Vers Nancy stages an encounter between two figures as they work together to 
make sense. In that manner the film is a metaphor for this book, which extends 
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a  conversation between philosophy and film. Vers Nancy exposes the tensions 
between concepts as they develop in language, and the power of film to evoke 
what is difficult to articulate. As an encounter between spectator and image, 
the film effectively produces, in all its bodily and affective power, the reality of 
an intrusion – how an unknown other makes us feel.2 When Descas steps into 
the carriage, we sense the complex nature of the intruder on a much more per-
sonal and affective level than the dialogue has lingered on. While Samardzija 
and Nancy have referenced larger geopolitical and cultural issues in France 
and Europe today, the issues of intrusion and difference permeate Nancy’s 
thought from the smaller level of the body and identity, to the larger themes 
of community and myth. Denis’s work often explores intrusions that resonate 
at a bodily and interpersonal level and touch on larger histories of colonial 
violence. This raises a central point of difference between Nancy and Denis. 
While Nancy wants to talk about real politics and a real historical moment, his 
writing must reckon with the language and the history of philosophy, such 
that his account tends to remain on the level of meta-analysis and abstract. 
By contrast, Denis is able to give similar problems a pulse, to make images 
resonate with the weight of history and geographical borders, and to invite the 
viewer to share in this material sense. In this way, film is able to articulate differ-
ent differences, as they affect different bodies in different ways. This is perhaps 
well illustrated by the difference between Descas’s body and Samardzija’s. 
His blackness registers immediately as a greater barrier to inclusion, versus 
Samardzija’s whiteness, which may mean that her alterity is more easily cam-
ouflaged. Vers Nancy raises the question of materially significant differences 
in the conversation itself. The Frenchman demands that something in the 
foreigner must remain so, but does so to a young woman who herself may be a 
refugee, and who has already emphasised her desire to be invisible in French 
society, to not be rejected or deported. While both Nancy and Samardzija are 
undoubtedly, if we follow Nancy’s account, constituted in and through alter-
ity, the everyday reality of these differences positions them variously according 
to gender, age, education and ethnicity, even if they sit across from each other, 
equals in the film’s frame. The beauty of Denis’s cinema lies in part in the fact 
that although she exposes the material reality of difference, we can never know 
in advance what that difference will mean, that is, identity categories never tell 
us in advance who someone is or what will be important, although they prob-
ably inflect their being-in-the-world.
The arrival of the stranger from the corridor is of course a disruption, yet 
it also offers all the possibilities contained in a new encounter. He is a surprise 
– a surprise being that which comes from without and undermines the agency 
and mastery of the subject. Surprise emphasises the limits of our autonomous 
self-determination in the world. In Nancean language, the other is a new point 
of access to the origin of the world – an origin that is never truly an origin, 
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never a foundation or essence, but is always multiple, relational and constantly 
renewed with each new birth, with each new encounter, each time and every 
day. Film can provide an opportunity to listen rather than understand, to 
wonder at the birth of the new, at the strangeness of the other, and to become 
aware of the plurality in which we are constituted and which singularises us in 
and across time. It can be an intrusion that surprises, disrupts and interrupts 
our habitual ways of seeing. To focus the discussion, I read Nancy alongside 
Denis’s films Vers Nancy and Nénette and Boni. Nénette and Boni centres the 
theme of natality that I build on, through its plot of an unwanted pregnancy, 
and also challenges the notion that all aspects of a film should work towards 
building a coherent and referentially meaningful text. Its use of dreamy visual- 
and audioscapes, lack of explanatory dialogue, and inclusion of scenes that do 
not work to further the plot in any traditional sense make it ideal for explor-
ing an ethics of sense in contrast to conventional film language. Vers Nancy 
displays nicely the complex sharing of concerns between the philosopher and 
the filmmaker, while also highlighting the ways in which Denis pushes Nancy 
further.
Intrusion is an apt metaphor for the ongoing relationship between Denis 
and Nancy, who have participated in a dialogue that has involved films (Vers 
Nancy), texts (Nancy has written essays on three of Denis’s films, Beau travail, 
The Intruder and Trouble Every Day) and adaptation (Denis’s film The Intruder 
is based on an essay by Nancy of the same name). They have also intersected in 
the field of dance, collaborating in writing and on film with the choreographer 
Mathilde Monnier.3 Denis’s film on the choreographer shares its titular prepo-
sition with the short Nancy film: it is entitled Vers Mathilde (2005), again rein-
forcing Denis’s concern with movement and with approaching (as opposed 
to capturing) bodies/selves on film. This moving towards touches on a key 
element of the ethics discussed in this chapter – a filmic ethics of sense (sens). 
In French, sense (sens) indicates direction and manner, rendering meaning 
dynamic and relational rather than fixed or closed, possessable or masterable. 
It moves towards (vers) rather than referring indexically to.
Sense signifies in a way other than that of language – it evokes the role of 
the sensory in approaching the other and it is more aleatory than static. This 
notion of sense applies equally to Nancean ethics and to Denis’s ethical film-
making. Thinking intrusion as a practice of interruption, I continue their 
intellectual sharing by interrupting my analysis of Denis’s work with Nancy’s 
philosophy and vice versa. Denis’s films are noted for their sensory qualities 
and their privileging of affective encounters over explanatory narrative. They 
gesture towards the other, rather than fixing or positioning her, and their sig-
nification touches on the limits of the articulable, thus stepping in where phi-
losophy opens onto its limit. The concept of sense (sens) is central to Nancy’s 
thought on the body, the ‘subject’ and the world precisely because it carries 
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these multiple valences of meaning. Nancy prefers the term ‘sense’ to that of 
‘meaning’, as sens connotes that significance is an embodied process, rather 
than purely cognitive. In this way ‘sense’ connects meaning to the materiality 
of worldly existence. Sense cannot find its grounding in something outside our 
world. Rather than basing significance in something beyond the ontological, 
Nancy will argue that we beings are sense and the only possibility for sense.
To approach film through an ethics of sense I frame it as ‘literature’, after 
Nancy’s writing on literature in relation to myth.4 Myth, at the larger cultural 
level, represents the desire for a foundational discourse, turning the people 
into one unified Subject with all of the fascistic implications it suggests. Myth 
strives to give absolute and all-encompassing meaning. As B. C. Hutchens 
writes, ‘Myth is the mimetic instrument par excellence; it is the primary means 
of identification whereby “guiding myths” achieve totalitarian power. Mythic 
power brings people together and projects an image by which personal and 
social identity is possible.’5 Its interruption thus has political as well as ethical 
implications and its reach extends from society to the individual. In Nancy’s 
work, myth is linked to the desire for a total and comprehensive understand-
ing of the world. This would entail a notion of communion, of the community 
as sharing a singular essence, producing something in common, or having a 
unified origin and destiny. The quest for self-presence and knowledge is inter-
rupted by singular plurality, or what Nancy terms ‘literature’ and which I am 
extending here to film. Nancy contrasts myth with literature in the following 
way:
But literature’s revelation, unlike myth’s, does not reveal a completed 
reality, nor the reality of a completion. It does not reveal, in a general 
way, some thing – it reveals rather the unrevealable: namely, that it is 
itself, as a work that reveals and gives access to a vision and to the com-
munion of a vision, essentially interrupted.6
The literary is the exposure to finitude, to the limits of comprehension and 
totalisation. Myth and literature are not mutually exclusive categories, where 
myth is that which first exists and is then interrupted by literature. Rather, 
the two are always present in any discourse: ‘The text interrupts itself at the 
point where it shares itself out.’7 One can imagine the telling of a communal 
narrative where the unique timbre and ephemerality of the teller’s voice breaks 
through, giving a rhythm and inflection to the language that will never be 
heard again, announcing finitude and historicisation in the midst of a story 
that attempts an ahistorical and immutable account of the world. Where there 
is a story being told, no matter how mythic, there is always a unique voice that 
shares it out, belying the notion of an immutable and unified essence.
Moving away from the terminology of literature and its connotations of a 
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certain calibre of written text, we can substitute ‘sense’ for that which inter-
rupts myth.8 Sense (or ‘the literary’) exposes a singularity or a new meaning 
that myth cannot account for or anticipate. Nancy himself admits that ‘litera-
ture’ is an unsuitable word for that which interrupts myth. In fact, he says ‘no 
name is suitable here’, presumably because language would limit and contain 
the singularity and sharing that interruption indicates.9 Nancy does not 
mention film explicitly in this text; however, he opens up the possibility for 
reading many forms and practices as having the function he ascribes to litera-
ture, which interrupts myth or prevents immanence by the exposure of a new 
singularity or another origin, continually reopening the world to a meaning 
that it is but that it cannot master. Film, then, like art, dance and the other 
instances of ‘literature’ mentioned by Nancy, is a fruitful domain within which 
to examine how Denis’s counter cinema, both formally and narratively, pre-
sents a contrast to classical film language’s tendency toward mythologisation. 
When film is ‘literature’ or when it participates in an ethics of sense, it is inter-
ruptive, it refuses normativity, it privileges listening over understanding, and, 
finally, it opens us up to the wonder of being exposed to and with one another.
Formally, Denis’s films are interruptive or ‘literature’ in that they privilege 
fragmentariness in content and form, refusing wholeness and closure, having 
neither a definitive origin nor an endpoint, and continually expose their own 
limit/frame. It is a non-normative ethics in the sense that the film disallows 
any propositional morality or knowledge to arise from its plot. Instead, the 
ethics of Denis’s cinema entail an exposure to the world that keeps meaning 
open, raising questions and cultivating an attentiveness towards others. This 
connects to the aspect of an ethics of sense that foregrounds wonder. I explore 
wonder in part by connecting it with birth – instead of death, a focus on 
natality reveals the generative potential in thinking of a world of with-ness, 
in which the unravelling of the subject is not a cause for despair but rather a 
source of joy and productive, creative potential. The notion of birth becomes 
pivotal in understanding the way Nancy conceives co-existence and world, 
and therefore ethics. Birth is our origin in a moment that we cannot know or 
master, and reveals our originary relationality (we have our start both in the 
body of another and in a web of relations that exceeds and precedes any proper 
origin). While Nancy’s philosophy opens up the space for thinking about our 
being-here-with in terms of natal newness, Nénette and Boni simultaneously 
introduces and probes these ideas, posing difficult questions about maternity, 
gender and identity (beyond any romanticisation of childbirth/motherhood). 
Again, the film gives flesh to an abstract concept and in so doing challenges it 
to address the materiality of difference. Denis invites us to think about sexual-
ity and reproduction beyond normative categories. In that sense the film makes 
curious what we may assume to be self-evident – for example, about teen 
mothers, broken homes and adolescent male sexual fantasies.
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As we will see, this openness to the surprise of intrusion ties into the 
absence of any one foundation. Because each of us is an origin and one that 
is constantly renewed, and because this origin is one to which we have no 
access (how can we know or remember the experience of our own origin?), 
it is inappropriable. Although I do not aim to stake out a privileged place for 
film amongst the ‘arts’ in this chapter, film most certainly carries the poten-
tial to heighten our awareness of the wonder of the everyday, to hone in on 
each body, each singularity, and open us up to curiosity about the origin that 
each of us is – a unique point of access to the world. Conversely, film also has 
the potential to shut down wonder or to mythologise its content, by clearly 
demarcating good and evil and giving us the comforts of feeling that we have 
solved a problem or understood the world at the movie’s end. I generalise to 
some extent about mainstream cinema in order to better highlight the contrast 
with Denis’s filmmaking. In general, popular cinema aims towards maximum 
comprehensibility, catharsis and resolution.10 This, along with its reliance 
on generic codes and overused representational conventions, tends to work 
against the ethics of sense I describe. A counter cinema such as Denis’s offers 
an alternative that itself is a practice and elaboration of the ethics of sense. It 
is not therefore merely that Denis’s films illustrate philosophy. I argue that 
film and philosophy touch each other at their limits, opening onto meanings 
that exceed either one in isolation when they are read together. All of these 
moments of interruption, wonder, birth and listening are intimately con-
nected. They overlap and extend each other to foreground the importance of 
a particular way of relating to the world – an ethical conduct that is not about 
a positive platform but rather the refusal of all platforms and their tendency to 
fix, to exclude and to explain.
Unlike Levinas, who I turn to in the following chapter, Nancy is not pri-
marily thought of as an ethicist. In fact, none of the major books on Nancy 
in English include ‘ethics’ as a subheading or chapter organiser – instead 
they focus on issues of Christianity, community, ontology, body and art, all 
of which are central themes in his philosophy.11 Nonetheless, when he does 
talk specifically about ethics (and the two most notable essays in this regard 
are ‘Originary Ethics’ and ‘The Insufficiency of Values and the Necessity of 
Sense’), it is in a way that overlaps significantly with his thought in these many 
other areas. His philosophy could be described as a fugue, with variations on 
the same themes echoing and ‘chasing’ each other throughout his voluminous 
oeuvre. In practice, this means that reading Nancy in any one area strengthens 
a sense of his perspective in the others. Or, to return to the ideas with which 
I started this chapter, his ideas move towards each other, regardless of what 
rubric a specific text may fall under. Furthermore, since for Nancy ethics is 
ontology and his thought is deeply invested in and concerned with how we 
think ontology, arguably his whole philosophy is an ethics.
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Part of my contribution to discussions of Nancy’s philosophy in this chapter 
will be to highlight the ways in which his ethics is relevant for thinking about 
film. Of course it is Denis’s films that make this reading available, through 
their shared concerns with Nancy. Viewing Nancy’s work through the lens 
of ethics enables a special and useful application to film, offering insight in 
particular as to why a filmmaker such as Denis resonates with her viewers and 
commentators as ‘ethical’. Although some excellent scholarship has recently 
been published on Nancy and film, my focus on ethics not only shifts the terms 
of the analysis but also highlights other themes in his work that are useful 
for thinking about the cinema, such as natality, wonder, interruption and 
listening.12 I am drawn to these particular areas through Denis’s work itself. 
Furthermore, several of these themes allow me to connect cinema to the work 
of other contemporary philosophers dealing with Nancy outside of cinema, 
specifically Anne O’Byrne’s work on natality and Mary-Jane Rubenstein’s 
writing on wonder.
Nancy’s ‘originary ethics’ requires a dis-position towards the world that 
is attentive to the sense that we are; that refuses the comforts of myth and 
identity in favour of creative newness, flux and exposure to the unmasterable 
world. It also necessitates a rethinking of being in terms of the with. We are 
always being towards (vers) both others and ourselves, dis-posed and ex-posed, 
lacking a stable position. In Denis’s work, this interruptive ethics of sense is 
enacted through the use of movement, her selection of shots, the inclusion of 
marginal scenes and figures, her use of regular actors, and the emphasis on the 
sensory over the visual. Vers Nancy is a small case study of the kind of inter-
ruptive practice that Denis is interested in – a conversation whose interlocu-
tors are not clearly positioned: their relation is partly implied by their patterns 
of speech and body language but they are never named. The man from the cor-
ridor has no clear role – his intrusion does nothing to move a plot forward or 
to increase the viewer’s comprehension of what is happening on screen. In the 
earlier shots of him smoking, the film is cut such that we are not clear whether 
he hears the conversation or not. The goal of both image and sound is not to 
provide greater clarity. The strangers are on a train without clear destination. 
Beginning in media res, the film emphasises process, rather than endpoint. We 
could keep riding with the passengers, keep moving, and keep listening, but 
the camera forces us to get off. In that sense we are sternly reminded of the 
limits of what we can see or know (much as the corridor shots seem to function 
to remind us that life keeps happening outside of the frame). These strategies 
are also present in Nénette and Boni, which privileges an interruptive ethics of 
sense.
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nénette,  boni  and an ethics  of  sense
Denis’s fourth feature film Nénette and Boni moves further away from narrative 
than any of her previous work and towards a cinema that privileges the sensory 
over the cognitive. It tells the story of a teenage girl, Nénette (Alice Houri), 
who runs away from her boarding school to her brother Boni’s (Grégoire 
Colin) home in Marseille.13 Boni, himself only nineteen, has inherited their 
dead mother’s apartment and lives there with a group of friends and his pet 
rabbit. The kitchen is messy with a barren fridge and the apartment feels tran-
sitory and uncared for. Boni sells pizza from a truck with his roommate and 
also dabbles in the black market. In one scene he is shown selling curtain rods 
from Taiwan under the table to a man who owns a small hardware store. Boni 
chooses a coffee maker as a bonus, a modern American-style drip machine with 
built-in clock, which he will keep next to his bed. This coffee maker suggests 
a certain Americanisation of French youth culture (the hardware shop owner 
recommends the traditional Italian stovetop, calling the coffee produced by 
the machine Boni wants ‘American donkey piss’). It also ironically contrasts 
the reality of Boni’s orphaned existence with the machine’s connotations of an 
affluent domestic life of modernised commercial conveniences and comforts. 
That the machine sits by his bed rather than in the kitchen implies a certain 
out-of-orderness about his life, and points as well to the transient moment at 
which we encounter him.
Fantasies of domestic bliss are both projected onto and violated through the 
figure of the baker’s wife or boulangère (Valeria Bruni-Tedeschi). Boni spends 
much of the film narrating his aggressive sexual fantasies towards this woman, 
sometimes with dream-like visual accompaniment spliced in. Nénette, for her 
part, seems indifferent to sex, despite the revelation that she is pregnant. At 
times, the film implies that the child’s father may be Nénette’s own. Boni is 
estranged from their father (Jacques Nolot), who is linked throughout the film 
to a criminal underworld and is eventually shot. The film elliptically tracks the 
siblings’ relationship, culminating in the birth of the child ‘under x’ – Nénette 
has chosen to give her child up anonymously once it is born. Ultimately, Boni 
takes the child from the hospital at gunpoint, presumably to raise it himself. 
While the various plot elements such as teen pregnancy, murder, criminal-
ity and kidnapping may seem to suggest a highly dramatic film, the portrayal 
of events is muted and unmelodramatic. The film creates, through music, 
editing  and camerawork, a flowing oneiric quality that floats between char-
acters and scenes, privileging smells, colours, sounds and feelings over linear 
narrative and dialogue. Dialogue is sparse and becomes almost part of the 
soundtrack, and the mise-en-scène is dominated by close-ups shot with often 
shaky handheld cameras, and frequent slow pans over faces, bodies and spaces.
This drifting applies to the feel of the film as well as the ways in which both 
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siblings are adrift in the world and in which their relations with those around 
them alter them and undo any notion of stable identity.14 The first image of 
Nénette shows her floating through the water, impassive and ephemeral. This 
is followed by a scene of Boni and his friend driving wildly through the streets 
of Marseille, eventually passing the boulangère and shouting vulgarities at her. 
We keep moving from beginning to end, exploring an origin at once multiple 
and impossible to grasp. It is multiple because one character is never the Origin 
– we are continually exposed to yet another face or sensation, cultivating a 
plurality that undoes any notion of a single foundation. We tend towards it, 
approach it, but never arrive. The origin of the child who is born into a web 
of relations that precede and exceed him is as intangible as Nénette and Boni’s 
own mother whose absence permeates the apartment. In its sensual drift the 
film explores existence as meaning rather than as having meaning. The ellipti-
cal editing and multisensory non-causal movement between scenes encourage 
the spectator to experience the film outside of modes of cognition or under-
standing, exposing her to being rather than looking for a greater significance. It 
participates in an ethics of sense that keeps our co-existence an open question. 
Keeping things adrift is one way of framing an ethics that does not rely on 
foundational principles or maxims. Ethics must not become a fascism of sorts 
or a terrain marked with borders.15 Rather than securing foundations it must 
work to keep things moving, to emphasise the with of existence rather than 
the ‘I’, or to be sense rather than have meaning. Both Nancy and Denis share 
this orientation onto the world, and I extend this tendency by moving Denis’s 
filmic strategies towards (vers) Nancean ethics and vice versa.
Questions of sense, of humans as those beings whose being is a fundamental 
question for them, are the basis of Nancy’s ‘Originary Ethics’. It is in this text 
that Nancy most explicitly articulates his ethical philosophy. The essay builds 
on Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’, exploring the earlier philosopher’s 
claim that fundamental ontology is inseparable from an ethics. As is the case 
with Nancy’s singular plural ontology, which pushes Heidegger’s description 
of being as always being-with further along the path it suggests but fails to 
fully bear out, this essay also edges forward the promising ethical implica-
tions of Heidegger’s thought. Nancy argues that ‘“Originary ethics” is a more 
appropriate name for “fundamental ontology.” Ethics is what is fundamental 
about fundamental ontology.’16 Ethics is originary in the sense that it cannot 
be thought outside the coming into Being; ‘There is not first a brute fact (the 
being of beings, the “there is”), then a desire for sense (for this being). If this 
were the case, sense, action, and ethics would have to come after and from 
somewhere other than the fact of being.’17 Put differently, there is no essence 
that we are born with which then receives its meaning from a transcendent 
outside. Rather, our lack of essence and our fundamental ‘co’-existence makes 
the ontological condition that we share and are (that we are because we share 
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it) part and parcel of the ethical project of making sense. The meaning of our 
being here is precisely undecided and undecidable. ‘Making sense’ is a matter 
of conducting oneself so as to maintain and heed that responsibility. But 
conduct as a kind of ethics must be understood in a much more passive form 
than it may seem to imply. Here it is a question of living with the question, 
refusing to stabilise its meaning or fix an answer, but maintaining that question 
in all of its messiness as it impacts the way we are in the world. In fact, Nancy 
is careful to distinguish conduct from production, making ethics unproductive 
or désouvrée (like his community).18 Rather than constructing or codifying, 
ethics unworks. This idea of unworking is akin to the notion of interruption, 
discussed below in relation to film form and Denis’s aesthetic practices.
For both Denis and Nancy, ethics and ontology are virtually inseparable 
in terms of how they are thought and practised.19 Nancy writes, ‘There is no 
difference between the ethical and the ontological: the “ethical” exposes what 
the “ontological” disposes.’20 In her films, Denis exposes precisely this dis-
position that existence is, always relational and shifting. This is a practice that 
we view on screen but that is also induced in the spectator who experiences a 
relational exposure to the film. This is not a solitary speculative project but, 
rather, ‘The opening of making-sense is utterly impossible in a solipsistic 
mode.’21 Underlying this ethics is a notion of an originary difference that pre-
vents immanence or the ontological from being a totality, or a closed and static 
thing. As Nancy says in Vers Nancy, ‘Because an identity that is complete and 
well-founded . . . and incapable of accepting intrusion . . . is as stupid, closed, 
sealed . . . like a stone.’ The stupidity of full immanence applies to the commu-
nity and the world as much as to the individual. Significantly, in the short film 
this conclusion comes about as a result of Samardzija’s intervention – listening 
to Nancy as he plods forward with his analysis, she interrupts with the sugges-
tion ‘a stone-like identity’, which Nancy accepts as the fitting metaphor. They 
make sense together. Their speech is only meaningful because unlike a self-
enclosed stone their existence is shared, and continues to share out through the 
interruption of others – landscapes, faces, stray cats and flowers.22 The myth 
of a stone-like identity must be interrupted; difference must be integral to how 
we think being-with.
For both Denis and Nancy, difference is not only that which comes from 
the outside, but is there at the origin of the subject, making her own self-
identity a myth. Nancy writes in The Inoperative Community,
We are alike because each one of us is exposed to the outside that we are 
for ourselves . . . I do not rediscover myself, nor do I recognize myself in 
the other: I experience the other’s alterity, or I experience alterity in the 
other together with the alteration that ‘in me’ sets my singularity outside 
me and infinitely delimits it.23
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Otherness is already present at the origin of the subject, but not because of 
a relation that would be outside of or prior to the ontological. There is no 
essence to the subject that precedes and defines it. In his essay ‘L’Intrus’, 
Nancy develops these considerations starting from his own experience of 
undergoing a heart transplant and the subsequent need to suppress his auto-
immune system, due to his body’s rejection of the foreign heart. These events 
spur reflection on the ways in which our bodies are always already other to 
us, from the moment of our birth. It is not the intrusion of a foreign heart 
that begins the process of self-alteration, but rather the body has always been 
porous, at risk, and imbued with a strangeness such that it was never properly 
bounded to begin with. Similarly, I am in relation even before my birth and my 
involvement with others extends beyond my death. I am already other from 
the moment of coming into the world, and my involvement with others is such 
that it alters me in the process, revealing that I am singularly plural. Difference 
finds itself within being, rather than any beyond.
This notion of difference is one based on sharing and division. The French 
word for sharing (partager) connotes both dividing up and sharing out. To 
share (out) is always also to divide; to be with is to be divided. Only by being 
shared can being have meaning; otherwise it would be pure presence, a self-
enclosed thing unable to be a part of a shared world (‘like a stone’). If being is 
being-with it must involve division, spacing and giving outward. We can only 
share because there is space or division between and within us. Difference 
thought this way introduces a persistent fragmentation, which is always also a 
pluralisation, into the ontological. Because Nancy and, I would argue, Denis 
do not look to any transcendent realm or beyond to give meaning to the world, 
they must find a way to address the difference that is always at play within 
it. This play of differences is not reducible to a fixed relation between terms 
because the terms themselves are never fixed but rather constantly shared out, 
spacing and altering in their course.
Denis draws on cinematic means for displaying this difference that inter-
rupts all identity. She introduces a fragmentation into the ontological through 
the way in which she shifts from character to character, scene to scene, keeping 
things adrift and in constant motion. Difference also permeates the ontological 
through her use of fantasy and dream sequences. Scenes that collapse dream 
and reality or fantasy and memory punctuate Nénette and Boni. This is typical 
of Denis’s work and is notable in other films such as The Intruder and Friday 
Night; and 35 Shots of Rum (2008), while a fairly ‘realistic’ film, includes an 
improbable dream-like sequence in which daughter and father ride on horse-
back (a reference to Goethe’s Erlkönig). It is often unclear whose dreams we 
are seeing in Denis’s films (a character’s? the camera’s?), or whether an image 
is a memory or fantasy. These impressions are not meant to explain causality 
or psychology but to float across the screen, filling it with scents, textures, 
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colours and affects. At the same time they splinter the world of the film, insert-
ing an unmasterable difference into the diegesis. In one scene Boni wakes up 
to a trail of brioche leading his way down the hall. As Boni’s world has often 
been intruded on by fantasy images (particularly related to the boulangère 
who sells said brioche), we assume this is going to lead to an erotic scenario. 
Boni picks up a brioche and gently caresses it, with a ‘Bonjour’, after which 
we see him bite into the pastry on his patio. We then cut to Boni, back inside 
and sitting next to his coffee maker, which gurgles and exhales sensually (this 
machine comprises a very haptic and erotic aspect of the soundtrack) behind 
a small mountain of brioche, one of which he squeezes rhythmically. It is pos-
sible that Nénette has purchased and arranged the baked goods, after reading 
Boni’s diary in which he narrates his bakery-related fantasies; however, the 
film leaves this unclear. Boni’s immediate acceptance of the existence of the 
buns is puzzling if they are not an element of his fantasy life. (It is impossible 
that the boulangère has entered his apartment since she doesn’t even know 
his name, much less his address.) There is a surreal blurring of dream and 
reality here that the film’s general tone encourages us to accept and float with. 
It works against direct narrative meaning as it privileges a sensory drift over 
viewer comprehension, again inserting otherness into the diegesis.
It is much easier for us to recognise Denis’s characters’ opacity both to 
us as spectators and to each other than it is to recognise their own opacity to 
themselves, or the difference that they experience at the heart of their own 
being and embodiment (and this difficulty to ‘know’ is precisely because of 
their opacity to us). Perhaps the clearest that Denis comes to illustrating this 
is in the film The Intruder, fittingly based on Nancy’s essay ‘L’Intrus’. The 
main character, Louis Trebor, possesses multiple passports, and crosses many 
borders in search of a heart and his son. The film also consistently collapses 
states of dream and waking. Trebor’s insistence that he not be implanted with 
the heart of a woman gestures towards the instability of his sense of self and the 
murky boundaries of identity. Another example of the alterity within is illus-
trated through the character of Shane Brown in Trouble Every Day. Plagued 
by a murderous sexual disease that makes him both surprised by and afraid 
of himself, he recognises his own lack of mastery over the difference inside 
him. Finally, Boni is unable to anticipate his own reaction to the birth of his 
nephew. Nor can his imaginary performance of sexual dominance and entitle-
ment prepare him for a real interaction with the baker’s wife in the mall, which 
renders him mesmerised and speechless (a scene which I will return to further 
on). Difference from within is as much a surprise as that which we encounter 
‘outside’ of ourselves.
This ontology of differences, of singular plurality, cannot be mastered by 
thought. It refuses any fixed or higher meaning. With Nancy, if we can speak 
of transcendence, it is not in opposition to or outside of immanence, but rather 
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that which prevents us from stabilising what is constantly shifting in the 
world. In Nancy’s writing on ethics, the complex neither/nor of transcend-
ence and immanence is attended to:
There is, in principle, neither a simple transcendence nor a simple 
immanence. If it is entirely legitimate and not simply verbal acrobatics 
to say that the sense of being is the being of sense, this means that sense 
(the sense of human existence, but also, and along with it, the sense of the 
world) is in principle nothing other than action, or conduct. Conduct is 
thus the proper transcendence of the immanence that is.24
Transcendence as conduct is something at play within the realm of ontology 
rather than leading us to a realm beyond our being-here together. It is borne 
out in the process of life, through action rather than being a stable state or 
essence. This ethics is non-normative, in that it cannot be translated into 
propositional language or given a fixed referential meaning. Normative ethics 
tends to presuppose a self-identical rational subject that cultivates virtues or 
acts according to various maxims or principles. Norms also fix things into 
language, that is, the maxims and principles just referred to, creating a fixity 
which is precisely the danger that Nancy wants us to avoid. While on a practi-
cal and political level we may need certain norms and categories, the ontologi-
cal level reminds us to keep these foundations mobile and contingent.25
Nancy discusses the possibility of originary ethics being based on the 
maxim or law to ‘respect life’ but reassures his reader that this freezing of the 
content of ethics into a phrase would in fact be a reopening, since we have no 
immutable idea of what life is or what it might mean to respect it. Life itself 
is a category that must remain open to further revisions and inclusions and to 
respect it implies a conduct that is also open to broadening and redefinition.26 
Nancy’s rejection of any law- or principle-based ethics is evident when he 
writes that, ‘In principle, the ethics thus announced refers to nothing other 
than existence. No “value,” no “ideal” floating above concrete and everyday 
existence provides it in advance with a norm and a signification. But this 
everyday existence finds itself asked to make sense.’27 Perhaps the refusal of 
normative ethics is illustrated most clearly in what Nénette and Boni does not 
do – namely it refuses to make itself a didactic social issue film. Although it 
deals with broken familial ties and a teen pregnancy, it never judges or mor-
alises its characters. Its look is curious rather than categorical. As Nénette 
herself says to the nurse as she goes into labour, ‘Don’t moralise me!’ This does 
not mean that it lacks a politics per se, but rather that it does not aim to give the 
viewer a set of maxims or truths that she can walk away from the film feeling 
self-content about having reaffirmed or gained. The film lacks any moral 
judgement about Nénette’s pregnancy or her attitude towards it – she wants 
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to abort the child but is told that she is too far along. She attempts to abort the 
baby herself by bathing in a tub of mustard – an exercise in which Boni inter-
venes. She shows no positive emotion towards the child, remaining indifferent 
to it during ultrasounds, calling the technician a ‘dumb bitch’ and refusing 
to look at or touch the baby once it is born. Her labour is experienced as an 
unbearable suffering and Denis does not turn the child’s birth into a moment 
of melodramatic maternal awakening in Nénette. In many ways she refuses 
our pity, as much as she obfuscates any understanding. The film encourages 
an openness to her singularity that must remain sensed rather than cognised. 
She exists before being subsumed under any meaning-giving label, be it that of 
teenager, girl or mother.
Boni similarly refuses condemnation or redemption. He is shown engaging 
in contraband sales, and having aggressive and non-consensual sexual fantasies 
about the boulangère and other women. (His language is peppered by such 
colourful imperatives as ‘Come here you bitches. Come and eat daddy.’) His 
dreams move into the realm of the real when he approaches the bakery counter 
and asks the boulangère for a ‘long French stick’. Visibly uncomfortable with 
the interaction, she calls out for her husband to replenish the baked goods. 
One could easily assume that a role such as Boni with his misogynist rants 
and repressed emotional rage would be a fairly unsympathetic character in 
front of a female director’s lens. Yet, Denis has expressed her obsession with 
Boni in interviews and her manner of filming him suggests that his character 
fascinated rather than repulsed her. He is given full human complexity and 
not simply dismissed as a category or type. This treatment works to demys-
tify constructs of masculinity and refuses to only shed light on characters we 
assume self-evidently to be worthy of our gaze. For, ultimately, Boni too occu-
pies a position on the margin from which he struggles to survive. In one inter-
view Denis even compares her filmmaking process to Boni in a scene where he 
frenetically works the pizza dough amidst orgasmic shrieks, demanding, ‘You 
like that don’t you? Yeah, you sure do. It’s so good. Yeah, it’s good? Don’t 
move. I’m kneading you hard.’ The scene ends with Boni immersing his face 
in the dough, almost crying, suddenly vulnerable and soft.
Without analysing Denis’s own relationship to her trade here, I am inter-
ested in the solidarity she feels with her characters. As she says in an interview, 
‘I think to make a film the minimum is to be solidaire . . . In solidarity with the 
people you film. I mean the character that you imagine and you create with 
the actors.’28 The characters are not problems to be analysed or solved, nor 
are they easily categorisable into good or bad, desirable or undesirable. Thus 
Nénette and Boni refuses a normative ethics. Janet Bergstrom notes something 
related apropos the role of race in the film when she points out that the film 
uses characters of mixed race in a racially mixed setting, but, unlike many 
contemporary French social problem genre films, it never makes race a theme 
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or a problem.29 Perhaps this is because Denis realises that race is a category 
based on (mis)recognition – we may think we see race, and undoubtedly it 
informs her characters’ lives, but race does not define who they are. Nor does 
race demand a melodramatic treatment, simply because the cast is not white. 
Denis’s work in general cannot be read in terms of ethics as normative princi-
ples that can be pulled from narrative content. Ethics occurs narratively and 
formally in terms of what the films do not say or try to make visible, in the 
attitude they show towards their characters and that they cultivate between 
spectator and film. They expose rather than represent the other – offering a 
glimpse rather than capturing an essence. Or, in other words, they make sense, 
rather than moralise.
This making-sense is a never finished work, a désouvrement, which defines 
us in our being-here-with-others. In ‘The Insufficiency of “Values” and the 
Necessity of “Sense”’ Nancy writes,
To bring into view that which we cannot ‘see’ – that which conceals 
itself as the origin of the other, in the other – and to bring ‘into view’ 
the fact that we cannot ‘see’ it: that is what today makes an ‘ethical’ 
demand, without which any moral standpoint, any normative or pre-
scriptive assurance, is only the application of a recipe, with eyes closed, 
sleepwalking . . .30
This description begs for a consideration in relation to the medium of film – 
what does it mean to bring into view the fact that we cannot see? This suggests 
the ethical necessity of a kind of representational failure, to make visible the 
impossibility of making visible – a discussion that will resurface in the next 
chapter’s discussion of Levinas and Denis. The notions of representational 
failure and ethics as an unworking are closely linked with the concept of lit-
erature as that which interrupts myth. I elaborate on some of the specific ways 
in which this occurs in film in the next section. Refusing mastery and myth, 
Denis’s films move towards sense and literature.
interruption as  sense
Nénette and Boni participates in the ethics outlined through its revelation of 
life as ungraspable motion, as sense over myth, and cinema as a practice of 
interruption. These interruptive ethics are evident in the film’s emphasis on 
movement, the selection of shots, the inclusion of marginal scenes and figures, 
the use of recurring actors, and in the prioritising of the sensory over the 
visual.
The application of myth to the cinema is hardly a stretch. The classical 
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style, which developed out of Hollywood and has shaped mainstream film 
today, was based on the perpetuation of American ideological myths and the 
illusion of the viewing subject’s narrative mastery with respect to the film. In 
his book on Hollywood cinema, Robert B. Ray emphasises the classical para-
digm as functioning to conceal the multitude of choices that in fact compose 
every finished film. Choice is made invisible largely through ‘the systematic 
subordination of every cinematic element to the interests of a movie’s nar-
rative’.31 Furthermore, ‘The American Cinema’s habitual subordination of 
style to story encouraged the audience to assume the existence of an implied 
contract: at any moment in a movie, the audience was to be given the optimum 
vantage point on what was occurring on screen. Anything important would 
not only be shown, but shown from the best angle.’32 In this way, we can see 
how the subordination of all technical and stylistic elements to narrative also 
privileges sight as the sense of knowledge and comprehension.
Conversely, film can act as literature or privilege sense: it has the potential 
to disrupt its own mythologising tendencies when it does not subordinate dif-
ference and the sensory to narrative clarity. This interruption, which exposes 
singularities rather than represents identities, is key to what I am terming an 
ethics of sense as it relates to Denis’s films. Film conducts itself ethically, to 
play with Nancy’s language, when it interrupts itself, be it through characters’ 
own difference to themselves (as discussed above), or through the inclusion of 
peripheral scenes and characters in unexpected ways, which open the film up 
rather than containing it.33 Time-based arts, such as film, have a unique poten-
tial to enact an interruptive alterity, because our singular plurality is revealed 
in existence as a process, rather than a thing. In tandem with movement, time 
becomes a crucial element of being and ethics thought in terms of sense. As 
Nancy says in Being Singular Plural, ‘We do not have access to a thing or a 
state, but only to a coming.’34 Film as ‘literature’, with its temporal trajec-
tory, is a coming. Films that contain many low-action long takes (the films of 
Michelangelo Antonioni and Alexander Sokurov come to mind here) heighten 
the emphasis on duration that film offers, often encouraging the viewer to 
meditate on her own altering mental states during particularly contemplative 
shots. The train in Vers Nancy never arrives at a destination, nor does it stop to 
fix the characters in a state of permanence. Their relations shift and continue 
becoming from start to finish.35 Likewise, in Nénette and Boni we begin the film 
in a room of strangers, who will remain unknown, and we end at an ambiguous 
moment. In the penultimate scene we see Boni holding the newborn child. He 
looks at it lovingly, but has no skills or means to feed or care for him, nor is his 
own legal future certain, having stolen the infant at gunpoint. The final shot 
shows Nénette, adrift again, picking through an ashtray to find a smokeable 
butt, her face and future opaque. The film lacks any clear narrative resolution 
and the final scenes could just as easily constitute the middle of the film as the 
film interrupted  57
end. This emphasises the ongoing and unfinishable process of making sense. 
It makes the film literary rather than mythic. This facet of a non-normative 
ethics asks us to consider rather than understand.
The notion of movement without clear origin or telos applies to the subject 
herself, which extends to thinking about the film’s approach to its characters 
and the relation it facilitates between spectator and film. In ‘Who Comes After 
the Subject?’ Nancy writes that rather than a return to the subject, what is 
needed is a ‘move forward toward someone – some one – else in its place’, that 
is, ‘a punctuality, a singularity or a hereness (haecceitas) as place of emission, 
reception, or transition’.36 This would not be a subject but a ‘presence-to’ 
or toward that which is not itself. This is echoed in Denis’s own use of the 
preposition vers in two films that are portraits of sorts (Vers Nancy and Vers 
Mathilde). Both works approach a personage without employing any tradi-
tional biographical or documentary conditions (in the sense of back story, a 
sense of chronology, or an attempt to give an overview of major contributions). 
The films are more interested in the impression of the other, in exposing their 
sense as singularity rather than offering a total narrative of their lives. Vers 
reinforces the directional connotations of sens. Again, this movement across 
time may have a privileged space in the medium of film, which points us 
towards the other, touches on the other as origin, and in which that exposure 
between viewer and film and between characters on screen is sense and is the 
world that we are.
The movement away from myth and towards sense is further evident in 
the choice of shots and settings. Nénette and Boni, typical of Denis’s work, 
avoids the conventional use of establishing shots, which traditionally help 
spectators to locate the characters in a specific place and time, maximising 
narrative clarity. Although the film is shot in Marseille, iconic city shots are 
absent from the film. As Denis herself says, ‘Marseille is a city I really like to 
photograph, but because I was so into Boni there was no space for it in the film. 
I told Agnès [Godard, director of photography] that we were not going to illus-
trate Marseille at the expense of Nénette and Boni’s story.’37 Godard further 
adds that ‘the main landscapes were the faces of the actors, and these were 
infinite landscapes’.38 In fact the film favours close-ups, intimate explorations 
of bodies and skin, shot with a long lens and handheld camera. The choice 
of handheld camera also means that movement is present within most of the 
shots composing the film. As Martine Beugnet writes in her book on Cinema 
and Sensation, ‘In contrast with the body caught in action in medium or long 
shot, filming in close-up makes it possible to evoke a body that is temporarily 
freed from its function as social, cultural and even gender signifier – a body 
that escapes the conventional order of male/female dualism.’39 Privileging 
sensation over form, the close-up can also interrupt the myth of identity based 
on categories such as gender. This opens up an important intersection with 
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feminist concerns about representation and identity – what would it mean to 
rethink cinema in terms of an exposure that shows the limits of any identity-
based categories for making sense of the other’s singularity? While it is and has 
been no doubt crucial to insist on positive female, lesbian, differently abled, 
racialised and ageing (to name a few categories) representations of subjectivity, 
it is equally important to disrupt the notion that identity categories signify a 
fixed referent or that they define individuals in advance.40 In practice these two 
impulses often work hand in hand, insisting on more complex representations 
of those bodies that are typically relegated to minor characters. At a formal 
level, the use of the close-up and the move towards less sharply defined forms 
are strategies that can work to interrupt the body’s identitarian or referential 
status.
In Beugnet’s notion of a cinema of sensation, in which she includes Denis’s 
work, the body in close-up can neither be objectified nor act as a stable anchor 
of subjectivity (as it typically functions in dominant film language).41 Rather, 
‘Metamorphosing or deformed beyond recognition, the body in close-up 
evokes a subjectivity in a state of flux – a subjectivity in the making or in the 
process of dissolution.’42 Whereas Beugnet’s reading draws on Deleuze, this 
processual, constantly altering and sharing-out ‘subject’ can also be read as 
demonstrating a sense that interrupts myth, a reading which is sympathetic 
if parallel to Beugnet’s work. If anything, Beugnet’s focus on decomposi-
tion, formlessness and the unnameable moves to a different affective register 
when we read the shifting, relational and never complete subject through 
Nancy. There is a sense of creative warmth in the Nancean idea that the co-
imbrication of the human and technological, human and animal, human and 
mineral is the human condition. The human is that which never forms, never 
solidifies, keeps turning, meshing, touching and pulling off, being wounded 
and feeling ecstatic, unable to stand still and become a stable form. Through 
this lens the close-up (in Denis) works neither to decompose the character into 
a realm of pure sense, nor to individuate or give psychological legibility to the 
character. Rather, it is a mode of sensual, interruptive exposure to the other, 
which moves towards the other without fixing her in a stable location or frame.
The face as landscape is also interesting to consider in Vers Nancy, where 
faces and hands are given precedence over a clear time and space. We see 
mostly blurred landscape through the windows and are never given an external 
shot of the train riding through the countryside, or a legible road sign to orient 
us. While the train approaches an unknown destination, we approach the 
bodies on screen and gain access to them at this specific and fleeting moment 
as they are with each other. Along the same lines, the opening sequence in 
Nénette and Boni can be read as an (anti)establishing shot that privileges sense 
over fixed meaning (i.e. clear location in time and space). Counter to domi-
nant filmmaking practice, the first images of the film are not successive views 
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of the city or even the outside of the building in which we find ourselves. 
Rather, we begin in a congested room, where a man sells bootleg telephone 
cards to a group of African immigrants. Women and men sit crowded on the 
floor as the salesman assures them of the legitimacy of the phonecards, despite 
their vocal scepticism. It could be argued that the scene illustrates the ethnic 
diversity of Marseille, as well as foregrounding its shadier criminal underside 
in the French imaginary and French cinema.43 However, it never explains 
where we are, nor does it obviously introduce a major theme or any significant 
characters. It establishes very little. This scene is an example of another facet 
of Denis’s interruptive cinema, her inclusion of marginal narratives or uncon-
nected scenes.
Often these marginal scenes have the last word in Denis’s films, refusing 
the viewer a sense of tidy plot completion by reminding her that any narra-
tive finality must be interrupted by the ongoing movement of life as sense, 
without finality or telos.44 The opening scene of Nénette and Boni exemplifies 
this practice of interruption or marginal narrative inclusion, and it continues 
to intrude at various points throughout the film. This story is so marginal that 
it can hardly be called a subplot. We never see these characters again, except 
for the salesman whom we later view (notably only after we have completely 
forgotten the seemingly random opening scene) asking a man at a payphone if 
he can photograph his phonecard, since his ‘daughter collects them’. At a later 
point in the film the camera drifts away from the main scene to someone speak-
ing in Vietnamese on a payphone. A meeting between Nénette and her pre-
natal counsellor is interrupted when the counsellor answers the phone. We 
listen to her complain of unaccounted for charges on her phone bill to Ho Chi 
Minh City. This literal interruption, along with the aforementioned visual and 
narrative interruptions, works to keep a sense of dynamism and difference at 
play in the film through cinematic means. This sub-narrative strain of broken 
communication – frustrated, interrupted or somehow clandestine – highlights 
the play of difference throughout the film as different bodies cross paths and 
touch each other without necessarily communicating in a way that implies 
understanding, fusion or communion. In fact, perhaps here it is useful to think 
of Bataille’s use of the word ‘communication’ as a kind of contagion, infecting 
and altering rather than rationally exchanging.45 This moves us yet further 
away from the notion of an autonomous subject and towards a messy together-
ness that the film exposes as our ontological condition. The film accomplishes 
cinematically what Nancy describes in a text released the same year as the film, 
which relays the need not to interrogate the meaning of being, but instead to 
‘pay attention to the fact of [being’s] exhibition’.46 He says,
If ‘communication’ is for us, today, such an affair – in every sense of 
the word . . . – if its theories are flourishing, if its technologies are being 
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proliferated, if the ‘mediatization’ of the ‘media’ brings along with it an 
auto-communicational vertigo, if one plays around with the theme of 
the indistinctions between the ‘message’ and the ‘medium’ out of either 
a disenchanted or jubilant fascination, then it is because something is 
exposed or laid bare. In fact, [what is exposed] is the bare and ‘content’-
less web of ‘communication.’ One could say it is the bare web of the com- 
. . .; that it is our web or ‘us’ as web or network, an us that is reticulated 
and spread out, with its extension for an essence and its spacing for a 
structure.47
Rather than the meanings that communication communicates or has, Nancy 
draws our attention to the with-ness that is exposed through our increas-
ingly proliferated technological modes of contact. It is there that we can see 
the meaning we are, as beings who are enmeshed with one another in ways 
that alter us continually. Communication is our mutual contagion before any 
content. The meaning is in the contact itself rather than interpreted from the 
content of what is communicated. As a form of media, cinema reveals another 
valence of this affective encountering of and in the world. Film can enact 
what philosophy gestures towards, as it pays attention to the exhibition of 
our singularly plural existence as it happens, each time. The scenes relating 
to the international phonecard scandal bring again a form of fragmentation 
or pluralisation into the ontological world of Nénette and Boni. Through this 
Denis exposes the limits of her story, unworking any mythic tendency. We do 
not come to a real resolution, we do not solve a moral problem, and the film 
presents us with a world that is constituted by a difference that it does not 
presume to contain.
Sometimes, these seemingly unimportant scenes also serve to allow an actor 
that Denis regularly uses to appear briefly in another of her films. One of the 
ways we can understand Denis’s use of the same actors between films is in 
the sense of an interruption elaborated above. When Nénette first arrives in 
Marseille, she sits outside on a fountain next to an anonymous person, played 
by Richard Courcet, who stars in Denis’s previous film I Can’t Sleep and 
will reappear in later works, such as Beau travail. Nénette, in a personalising 
gesture, removes her hamburger patty from the bun to eat it. Courcet asks if 
he can have her bun and she obliges. This brief scene reveals an idiosyncrasy of 
Nénette’s without explaining it or suggesting it implies any deeper truth about 
her personality. It also allows Denis to incorporate one of her regulars, who, 
if one has seen Denis’s previous film, will be recognised, as he brings these 
intertextual associations along with him (and this holds also if one has seen 
later films with the same actor before an earlier picture). In a sense Courcet’s 
presence again draws attention to the limits of the frame or the film’s world. 
He is another (recognisable) face that interrupts the film’s plenitude. Houri 
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and Colin (the actors who play the title characters) are themselves recurring 
actors, having played a brother and sister in their previous Denis production 
(the made-for-television US Go Home, 1994). Their characters are different 
here, as is their setting and family structure, but we are invited to view the film 
in relation to this earlier work. It continues an exploration into siblings and the 
dynamic between the two actors, and probes its own themes even further, from 
a slightly different angle. One way to read all of Denis’s interfilmic character 
sharing is as a form of ‘communication’ – a feature of her oeuvre that is often 
noted but rarely analysed.48
In Nénette and Boni alone, we also see Jacques Nolot as the father, who plays 
a bit role in I Can’t Sleep, and Alex Descas as the gynaecologist, who stars in 
No Fear No Die (1990), I Can’t Sleep, Trouble Every Day and 35 Shots of Rum. 
Houri will reappear briefly, without speaking, on the metro in Trouble Every 
Day, and Colin acts again in Beau travail, The Intruder, Friday Night (in a brief 
non-speaking cameo), 35 Shots of Rum and Bastards (2013). Vincent Gallo, 
‘the baker’, was also cast in US Go Home and stars in Trouble Every Day. This 
use of actors puts Denis’s films in direct communication with one another – 
where again communication is a kind of contagion. Put differently, her films 
contaminate one another through their sharing of bodies. Rather than a clear 
referential meaning, the meaning alone seems to consist in the act of the char-
acter appearing. A spacing or sharing out is enacted amongst the films, where 
the world of each film is further stretched open around its already interrupted 
frame. Denis’s repeated use of actors also renders each film, each time, a sin-
gular encounter – rewatching a film may expose another face or facet of a face, 
if other films with that actor have been viewed in the interim.
This intertextuality also applies to Denis’s use of music. Six of her films 
are scored by the British group Tindersticks (or by single members of the 
group), of which Nénette and Boni was the first (in addition to The Intruder, 
Friday Night, Trouble Every Day, White Material (2009) and Bastards), and 
music tends to function as itself a character of sorts in her films. What is rel-
evant here is to imagine how the particular feel of their music, which though 
different each time, just as an actor plays different roles, can still be read as a 
sonically recurring personality, something familiar but still undefined. It again 
asserts itself in a way that draws attention to the film as it exists in relation to 
Denis’s entire oeuvre, an effect that, as with the inclusion of regular actors, 
tends to interrupt the illusion or plenitude of the film and gesture to the world 
outside of itself. As Jenny Munro notes, it also introduces an element of time, 
as we see actors ageing throughout their careers. This recurring cast (which 
also includes actors such as Béatrice Dalle, Michel Subor, Isaach de Bankolé 
and the late Yekaterina Golubeva) fragments the world of the film by bringing 
in extradiegetic connotations. In this way Denis forms a community of shift-
ing presences, each film altering how we read these bodies, depending on the 
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order in which we screen them. The actors are each time different and their 
inclusion seems to be sufficient in and of itself to not require narrative or even 
visual motivation (as in the above scene with Richard Courcet). Their faces 
literally interrupt the world of the film, creating another opening outside of the 
diegesis in the potentially mythic film narrative.
This intertextual interruptive practice can be further supported by other 
moments in Denis’s oeuvre. For example, her first film with Michel Subor, 
Beau travail, consciously quoted and even suggested a continuation of a 
much earlier character that Subor played in Jean-Luc Godard’s Petit Soldat 
(1960). In the earlier movie Subor played a soldier name Bruno Forrestier. 
Some thirty-nine years later, Subor plays another Bruno Forrestier in Denis’s 
film, now an officer in the Foreign Legion with a murky past. Here, Denis 
consciously invites us to read what is outside of the film into it, or to view 
the film in relation. She thus undermines our desire for narrative completion 
or to close the world of the film around the diegesis itself. Similarly, Subor’s 
second picture with Denis, The Intruder, includes footage from an unfinished 
earlier film starring Subor entitled Le Reflux (Paul Gégauff, 1965). This 
grainier footage of a younger Subor sailing through the South Seas is inserted 
during a scene where the now much older Subor returns to Tahiti to seek out 
his son. Again, this film intrudes onto Denis’s own, grafting itself onto the 
work, altering it and letting its meaning be altered by it, all the while expos-
ing a limit to the frame.49 While it may be argued that almost all films, then, 
‘interrupt’ themselves as they use actors who have appeared in other movies, 
Denis’s repeated use of the same group of actors (and technicians), as well as 
her conscious insertion of references to cinematic moments outside of the film, 
itself creates a unique dynamic. They open up the film, again privileging sense 
over narrative as it moves between and amongst her films and extends to points 
outside of her own body of work.
Finally, interruption as sense also functions in terms of sense as sensorium. 
The aforementioned close-ups and pans of bodies and surfaces work to evoke 
a tactile sensuality. Here I focus on sound and smell as they contribute to 
sense over meaning. This sensuality permeates Nénette and Boni’s drift, which 
moves across tactile images from fantasy to reality to pure abstraction. The 
score is characterised by a gentle and floating quality and almost always accom-
panies transitions between varied images (often seemingly unmotivated or not 
linked according to any causal logic). In one scene we see Boni’s back in chia-
roscuro as he writhes in bed narrating one of his boulangère fantasies aloud. 
Music comes on the soundtrack. As Boni’s back falls into darkness (Figure 2.7) 
we move to a dream scene in which he walks along an overpass where the baker 
woman brushes her hair. Almost completely in shadow we are given fleeting 
glances of a hand in her top, the woman going to her knees and so on, as the 
score melts away and groaning-like noises come onto the soundtrack. The 
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scene also melts away, almost literally, becoming a psychedelic kaleidoscope 
of orange-gold oscillating patterns (Figure 2.8). This is overlaid with a highly 
haptic gurgling and hissing noise. We see Boni bathed in gold light (Figure 
2.9), then cut to him sleeping in bed, in a less rich light (Figure 2.10), all the 
while the gurgling and hissing dominating the soundtrack. The camera slowly 
pans to the coffee maker next to Boni’s bed (which we come to realise is the 
source of the sounds), as we see his hand slowly and erotically caressing the 
machine and pulling it slightly closer (Figure 2.11). My attempt to evoke this 
scene is hindered by the fact that language falls short of Denis’s multisensory 
montage. This sequence is a sensual glide across physical surfaces, sound-
scapes, light, shadow, colour, form and formlessness. It is an ‘unnecessary’ 
scene, in that Boni’s fantasy life has already been well established, along with 
the high value he assigns to the coffee maker. It is a purely sensual indulgence 
that works against dominant forms of narrative development and continu-
ity in cinema. Bringing us affectively and haptically closer to Boni, if only to 
emphasise the distance between us, it suspends meaning in favour of an excess 
of sense.
Nénette and Boni was Denis’s first musical collaboration with Tindersticks, 
who were present on set during filming, often playing through taping to 
contribute to the overall feel of the film. Denis listened to their music while 
constructing her screenplay.50 In the editing room, she worked according to 
their score, even keeping scenes that she normally would have cut, because 
they fitted with the music.51 She has said of this partnership, ‘Stuart [Staples, 
of Tindersticks] and his music gave us more courage to be more elliptic, 
Figure 2.7 Boni’s back in chiaroscuro.
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abstract . . . The music uninhibited me so I could fabricate the film.’52 In an 
interview almost a decade later, she states, ‘The only time when I recognize 
myself in my work, is when I have a very strong rapport with music. Music 
multiplies itself, it is an ally, a road companion. Sometimes I look to music for 
what my collaborators cannot give me, for what a project cannot give me on its 
own. It is like a secret companionship between myself and music.’53 Denis’s 
approach does not subordinate the sensory and rhythmic aspects of filmmak-
Figure 2.8 The scene melts away, becoming a psychedelic kaleidoscope of orange-gold 
oscillating patterns.
Figure 2.9 We see Boni bathed in gold light . . .
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ing to narrative clarity, as characterises the classical cinema.54 Commenting on 
the traditional film soundtrack, Denis says, ‘What’s called the film score, that 
intervention after-the-fact . . . is often a way to impose “character psychology” 
(which horrifies me), and it is completely contrary to my idea of the cinema.’55 
It is interesting in this regard that perhaps the most dramatic scene of the film, 
when Boni takes the baby at gunpoint, is shown completely without sound, 
as though we are watching through soundproof glass. Denis downplays the 
drama and shoots it more clinically than other more banal moments in the film. 
Figure 2.11 We see his hand slowly and erotically caressing the machine and pulling it  
slightly closer.
Figure 2.10 . . . then cut to him sleeping in bed, in a less rich light.
66  towards a  feminist  c inematic  ethics
The soundtrack, throughout the abduction, remains silent. In her touchstone 
work on music in film, Claudia Gorbman emphasises the danger of silence 
at key narrative moments, noting that when you remove music ‘from a scene 
whose emotional content is not explicit . . . you risk confronting the audience 
with an image they might fail to interpret’.56 As a counter cinema, Nénette and 
Boni draws on this as a strength, allowing the image to remain unanchored. 
This allows a less calculated affective engagement to take precedence over cog-
nitive clarity, giving the viewer an emotional freedom to encounter the scene 
in less manipulative terms.
Denis’s use of sound resonates with Nancy’s distinction between listen-
ing as hearing (écouter) and listening as comprehending (entendre), the former 
of which places emphasis on the pre-cognitive affective connection with the 
audible. Listening as a sensible rather than an intelligible mode resonates with 
the notion of ethics as a call to keep meaning in question rather than locking 
it down, and with a privileging of exposure and receptivity over the illusion 
of the body as contained and autonomous. Nancy writes, ‘To be listening is 
always to be on the edge of meaning, . . . not, however, as an acoustic phenom-
enon (or not merely as one) but as a resonant meaning, a meaning whose sense 
is supposed to be found in resonance, and only in resonance.’57 Sense thought 
in terms of listening highlights the vibratory power of sound and sound as a 
material force that resonates through bodies, further touching on the proces-
sual, directional component of sense. Here listening functions as a liminal 
concept. It resonates – a material presence vibrating through the air, a body 
against other bodies; being meaning, rather than possessing it.
In filmic terms, listening also opens up a discussion of the role of sound 
in the spectator’s experience. An ethics of sense demands that we ‘tune in’ 
in every sense of the phrase to the sounds and images before us, exposing 
ourselves to them such that they ‘play’ us and perhaps offer an encounter that 
interrupts our illusion of autonomy, altering our singularity through the sin-
gularities shared on screen. Nancy posits the subject as a ‘diapason-subject’ – a 
one-of-a-kind tuning fork. ‘Diapason’ suggests the full range of potential of 
any being, and its singularity, while highlighting the body’s receptivity and 
sensitivity to the world. We are in relation to a world with which we get in 
tune, as its vibrations traverse the body. Nancy states,
To listen is to enter that spatiality by which, at the same time, I am pen-
etrated, for it opens up in me as well as around me, and from me as well 
as toward me: it opens me inside me as well as outside, and it is through 
such a double, quadruple, or sextuple opening that a ‘self’ can take place. 
To be listening is to be at the same time outside and inside, to be open 
from without and from within, hence from one to the other and from one 
in the other.58
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The subject can only be understood in terms of this making-space, this 
spacing or opening up of a subject-place that happens through time and keeps 
happening beat after beat, verse after verse, frame after frame. Boni literally 
makes room (clearing the mother’s room) for the baby, physically manifesting 
the space that has opened within him through the arrival of Nénette and the 
anticipation of new life. We, as spectators, are open to the vibrations of image 
and sound, making room for new beings and impressions, preparing for an 
encounter that is spatial as well as temporal.
This works towards a post-phenomenological sensory form of spectator-
ship. By post-phenomenological I mean to signal a desire to move away from 
the notion of an autonomous subject who sees the world as properly outside 
of her and then incorporates what appears to her consciousness into a larger 
horizon of meaning. In listening it is not a matter of appearing as full-presence 
or manifestation. It does not require an intentional consciousness directed 
towards something, perceiving and assimilating it. Rather it is a receptivity 
to resonance, to the affective timbre of an animal calling, music playing, or a 
voice crying out:
The subject of listening or the subject who is listening (but also the 
one who is ‘subject to listening’ in the sense that one can be ‘subject to’ 
unease, an ailment, or a crisis) is not a phenomenological subject. This 
means that he is not a philosophical subject, and, finally, he is perhaps no 
subject at all, except as the place of resonance, of its infinite tension and 
rebound, the amplitude of sonorous deployment and the slightness of its 
simultaneous redeployment – by which a voice is modulated in which the 
singular of a cry, a call, or a song vibrates by retreating from it.59
As spectators of multisensory media, we ourselves open as spaces of reso-
nance, receptive to a story or an image that alters us. This reading is important 
because it foregrounds our vulnerability, our with-ness and our non-mastery 
of the world, all of which challenge the spectator accustomed to the classical 
American film idiom and, more broadly, lingering notions of a bounded and 
intentional subject.
One scene in Nénette and Boni is particularly striking in regard to listening 
and the sensory. Dialogue in the film is sparse, so the conversation in which 
Boni encounters the boulangère outside of her station behind the bakery 
counter and they have a coffee is notable.60 We see her sampling perfume in the 
mall before we cut to a frontal shot of Boni, looking through a window. While 
the engrained viewer assumption is that we are seeing a reverse shot here (i.e. 
that Boni is watching the woman as she runs errands), we realise quickly that 
we are mistaken when she approaches him at the window and says hello. We 
are never shown what he has been viewing. Boni accepts her  invitation for a 
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coffee and what follows is a fascinating study in encountering. The conversa-
tion occurs in three very long takes that together last around three and a half 
minutes. We start in close-up on Boni as the boulangère attempts to make 
conversation with the impenetrable boy. It is impossible to tell what he is 
thinking (Figure 2.12) – is he awestruck? Dumbfounded? Boni’s reticence 
is further accented by its contrast with his long-winded fantasy scenarios, 
which are filled with colourful dialogue. The reality of the woman seems to 
render him speechless, his only two comments during the whole conversation 
being to state his name when asked and to reply that he doesn’t know when 
the woman asks what her wrists smell like. She herself almost immediately 
comments that Boni is not a big talker, but quickly applies the comment to 
herself, explaining that that is what a customer told her earlier. Ironically, she 
then nervously carries the weight of the interaction with the almost completely 
silent Boni. After thirty seconds we cut to a medium shot of the woman, who 
lights a cigarette and introduces the topic of smell, explaining that she prefers 
not to wear perfume because she’s read about a famous molecule that causes 
a chemical reaction between men and women. The camera rests on her for 
over two minutes as she continues, still receiving no audible response from 
Boni. At times she seems visibly uncomfortable and she erupts into pleas-
ing and nervous bursts of laughter as she describes how a similar molecule 
works on female pigs (Figures 2.13–2.15). As we cut back to Boni (in close-up 
for another take lasting almost fifty seconds), she turns to the subject of the 
inequitable distribution of these chemicals amongst humanity and the viewer 
wonders whether Boni has any pheromones to offer. He remains impassive, 
except for the brief hint of a smile. We never see the conclusion of the conver-
sation as the next cut transfers us somewhere else.
In this ‘dialogue’ we listen rather than understand, language giving way to 
the affects that happen between us – the sense of how we impact and touch one 
another. The woman’s description of attraction and repulsion is echoed and 
exceeded by the image, sound and feeling of the interaction as we experience 
it. The conversation opens up more than it pins down, sharing out a moment 
of encounter whose affect is sensed by the viewer. It is not only sound that cir-
culates but, as the boulangère herself has indicated, scents are material chemi-
cal particles that travel amongst us, disregarding any bodily boundaries in their 
passage. In an interview Denis comments,
You know, I’ve always thought about smell. I’ve always thought that to 
be attracted to someone had to have something to do with smell. And 
there is even a scene in Nénette et Boni where Valeria Bruni-Tedeschi 
speaks at great length with Grégoire Colin, and she’s speaking to us 
about smells. See, there are dialogues in Nénette et Boni after all! And 
that particular dialogue is very good. But smells, you can imagine them 
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in the cinema. You can speak of smells in the cinema because you do have 
bodies present.61
This sensory materiality, as it relates to smell, is present at other points in 
the film – Nénette asks her brother if he ever does laundry because all of his 
clothes stink, she smells her mother’s sweater as she rifles through her closet, 
Figure 2.12 It is impossible to tell what he is thinking.
Figure 2.13 She’s read about a famous molecule that causes a chemical reaction between men 
and women.
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and we see Boni smell his own odour after waking up (Figures 2.16 and 2.17). 
This olfactory thread is part of Denis’s scriptwriting practice:
When Jean-Pol Fargeau and I write, we write sensations. We even 
describe odours – the smell of a forest in summer when you’re naked in 
the heat with two dogs. In a script you need to understand the ellipses. 
Figure 2.14 At times she seems visibly uncomfortable.
Figure 2.15 She erupts into nervous and pleasing laughter.
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Sometimes they come later, little by little, but often they impose them-
selves from the start.62
This quotation suggests that the ellipses, the lack of dialogue and narrative 
legibility so characteristic of her work, indicate those moments when sensation 
steps in to be meaning in the absence of semiological or cognitive modes of 
Figure 2.16 ‘You can speak of smells in the cinema because you do have bodies present.’
Figure 2.17 Nénette smells her mother’s sweater as she rifles through her closet.
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comprehension. It is a form of interruption, where we are offered an encounter 
with smells, tensions and auditory vibrations.
Denis’s films contribute to an ethics of sense when they cultivate a form of 
listening in their viewers, highlighting the tactility of sound (its power to evoke 
feelings even in the absence of images), its synaesthetic qualities, and also the 
power of music and voice to touch on what cannot be grasped, to expose and 
to gesture towards the liminal in human experience. This, in addition to other 
strategies such as the intertextual uses of actors, the privileging of close-ups, 
and the inclusion of peripheral scenes, all work to interrupt myth, to make her 
films literature and to suspend meaning in favour of an ethics of sense. At stake 
here is a challenge to our habitual ways of orienting ourselves onto the world – 
in place of the absolutism of myths of nation or subject, we learn to attune our-
selves to the singularity or sense of the other and to the non-masterability of the 
world. This relinquishing of the control and power attendant on ‘knowledge’, 
in particular, challenges dominant subjectivities who have historically had the 
privilege of ‘knowing’ and naming the world. As a move towards that which 
cannot be, properly speaking, known, I now turn to a paradigmatic instance of 
liminality, focusing on birth as it relates to the ethics elaborated here.
natality and wonder
The phonecard thread in Nénette and Boni references a larger framework of 
fragmented communication, which I suggested we might think in terms of 
communication as contagion (after Bataille). Nancy connects the notion of con-
tagion to the birth into community when he writes, ‘Instead of fulfilling itself in 
a work of death and in the immanence of a subject, community communicates 
itself through the repetition and the contagion of births: each birth exposes 
another singularity, a supplementary limit, and therefore another communica-
tion.’63 As opposed to the coming into being of a sovereign subjectivity, birth is 
contagious, a new opening in the flux of the world. The origin is multiple, both 
in the sense that we are each of us an origin, a point of access to the world, and in 
the sense that our own origin is never autonomous or discrete. We very literally 
come out of a bodily space of sharing and are preceded by a web of connections, 
expectations, fears and joys. Although Nancy does draw on birth in a metaphor-
ical and creative sense, for example, describing art as in each instance the birth 
of a world, natality as a literal process and stage is also crucial to his thinking of 
co-ontology.64 Birth is a liminal concept, because our own origin must be, for us, 
immemorial. Birth is that which we can never ‘know’ or ‘remember’ although 
we have each experienced it. As an immemorial foundation, then, birth undoes 
the very notion of a stable or singular origin. We are already in-relation before 
we take our first breath – our earliest life originating in another body, such that 
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birth graphically illustrates our bodily with-ness, during both gestation and the 
process of being born. Boni, as much as the baby, highlights this immemoriality 
vis-à-vis his own deceased mother, whose absence permeates the apartment. 
His origins are something we as viewers do not have access to and nor does he; 
they withdraw from the viewer as much as from Boni himself. Denis has said 
that she wanted to use light sparingly in the interior shots of the apartment 
because she ‘wanted the house to be like a womb, since there is the mystery of 
what’s growing in Nénette’s stomach’.65 This womb-like environment also sug-
gests Boni and Nénette’s ongoing birth into a shared world, where that sharing 
is also always a division from the self, revealing the notion of an autonomous 
subjectivity to be another Western myth.
Nancy turns again to the womb and natality in his account of listening, as 
discussed already in relation to sense as interruption:
Perhaps we should thus understand the child who is born with his first 
cry as himself being – his being or his subjectivity – the sudden expan-
sion of an echo chamber, a vault where what tears him away and what 
summons him resound at once, setting in vibration a column of air, of 
flesh, which sounds at its apertures: body and soul of some one new and 
unique. Someone who comes to himself by hearing himself cry (answer-
ing the other? calling him?), or sing, always each time, beneath each 
word, crying or singing, exclaiming as he did by coming into the world.66
Here we see again the non-identity of the subject who ‘comes to himself’ and is 
himself the expansion of a space that both resonates outward and is traversed 
by vibrations that come from somewhere else, destabilising the distinction 
between inside and out. In describing the subject as this space of resonance, 
Nancy describes
The womb[matrice]-like constitution of resonance, and the resonant 
constitution of the womb: What is the belly of a pregnant woman, if not 
the space or the antrum where a new instrument comes to resound, a new 
organon, which comes to fold in on itself, then to move, receiving from 
outside only sounds, which, when the day comes, it will begin to echo 
through its cry? But more generally, more womblike, it is always in the 
belly that we – man or woman – end up listening, or start listening. The 
ear opens onto the sonorous cave that we then become.67
We start off, then, by listening, sensing rather than understanding, being 
affected by the world before we act on it and organise it into any cognitive unity.
In Denis’s work, subjects are revealed in their singular plurality (i.e. their 
constitutionally related existence), in part through relations that alter them 
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or that reveal a different facet of who they are. The baby’s arrival is antici-
pated with anxiety and eventually love by Boni, with dread and resignation 
by Nénette, and his birth in its turn alters their lives (although counter to 
gendered stereotypes about motherhood and maternity, the birth is merely 
a relief to Nénette, who wants nothing to do with the child, but nonetheless 
she has been undoubtedly changed by having to undergo this experience). 
The child is an event whose origin withdraws from us; this is perhaps most 
literally illustrated by the silence around the identity of the baby’s father. 
‘He doesn’t exist,’ says Nénette when pressed. While the film raises the 
themes of maternity and birth, it is undoubtedly through Boni that we truly 
witness the intrusion of the other, or the ways in which the other interrupts 
our illusion of autonomy. The film is very much about Boni’s own alterity to 
himself, and documents the various intrusions that shape him as an ongoing 
process through the diegesis, from Nénette’s arrival, to the conversation with 
the boulangère (whose reality interrupts his pure fantasy of her), to the baby 
itself. The struggle within Boni is evident when he asserts his autonomy to his 
newly arrived sister in telling her, ‘I do what I fucking want. Pain in the ass.’ 
This scene is closely followed by one of Boni searching the train station for the 
sibling he has just rejected. The struggle to accept this new piece of his life is 
reflected in the oscillations between affection and aggression that Boni shows 
towards Nénette. After insisting that she see a doctor and accompanying her 
there, Boni throws her out of the van and takes off. He cherishes the ultrasound 
image, but is nonetheless physically aggressive towards the pregnant Nénette. 
As the film progresses, we see Boni coming to terms with and welcoming 
the baby’s arrival. He clears the mother’s room for the child and caresses 
Nénette’s belly, excited when he feels it move (Figure 2.18). Boni is becoming 
other through the anticipation of a new life, but again this is displaced from 
where we would conventionally expect an alteration to be visible, namely, in 
the expectant mother herself. Boni’s nascent impulses of care unhook nurture 
from the maternal role. In fact, he reveals that the notion of the ‘maternal’ is a 
gendered construct for what is simply a feeling of nurture that any person may 
or may not evince toward another. The film thus documents Boni’s ongoing 
rebirths. Although Boni is already nineteen, as Nancy writes, ‘we never stop 
being born into community’.68
In her work, Anne O’Byrne focuses on birth as a central concept for under-
standing Nancy’s exposition of world, self and sense. Nancy writes in The 
Sense of the World that the world possesses ‘an innateness “whose structure is 
throughout the structure of birth and surprising arrival”’.69 O’Byrne develops 
this strain of Nancy’s thought, elaborating that ‘Identity is not asserted, but 
comes to pass and keeps passing in a continual movement within which birth 
marks a shift rather than a break. It is not yet a shift from the immemorial 
to experience that will in principle be available to memory – this will come 
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later – but a shift to visibility and susceptibility, which is to say, to the state 
of being exposed.’70 Just as Denis’s films make visible bodies that we may 
not get a complete picture of, birth is an exposure rather than the establish-
ment of an identity. Birth is always relational, as is being, which ‘finds itself 
constantly interrupted, stalled, set off-kilter by new arrivals; a shudder runs 
through it just as the self is trembled-through [durch-zittiert] by the self of the 
other individual but also by its difference from itself’.71 Rather than founding 
itself in a transcendent outside, birth itself is the opening of the world through 
the creation of the new, the ongoing flux of the world as sense.72 This again 
highlights the processual and dynamic nature of co-existence. The temporal 
aspect of birth as an ongoing rather than finished event re-emphasises the idea 
that time-based media such as film have a special capacity to expose this origin 
(which is always multiple and never a foundation) of sense.
As a liminal and immemorial experience, natality may suggest a breakdown 
in representation. But O’Byrne suggests that the immemorial is that which 
we tend toward – it emerges ‘obliquely’: ‘if not in philosophy then certainly 
in the maelstrom of lived experience and also, Nancy suggests, in painting’.73 
Building on this, we can extend Nancy’s suggestion that painting can reach 
towards the immemorial to the medium of film.74 The idea of tending towards 
(vers) a character, an impression, a place at a particular moment in time, or a 
sound echoes Denis’s own preoccupations. A filmic ethics of sense, then, is 
particularly interested in the immemorial, the natal and the liminal; it tends 
toward rather than simply captures. It also opens us up to the curiosity of the 
other as access to an origin.
Figure 2.18 Boni is becoming other through the anticipation of a new life.
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To think about birth as a starting place for understanding the structure 
of world, community and ontology is to radically shift the tendency of much 
Western philosophy to turn to death as an indicator of who we truly are or 
what our existence might mean.75 What Nénette and Boni suggests is that we 
can separate birth from its own mythology, linked as it is to notions of mater-
nal sacrifice. It also asks us to take birth as a starting place for thinking about 
‘children’ of all ages, to open up our curiosity to the each time of the gesture 
of another, to the way that they are altered as they move through their daily 
activities and to the way this openness alters us as spectators. From a femi-
nist perspective, this focus on natality allows us to learn from maternity and 
birth, which are either ignored or mythologised in our culture, but without 
essentialising what that experience means. This provides a way to emphasise 
an undervalued and often repressed process, that of the literal material repro-
duction of the species, but at the same time disrupts discourses that attach 
maternity to femininity or the maternal, or that render motherhood the sole 
defining state of any woman who has the option to and chooses to give birth (or 
who does not have the choice, for that matter). Just as sense interrupts myth, 
the film suspends mainstream representations that mythologise maternity. 
Because Denis works outside of generic conventions, she avoids altogether the 
dominant paradigms that Hollywood has used to pigeonhole mothers.76 These 
myths, of the sacrificial mother, the phallic mother or the abject mother, are 
interrupted in the film by Nénette’s singularity. She refuses to be redeemed or 
to be maternal towards the child, which she adamantly does not want.77 The 
only time we are shown her bare stomach, it appears alien and detached from 
her body, an orb in space (Figure 2.19).
When Boni touches and listens to her stomach, her face shows her complete 
dissociation from what is happening (Figure 2.18). To complicate any simple 
reading of Nénette as a cold person, however, the film does not disallow her 
caring and nurturing impulses altogether. She cleans her brother’s kitchen 
at one point (for which he very much resents her) and at another point she 
straddles a crying Boni in bed, feeding him food she has prepared as if he were 
a child and kissing him tenderly on the forehead. At the end of her book on 
the subject, E. Ann Kaplan speculates about the future of representations of 
motherhood. She writes,
. . . as subjectivities, including female ones, are in general conceived of as 
dispersed, multiple, unstable, in process, so the concept ‘mother’ may, in 
turn, no longer signify such supreme importance. The de-essentializing 
of subjectivity and, in a related move, of identity, should free women and 
minorities of their simultaneous subordination and fetishization. For 
women, one of the subordinated and fetishized positions has been that of 
‘mother.’ Once this position is opened up as only a part of any specific 
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woman’s subjectivity, not the all-consuming entirety of it; once any spe-
cific woman is seen to be constituted ‘mother’ only when interacting with 
her child; once ‘mother’ is no longer a fixed, essentialized quality, then 
women may be freed from the kind of discursive constraints and burdens 
studied in this book.78
While perhaps we have yet to see this kind of shift in Hollywood representa-
tions of motherhood, by altering the codified language of narrative cinema 
Denis makes it possible to read Nénette outside of dominant discourses of 
maternity, even as she carries a child throughout the film. In her analysis of the 
film, Beugnet raises potential concerns that it effaces the feminine or replaces 
the mother with the father, via the figure of Boni. Instead she concludes, 
‘Formally as well as in narrative content, rather than exposing a shift in gender 
roles, and an appropriation of the feminine by the masculine, the film appears 
to map out the absence or irrelevance of such models.’79 Beugnet’s point rein-
forces Kaplan’s argument that the de-essentialisation of female subjectivity 
multiplies the possible representations of maternity, claiming that the film 
disregards rather than problematically reinforces dominant discourses. This 
extends to Boni as much as Nénette, both of whom develop in relation to the 
child in ways that are in tension with hegemonic gender stereotypes. I would 
add that more generally Denis’s work challenges the usefulness of any iden-
tity categories for understanding the world or the other (something I discuss 
in the next chapter in terms of an aesthetic of alterity). Rendering natality an 
Figure 2.19 The only time we are shown her bare stomach, it appears alien and detached from 
her body, an orb in space.
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 open-ended process of making sense, rather than an overdetermined significa-
tion of femininity, links back to the ethics of sense. Instead of a mythologised 
representation of maternity we are offered an exposure to the unknown – to 
new faces and new origins, to wonder and curiosity. As Nancy writes,
‘Strangeness’ refers to the fact that each singularity is another access to 
the world. At the point where we would expect ‘something,’ a substance 
or a procedure, a principle or an end, a signification, there is nothing 
but the manner, the turn of the other access, which conceals itself in the 
very gesture wherein it offers itself to us – and whose concealing is the 
turning itself. In the singularity that he exposes, each child that is born 
has already concealed the access that he is ‘for himself’ and in which he 
will conceal himself ‘within himself,’ just as he will one day hide under 
the final expression of a dead face. This is why we scrutinize these faces 
with such curiosity, in search of identification, looking to see whom the 
child looks like, and to see if death looks like itself. What we are looking 
for there, like in the photographs, is not an image; it is an access.80
To our earlier discussion of the close-up as that which has the potential to 
make strange and to ‘evoke a body that is temporarily freed from its function as 
social, cultural and even gender signifier – a body that escapes the conventional 
order of male/female dualism’81 we can now add the nearness of the other as a 
point of access to the origin of the world, regardless of whether they are in the 
womb or nearing death. Key to this is the cultivation of an attitude of curiosity 
and wonder in the viewer. Nancy further elaborates, ‘As English [and French] 
allows us to say, other beings are curious (or bizarre) to me because they give 
me access to the origin; they allow me to touch it; they leave me before it, leave 
me before its turning, which is concealed each time.’82 We glimpse this wonder 
at the origin in Boni’s intimacy with the child and through our own curiosity 
about the rebirth of Boni himself.
As Laura McMahon points out, in Nancy’s The Evidence of Film (his book 
on Iranian director Abbas Kiarostami) he describes film in language that sug-
gests ‘pregnancy’. McMahon argues that his description of film as ‘“something 
with shape and strength that precedes and promotes a ripened delivery into 
the world [. . .]”’83 calls to mind ‘Merleau-Ponty’s “empirical pregnancy”, 
suggesting, . . . “not experience itself, with its contours and meanings, but the 
possibility of such experience, astonished exposure at the limit of meaningful-
ness rather than the presentation of meanings”’.84 Here natality again slips into 
metaphor, referring to an epistemological exposure to the wondrous (astonish-
ing) and new – to a surprise that the world can and does exist as it is. This 
astonished exposure suggests an important ethical role for wonder and also 
reminds us of the necessity of making visible the impossibility of seeing. Mary-
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Jane Rubenstein makes an argument for the epistemological and ethical value 
of wonder, describing wonder as ‘thinking’s unendured affect’. Relative to my 
work, Rubenstein draws on both Levinas and Nancy in making an argument 
for the risk of wonder, in which a commitment to uncertainty is part of what it 
means to truly think. She writes, ‘Wonder as “philosophy’s virtue” has some-
thing, rather, to do with keeping things difficult – with thinking at the limits of 
thinkability and making sense at the fault lines of sensibility.’85 I would argue 
that this is where film can play an important role. The sensory and sensual 
ability of image and sound to operate at the limits of the cognised is precisely 
what makes them effective tools for cultivating a spectatorial position that 
listens and is open to being astonished without the relief of clear resolutions.
Returning to the language of unworking (désouvrement), which I earlier dis-
cussed as akin to interruption, Rubenstein connects ethics and ontology with a 
practice that touches on the limits of the intelligible:
In the phenomenon of unworking, we thus see ontology give immedi-
ately onto ethics and vice versa; unworking is both ‘our’ existential (de)
situation and our responsibility. Again, however, it must be emphasised 
that, like the much maligned, little understood ‘unworking’ of decon-
struction, the task of exposing the failures and interruptions of sense is 
first and foremost a way of making sense, precisely by refusing to assimilate 
the unthinkable under ready-made categories of thought.86
The revelation of the limits to visual mastery, the demand for an affective 
engagement that offers a physical pre-cognitive relation to the image, the 
interest in reaching towards the ineffable and revealing in the process our 
unending birth-to-presence, all inflect the ethics of sense that Denis develops 
through her work. Rubenstein and O’Byrne, when read together, make an 
argument for including wonder at the origin – the opening in the world that 
the other is – into this constellation of ideas.
conclusion
In Vers Nancy, Samardzija makes a statement that beautifully characterises 
an ethical spectator/film relationship when she says of the intruder, ‘We’re 
unsettled, but something occurs that allows us to change.’ This seems to me 
a description of what film can do, from an ethical perspective. It unsettles us 
through the encounters it offers. It touches us in a pre-cognitive and affec-
tive way, and in the case of Denis’s work the images are left to linger without 
their meaning being contained by definitive dialogue or psychologisation. Put 
 differently, where myth settles, sense unsettles.
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Denis’s work evinces an ethics of sense, where this involves a practice of 
interruption or suspension of dominant representational conventions in favour 
of a meaning that drifts, unworking our expectations and unsettling us as spec-
tators. Through thinking about liminal states such as natality and wonder, and 
the ways in which film can cultivate a practice of listening in the spectator, I 
have opened an ethical common ground between Denis and Nancy. As noted, 
ethics is a facet of Nancy’s work that is not central in the secondary literature. 
Films such as Nénette and Boni show us, through their deep interest in beings, 
the necessity of an ethical curiosity or the ways in which our curiosity about 
being is an ethical position, one that the medium of film has the capacity to 
cultivate.
For much of the chapter, I have focused on the sympathies and similari-
ties between Denis and Nancy, perhaps at the expense of seeking out major 
points of divergence. The way in which film, and Denis’s practice in particu-
lar, emphasises the reality of different differences, material differences that 
impact the ways in which bodies are read and operate affectively in the world, 
is missing from Nancy’s work. Despite perhaps wanting to do otherwise, 
Nancy, committed to a philosophical lexicon, tends to flatten out or relativise 
the degrees or varying intensities of difference with his more abstract onto-
logical language. In a similar vein, where Nancy turns to birth to elucidate the 
process of the world, Denis links it concretely to sexed bodies, if only to reject 
any expectations we have of those bodies. We see how birth happens physically 
through certain bodies and how maternity shapes expectations and limits pos-
sibilities for those bodies as they act in the world. The unequal nature of dif-
ference is something that it is less easy for Nancy to convey, relying as he does 
on a less sensory medium and again working with the baggage of philosophical 
concepts. Here Denis’s work lines up with a feminist perspective, in that it 
seeks to account for material differences while suspending a sense of identity 
as essential and immutable. Feminism is deeply invested in myth’s disruption 
and has had much to gain from the dismantling of the subject of the Western 
philosophical tradition, although it has taken on its share of anxiety about what 
this means for claiming ‘woman’ as an identity. Nénette and Boni offers a rep-
resentation of maternity that challenges essentialist notions of womanhood and 
offers a world unmoored by stereotypes of race and gender.
Despite these points of divergence, or at least Denis’s better ability and 
willingness to pay attention to material difference, Denis’s and Nancy’s work 
can be read in complementary relation to each other, and not merely because 
of their documented intellectual and practical engagement. Nancy’s own 
practices suggest, counter to typical philosophical commentary on art, an 
enactment of his philosophy (i.e. a praxis) where his ideas do not summarise or 
interpret a work, but rather think with the work, rather than about it. There is 
a thinking-in-common that they share – in theory and in practice – and that I 
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have tried to think with as well, taking Denis as my starting point for finding 
an ethics that works outside of normative principles and offers a cinema that is 
as pleasurable as it is different from the dominant prototype. In the following 
chapter, I follow a similar practice, this time focusing on Emmanuel Levinas, 
a philosopher with whom Denis does not have any known relation. Centring 
the discussion on the film I Can’t Sleep, I further examine the ethics of Denis’s 
counter cinematic practices, this time through the lens of difference, or what I 
term an aesthetic of alterity.
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chapter 3
Otherwise than Hollywood:  
Denis, Levinas and an  
Aesthetic of Alterity
My way of making films is tied to desire . . . Not just the physical desire 
for another person but desire in general. All my films function as a move-
ment toward an unknown other and toward the unknown in relations 
between people.
Claire Denis1
Can we speak of an ethical responsibility towards the memory of a serial killer? What if the killer in question is gay, a black West Indian immi-
grant, and an HIV-positive drug user? All of these rubrics applied to Thierry 
Paulin, the so-called granny killer, who confessed to killing twenty-one elderly 
women in Paris between 1984 and 1987.2 Controversially, Claire Denis chose 
to take up this story in her third feature film, J’ai pas sommeil (I Can’t Sleep).3 
Rather than sensationalising her subject matter as a portrait of absolute evil or 
monstrosity, she explores the ambiguity of human violence through a multi-
plot structure and an understated representation of the crimes. Denis has said 
in interviews that Paulin was described as a sweet and nice person by those 
who knew him and that she was drawn to the reality of his multiple roles as 
brother, son and many other things alongside his role as a violent killer.4 I read 
her unique approach to her subject matter as ethical when viewed through a 
Levinasian lens, arguing that his philosophy offers fruitful possibilities for the 
articulation of a feminist filmmaking practice.
Denis’s representational practice is one centred in alterity and ambiguity. 
The ambiguity present on multiple levels of I Can’t Sleep is a strategy that 
evokes what Levinas would term the absolute alterity of the other. Unlike 
classical narrative cinema, the film refuses character psychologisation, leaving 
characters unknowable and opaque. I read I Can’t Sleep’s performance of 
failure – in the sense of failing to capture the other – as part of this ethical 
approach.5 I examine how Denis constructs her narrative to reveal a funda-
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mental being-with that resonates with Levinas’s concept of the subject as 
constituted relationally via a call to ethical responsibility to the other. After 
elaborating on the ethics of absolute alterity and relational subjectivity, I turn 
to the other spaces in Denis’s work that open up a dialogue with Levinas’s 
writing. These include what I term a ‘Levinasian Poetics’, or Levinas’s own 
writing as a representational model; his concept of the ‘saying’ which empha-
sises process and becoming over result and being; and, finally, his notion of the 
erotic, which returns us to the value of an ambiguity that both brings the other 
closer, exposing her, while revealing her absolute and unknowable singularity. 
In the chapter’s final section, I turn to the writing of Diane Perpich. Modifying 
Perpich’s argument for a feminist alterity politics based on Levinas, I argue for 
I Can’t Sleep as a model of a feminist aesthetic of alterity.
Rather than reading Denis’s films through Levinas’s philosophy, it is the 
films that guide us to the places in Levinas that have useful applications to 
the study of cinema. Denis’s work refutes Levinas’s often condemnatory 
position on art, revealing that film has the power to show us the face of the 
other and to help us in developing an attention to and respect for difference. 
Her filmmaking steps in at the limits of philosophical language, and is able to 
evoke and expose relations and knowledges that are difficult to translate into 
propositional content. In comparison with Nancy, who has written extensively 
on various arts, including film and painting, Levinas has relatively little to 
say about art and never takes up cinema as a sustained theme.6 Despite this, 
film scholars have begun to use aspects of Levinas’s thought to think about a 
variety of films from documentaries to classical Hollywood to silent features.7 
Scholarship on Levinas and cinema tends to avoid the fraught question of 
his position on vision and the work of art. His writing on these themes is 
ambiguous and at times openly hostile. He associates the artwork with an 
ethical irresponsibility and a turning away from the call of the other. I move 
away from his limited writings on art and aesthetics, which are not useful in 
helping us to pose important ethical questions about the highly visual world 
in which we exist and in which our ethical responsibilities are summoned and 
enacted. Guided by Denis, I look elsewhere in his thought to ask what his 
conceptualisation of ethics has to offer us in thinking about the opportunities 
for an engagement with alterity that are offered or denied the spectator. I Can’t 
Sleep suggests that particular films may aid us in honing an ethical sensibility. 
Levinas’s ethics teach us to resist the lure of full comprehension, to let things 
lie in the darker spaces, to value ungraspable movement, and to be open to 
the encounter with what we cannot know. Denis’s films similarly invite us to 
encounter what is unknown in the other rather than assimilating her into a 
comprehensive framework.
While Denis is often read alongside the philosophy of her collaborator and 
commentator Jean-Luc Nancy, putting her into conversation with Levinas 
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opens up another facet of the ethical dimension of her work, while simultane-
ously making Levinas available to feminist film studies. Placed in proximity to 
each other, they intrude on one another in productive ways – Denis, at times, 
pushing Levinas’s ideas further through the medium of film. Levinas, unlike 
Nancy, is concerned first and foremost with ethics. Like Nancy, Levinas 
defines ethics through a fundamentally relational and non-self-identical sub-
jectivity that entails a sophisticated concept of difference.8 The ethics under 
consideration are thus not to be located in the plot per se, nor in the kinds 
of moral choices that the characters make, but rather in how their alterity is 
represented to the spectator. While Nancy is an important figure for under-
standing the ethical in Denis’s films, by turning to Levinas we can more fully 
elaborate this ethical dimension and continue to open up the discussion of 
feminist representational ethics such that it has implications beyond Denis’s 
oeuvre.
The face-to-face encounter is the definitive image of Levinas’s ethics. This 
encounter with the other is present on multiple levels in Denis’s cinema – both 
amongst the characters on screen and in the relation between spectator and 
film. By its invitation to encounter the other, the film itself offers an opportu-
nity to view ethically and to develop an ethical sensitivity that extends beyond 
the timeframe of the film. The film is thus ethical both in its treatment of its 
subject matter and in the experience it offers its spectator. The potential for 
this experience to alter the viewer herself reveals that we are fundamentally 
with; our subjectivities are the result of the ongoing process of encountering. 
I Can’t Sleep introduces us to several others whose lives intersect in ways that 
extend beyond their – and our – frame of vision.
I Can’t Sleep is said by Denis to be the final instalment of a trilogy that deals 
with colonialism and the postcolonial.9 The spectre of colonialism is most 
visibly present in the characters of Théo and Camille, brothers from the West 
Indies with different relationships to France and to Martinique, their land of 
origin. Camille (Richard Courcet) is the character loosely based on Paulin – he 
lives by night, performing a toned-down drag in bars, and dancing in night-
clubs. He is shown being fitted for leather gear and fetish photos are strewn 
about his room. He is both gentle and taciturn in his interactions with others 
and also violent and dominating towards his white French boyfriend – his 
partner in both love and murder/robbery. His brother Théo (Alex Descas) 
works au noir doing odd jobs to make ends meet, supporting his young son and 
saving up for his dream of returning to Martinique, which he sees as a natural 
paradise in contrast to the difficulties of life in Paris. He is in a stormy marriage 
with a fiery white French woman, Mona (Béatrice Dalle). He is a difficult, dis-
gruntled and surly man, who several times over the course of the film denies 
his brother an intimacy that Camille desires.
Denis uses another marginalised character as a way into the complex web 
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of the city and the narrative. Daïga (the late Yekaterina Golubeva) is a young 
Lithuanian woman, whose entry into Paris is the spectator’s entry into the 
film. Able to speak only a small amount of French, but motivated to emigrate 
by the promise of a role in the theatre from a French director (and, it seems, 
casual lover) and by a letter from an long-emigrated great-aunt (Mina), Daïga 
brings us into a world of Russian-speaking French immigrants, whose circui-
tous paths will pass by and sometimes intrude upon those of Camille. In many 
ways Daïga’s complex depiction parallels that of Camille, avoiding an oversim-
plified separation of character types that Denis would associate with a typically 
‘Hollywood-esque’ screenplay.
Denis claims she was very wary of making a ‘politically correct’ film. In one 
interview she discusses the Hollywood film Philadelphia as an example of what 
she didn’t want to do, namely, to portray the marginalised as impossibly good 
or as absolute victims, which functions to erase their humanity just as much as 
does their representation as monstrous.10 Denis avoids what we would expect 
from a conventional narrative film. This would typically include an attitude of 
fascination and repulsion at the unqualified evil (and therefore difference) of 
the killer; or, given the various components of Paulin’s marginalised identity 
position, to make a melodramatic thriller that shows how society has created 
the killer through disregard, racism and homophobia.11 Perhaps, at face value, 
the latter option appears the ‘ethical’ choice.
Instead, I argue that the ethics of the film lies in its complex treatment of 
all of its major characters and the establishment of narrative parallels that 
reveal the ambiguous connections between them, such that easy distinctions 
between good and evil become murky. Through this ambiguity, the charac-
ters are allowed to remain opaque and cannot be assimilated into any easy 
interpretative frameworks about the world. This difference, rather than any 
notion of the other as monstrous, allows otherness to remain absolute – or 
unknown – and not merely relational (i.e. not other than myself, or evil as 
opposed to good, both of which define the other in relation to a known term). 
The following section highlights how Levinas’s notion of radical alterity and 
its fundamental reworking of relational notions of self and other shed light on 
the ethics of Denis’s portrayal. Denis’s approach makes it evident that radical 
alterity in filmmaking practice requires an other brought close enough that 
their contours are not so easily discernible.12 Ethics requires a representational 
ambiguity.
d ifference and the subject:  denis/levinas
Denis’s main characters tend not to say much. In fact, almost as if to poke fun 
at the lack of dialogue in her films, Denis will often have her more voluble 
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minor characters comment on the quietness of her protagonists.13 In I Can’t 
Sleep, both Théo and Camille are men of few words, and Daïga, even when 
conversing in her mother tongue, seems amused rather than engaged by verbal 
communication. In fact, at the time of the film’s production, Golubeva did not 
speak any French. Denis’s desire to cast her is symptomatic of the secondary 
role that dialogue plays in her films. She identifies dialogue as simply a com-
ponent of her films’ soundtracks.14 Dialogue, normally a central component of 
character development in mainstream film, is eschewed in favour of character 
impenetrability.15
A telling scene is one in which Camille visits Théo. Théo’s mother-in-law 
is visiting and Camille exchanges brief pleasantries with the family from the 
door. Théo asks Camille what he wants, but he says nothing. There is clearly 
tension between them and Camille seems to feel uncomfortable speaking in 
front of the others, while Théo makes no effort to move their interaction into 
another space. Camille leaves with his request unstated. After a brief interval, 
Théo decides to run after him. Finding him on the subway platform, as the 
doors close Théo hands his brother money, which Camille says was not what 
he came for. We see him drift away from his brother on the subway, as Théo 
demands, ‘Wait! Where are you going?’ to no response. Almost nothing has 
been said between the two. We don’t know Camille’s motivation for visiting 
his brother, nor why Théo decided to go after him. We can speculate, but their 
inner lives remain exterior to us. As Théo tells the incredulous officer who 
can’t believe that Théo did not notice anything ‘odd’ about his brother, ‘My 
brother’s a stranger to me, just like you.’
A scene near the end of the film further emphasises Camille’s ‘strange-
ness’. Here, he confesses to the murders in police custody. The inspector 
reads through the list of names, dates and locations of each murder, to which 
Camille responds, without affect, ‘Yes’ (or, in one case, ‘I don’t know’). In a 
film that followed the dominant Hollywood style, one can imagine that the 
scene of arrest would typically be padded with a cathartic confession (prefer-
ably in close-up) or some other scene of clarification into the mystery of the 
crime. Yet the scene in I Can’t Sleep adds nothing to our understanding of why 
Camille committed these acts of violence. He says merely (quoting the ‘real’ 
Paulin) ‘The world’s gone crazy’ in response to the inspector’s mystified gaze. 
There is no profound and insightful speech on his part linking the violence of 
his crimes to his experience of marginalisation or the violence of the colonial 
past. While the viewer could perhaps construe these acts as the perverse con-
sequence of Camille’s assimilation (his world, outside of his family, appears to 
be completely white), she is given no causal or clarifying explanation to make 
sense of his crimes.16
Denis contributes to this opacity through her choices in terms of the film’s 
narrative structure. Two murders are shown, one directly after the other, but 
otherwise  than hollywood  91
they do not occur until around an hour and forty-one minutes into the film. 
In the meantime we have witnessed many other facets of Camille – his charm 
towards his landlady (he lives with his boyfriend, Raphaël, at the hotel where 
Daïga has been given a place to stay and a job as a chambermaid), his strained 
relationship with his brother, his violent behaviour towards his boyfriend, his 
close community of friends in the gay club scene, and a scene in which he flir-
tatiously assists the twin maids who make his bed. It is only after these other 
sides of Camille are depicted that he is revealed as the murderer-at-large.
Additionally, it is after the murders occur that we are shown some of the 
more touching scenes involving Camille. At his mother’s birthday party, we 
see him dance playfully and tenderly with her, a smile on his face. There is 
even a brief and subtle suggestion – all communicated through body language 
– that Camille would like to dance with his brother and mother, the three 
embracing and enjoying the music. This is an invitation that Théo explicitly 
rejects, pulling away and leaving the dance floor, allowing Camille to cut in. 
Thus, even after the film has shown us that Camille is in fact the killer, our 
expectations are immediately complicated. The hands that have strangled and 
robbed are now affectionately holding another woman of the same age group 
as the victims, this time his mother. This ambiguity goes hand in hand with 
the impenetrability of his characterisation. I argue that absolute alterity, which 
means that the other is not reducible to a category or to being framed as ‘like’ 
or ‘not-like’ me, paradoxically requires a representational ambiguity. This 
ambiguity brings the other closer only to show the distance between her and 
my knowledge of her. This highlights the dimension of failure necessary in 
the attempt to represent the other. Rendering Camille’s otherness as absolute 
means that he eludes any categorical schemas. This inability to know the other 
is central to Levinas’s conception of the ethical relation.
The murders themselves only contribute to Camille’s mystery and further 
emphasise the non-Hollywood approach that the film takes. The first murder 
is filmed in medium shot, with no editing.17 There are no close-ups of the 
victim’s tortured face or of either of the men’s faces looking, for example, 
maniacally pleased or perversely violent, as one might expect in classical nar-
rative cinema. In fact, there is almost no emotion in the scene; the overall 
tone is deadpan and banal. Afterwards, as Raphaël searches the apartment 
for money, we see Camille absent-mindedly fingering various trinkets in 
the woman’s living room. His face, if any emotion is present at all, seems 
to express an unacknowledged and general sadness and ennui. The scene is 
neither sensationalised nor moving. Again, we are denied the thrill of exposure 
to an evil man or sadistic killer. We are given no sense of his interiority and no 
psychological explanation.18 His otherness is in his lack of clear psychological 
markers, rather than his visible monstrosity. Put differently, otherness is not 
a psychological category or innate condition. Camille remains as opaque as his 
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brother or Daïga; we cannot easily assimilate him into our pre-existing notions 
of good and evil. Rather than moralising about the nature of evil, the film – and 
this is one of the ways in which Levinas is useful for articulating a filmic ethics 
– reveals that a notion of absolute difference results in a more ethical, and also 
more challenging, representation of violence.19 This approach sheds light on 
what a Levinasian understanding of alterity looks like in the sphere of film.
Like Nancy’s concept of the co-existential analytic, Levinas’s turn to ethics 
is a response to Heidegger’s claim that Dasein (our individual being, being-
there) is Mitsein (being-with). Both thinkers see Heidegger’s failure to truly 
shape his fundamental ontology around the ‘with’ as the impetus for a new 
approach to our fundamentally related existence.20 As we have seen, for Nancy 
this becomes an elaboration of the notion of difference as singular plurality 
and sharing. Levinas will turn towards a transcendent outside to insert an 
ineradicable difference into his account of being. The ethical will come before, 
in every sense of the word, the ontological. This is the notion of ethics as ‘first 
philosophy’.21 The ethical relationship, in his account, intrudes into the onto-
logical; it is what prevents the realm of being from closing in on itself. The dif-
ference of the other interrupts being, it undoes my self-sufficient subjectivity, 
and it returns infinitely, undermining any sense of immunity.
Levinas’s critique responds to the exigency of forging a new way of think-
ing about our relationship to the other, a framework that would ‘find for man 
another kinship than that which ties him to being, one that will perhaps enable 
us to conceive of this difference between me and the other, this inequality, in 
a sense absolutely opposed to oppression’.22 Critiquing Heidegger in Totality 
and Infinity, Levinas writes,
To affirm the priority of Being over existents is to already decide the 
essence of philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with someone, who 
is an existent, (the ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of exist-
ents, which, impersonal, permits the apprehension, the domination of 
existents (a relationship of knowing), subordinates justice to freedom . . . 
In subordinating every relation with existents to the relation with Being 
the Heideggerian ontology affirms the primacy of freedom over ethics.23
By situating ethics in a space that is prior to being – or ontology – Levinas also 
reconfigures relationality such that it undermines what he would argue is the 
self-sufficient subject of phenomenology.
The primacy of the ethical before the ontological, or the ethical as calling 
us from outside of or on the hither side of being, requires a conception of 
difference as radical alterity. Levinas argues that the history of philosophy, 
with few exceptions, has been unable to truly think difference. Difference has 
always been understood in such a way that it is related back to the subject in 
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some form or other. Descartes, for example, put the thinking ‘I’ at the centre 
of the ability to know and experience the world, or that which is other to – and 
object for – the philosophising subject. Hegelian models of subjectivity share 
some of this Cartesian inheritance. The processes of recognition on which 
they rely always require relating otherness to the self and difference is subli-
mated through dialectical progression. The other is always illuminated for the 
subject by her own understanding of the world. What is other in philosophy 
is always referred back to the Same (or the perceiving consciousness of the 
subject of philosophy), and, after Heidegger, it is understood in light of being. 
Even nothingness or the negative always refers back to the realm of essence 
or is understood in relation to the latter. For example, to understand Thierry 
Paulin as a monster or utterly evil may appear to be putting into play a notion 
of radical difference. Yet this categorisation is precisely what makes him 
known and therefore only relatively other. He is not me (assuming that I don’t 
self-identify as monstrous or evil). His otherness is thus labelled, contained 
and referred back to the Same. The film makes it evident that to do justice to 
the other a degree of representational ambiguity is necessary. For her to be 
absolutely other, she must elude my grasp and evade my labels. She must resist 
my attempts at interiorisation.
Denis’s films are recurring encounters with the absolutely other, both 
amongst characters on screen and between viewer and viewed. Levinas’s 
privileged examples of alterity are the widow, the orphan and the stranger. 
Indeed, the films discussed in this project could aptly be called a cinema of 
strangers. Yet Denis also opens up Levinas’s notion of the other, revealing 
that we need to look in places where we least expect, to see the faces whose 
difference must remain singularly theirs. Although Camille occupies many 
categories of otherness – sexually and racially, for example – he is also a serial 
killer. This takes us far afield from the trinity of orphan, widow and stranger 
in need of hospitality. Similarly, despite Daïga’s foreigner status, which could 
position her as an underdog that the viewer roots for as she finds her way in 
a new place, she is neither lovable nor particularly relatable. While it is easy 
to imagine kind elderly ladies, poor and charming orphans and deserving 
refugees when reading Levinas, I Can’t Sleep shows us that ethics doesn’t 
discriminate between faces. In this sense Denis pushes Levinas further, or 
reveals the ways in which his own attempts to put the other into language 
work against the force of his argument. To assume we can know who is other 
in advance, for example, the colonised or the poor, would be to approach the 
other in the realm of ontology insofar as it categorises according to ability, eth-
nicity, gender and so forth. Across a spectrum of others, the film makes visible 
a generalisable radical unknowability, gesturing towards a practice of feminist 
representational ethics. As I elaborate in the section on alterity aesthetics at 
this chapter’s end, this practice offers an alternative to feminisms that rely on 
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identity- or recognition-based models of difference and subjectivity. Diane 
Perpich’s use of Levinas to articulate a feminist alterity politics provides a 
building block for thinking about the implications of this analysis of Denis’s 
work in terms of feminist representational strategies. Alterity creates a fissure 
in being that works against oppressive ways of approaching the other.
For Levinas the tyranny of being is connected to human conflict and war. 
Being is always invested in its own presence, fully immanent, synchronised, 
and concerned with protecting its own interest. To always grasp the other or 
assign her a meaning within the totality of some larger system is similarly a vio-
lence, in that it forces the other into one’s own framework for understanding 
the world, rather than letting her be radically different.24 The other is singular 
and I lack any frame of reference that would allow me to comprehend her based 
on my own experience. The other calls me to ethical responsibility towards her 
outside of any experience, ‘experience’ being always already in the realm of the 
ontological. The other approaches me as a face on the hither side of conscious 
experience, obsessing me, taking me as a hostage, demanding that I substitute 
my own life for hers in an encounter that is outside of the logic of history, that 
occurs in diachronic moments and that is irrecoverable by memory.25
This encounter occurs outside of time as we calculate it and quantify it, but 
also outside of time as we experience it. The other comes from elsewhere and 
elsewhen and continues to intrude, rupturing time and drawing me outside of 
myself, making a return to the Same impossible. The call to responsibility for 
the other is ultimately traumatic; it makes the self restless within itself, ren-
dering it homeless. It breaks up the totalising regime of essence and challenges 
the identity or ego of the subject. Instead of objects disclosing themselves to 
a transcendental consciousness, the self is exposed to the other, vulnerable in 
proximity. But rather than posing a threat to or signifying the end of the sub-
jectivity of the subject, it is precisely in this ethical encounter that the subject 
becomes a subject as such. Levinas writes, ‘It is as subject to an irreversible 
relation that the term of the relation becomes a subject.’26 Here we have a 
relation that does not connect two pre-existing terms, but rather the relation 
itself constitutes the terms of that relation. We are relationally. Being is thus 
always being-with; radical alterity entails a radical reconfiguring of self/other 
relations. I Can’t Sleep places Camille in a network of relations, an imperfect 
and fragile community, whose cause-and-effect relationships are rarely visible 
but nonetheless palpably shape the subjectivities on screen.
This encounter with alterity is what Levinas terms the face-to-face. It exists 
prior to any thematisation, outside of language and history, and is lost as soon 
as one tries to represent it or bring it into the realm of ontology. The unrepre-
sentable of the relation is central to understanding Denis’s use of ambiguity as 
a strategy for exposing representation’s impossibility. Describing the priority 
of the face-to-face, Levinas writes,
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Reaching the other is not something justified of itself; it is not a matter of 
shaking me out of my boredom. It is, on the ontological level, the event 
of the most radical breakup of the very categories of the ego, for it is for 
me to be somewhere else than my self; it is to be pardoned, to not be a 
definitive existence.27
My subjectivity is the result of the relation with alterity, while the very same 
relation is what constantly undermines or calls into question my claims to 
coherent identity. It is this very impossibility of starting from the self that 
Levinas names ethics: ‘We name this calling into question of my spontaneity 
by the presence of the Other ethics.’28 While the faces of Daïga and Camille 
expose their relationality within the diegesis of the film, they also intrude upon 
our spontaneity as spectators who are affectively drawn to witness their stories, 
although we are denied comprehensive mastery. Additionally, the relationality 
of the characters exceeds any labels we may give to them – Daïga and Camille 
do not necessarily connect as fellow immigrants, or through a normative mode 
of heterosexual desire; their connection is ambiguous, operating outside any 
clear account we might attempt.
However disparate, the characters of I Can’t Sleep are vulnerable to and 
deeply in relation to one another. Their actions reverberate outwards, often 
giving meaning to apparently unrelated moments. In one scene Daïga walks 
alone at night and passes Mona, Théo’s wife, who sits smoking at a café table. 
The instant is brief; shots of Daïga wandering without apparent purpose 
through the dark city streets are interrupted for a moment by the face of Mona, 
her visage a dark screen over her inner thoughts. The two will never meet – 
and Denis’s films are always populated by these ‘missed connections’ – but 
nonetheless they are together. Despite the appearance of mutual isolation in 
this scene, the women are revealed as part of the same frame. Their actions 
are connected by their existence within the shared world of the film, although 
they themselves never directly experience that connection, almost as though 
their link exists outside that of experience. As spectators, we are trained to seek 
out the links between scenes and characters in a movie. I Can’t Sleep offers 
the viewer a glimpse of the characters’ interrelatedness, at the same time as it 
resists a clear explanation or causal logic to these relations.
This relationality is perhaps most explicitly articulated in a scene late in 
the film. Daïga and Camille have never spoken, but have intruded into each 
other’s lives in other ways. She sees erotic photographs of him while cleaning 
his room and watches through a window as he and his partner share a naked 
embrace. Even without a traditional shot/reverse shot, it is also implied that 
Camille has noticed Daïga. For example, in one scene he is shown entering the 
hotel lobby. The image cuts to Daïga, drinking a beer and watching television 
in a room visible from the lobby. She turns around to see who has entered. 
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The scene cuts to Mona, buzzing herself into her sister’s apartment. There is 
never a cut back to Camille, in which the audience would be given confirma-
tion that he has in fact seen Daïga and through which we could register the 
emotion the scene elicits by his facial expression. The lack of a reverse shot 
leaves the narrative open. Perhaps they have made eye contact, or it could be 
that their lives parallel one another in ways that neither of them fully observes. 
The twinings and perambulations of their journeys finally climax when Daïga 
follows Camille to a café. She has seen his photo on a ‘wanted’ sign at the 
police station and we do not know if she has done anything with this informa-
tion (although Camille is apprehended shortly after). She orders a coffee at 
the bar next to Camille and we sense an attraction between the two outsiders, 
although they haven’t yet made eye contact. As he passes her the sugar their 
hands meet in a charged slow-motion touch (the only time that slow motion 
is used in the film, formally emphasising its significance). It is a touch that all 
the events of the film appear to have been building towards – a tactile recogni-
tion of the interrelatedness of their paths. Camille pays for her coffee and as 
he leaves they say goodbye without looking at one another. Their touch seems 
charged with the multiple relations that lie beyond the scene and outside of the 
characters’ experiences; their lives are revealed as constituted through their 
relations despite the fact that their faces may not recognise one another. These 
echoes of a formative encounter, which in a Levinasian sense occurs outside of 
knowledge and conventional time-space continuums, are traces of the ethical 
relation. This resituating of ethics at the level of the with works against oppres-
sive practices by thinking difference in a way that refuses self/other logics and 
embraces the unknown.
the saying and a  levinas ian poetics
As already discussed, the concept of absolute alterity and an understanding of 
the subject as constituted by and undone through the face-to-face encounter 
have applications for filmic representation. Denis’s films, in their focus on 
movement, their lack of explanatory dialogue, and their erotic ambiguity, offer 
us suggestive directives for where else to look in Levinas for elements of a femi-
nist film ethics. Because Denis does not rely on language for meaning, her work 
steps in where philosophy hits its limits. When words become traps that fix 
beings into frozen states of semantic meaning, images and sounds can offer argu-
ment or explanation by other means. As alluded to above, the reframing of the 
ethical as prior to the ontological creates problems for representation. Beginning 
with the notion of the saying, these difficulties extend to the very exposition of 
philosophy itself. These challenges, however, reveal themselves as generative 
rather than limiting, particularly in relation to Denis’s filmic practice.
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Levinas often approaches his concepts through several different words 
or metaphors, each of which reveals another facet of the idea he is trying to 
convey without pinning it down into clear definitional language. The encoun-
ter with the other is figured variously as the face-to-face, a trace, substitution, 
like being pregnant, as a caress in the dark, and as a saying that always undoes 
the said. This concept of the face-to-face as saying privileges becoming over 
being and movement over stasis. It is revealing in terms of Levinas’s privi-
leging of the auditory in his descriptions of what it means to encounter the 
other. In fact, the terminology of the face-to-face is misleading, as it suggests 
a highly visual encounter that belies his profound mistrust of the visual and 
obfuscates the encounter’s haptic nature, as I elaborate in this and the follow-
ing chapter. Moving towards the language of saying provides another means 
of approaching what it might mean to talk about film from the perspective 
of a Levinasian ethics. The saying (le dire) denotes a dynamic and fleeting 
contact with the other that signifies the ethical relation. This is in contrast to 
the said (le dit), a more fixed representation that occurs in the realm of ontol-
ogy. The face ‘speaks’ and this speech grounds all signification. It signifies 
prior to any semiotic system or coherent form of speech. It may groan, weep 
or whistle, but in each instance the face is saying before existing in the realm of 
the said. Levinas writes, ‘saying, saying, saying itself, without thematizing it, 
but exposing it again. Saying is thus to make signs of this very signifyingness 
of the exposure.’29 The language of exposure suggests vulnerability to intru-
sion by the other. It is not to be confused with literal speech. In ‘Language 
and Proximity’, Levinas is careful to distinguish this ‘speech’ from any 
articulate linguistic utterance, which would bring the saying into the realm of 
said:
The hypothesis that the relationship with an interlocutor would still 
be a knowing reduces speech to the solitary or impersonal exercise of a 
thought, whereas already the kerygma which bears its ideality is, in addi-
tion, a proximity between me and the interlocutor, and not our participa-
tion in a transparent universality. Whatever be the message transmitted 
by speech, the speaking is contact.30
What is important in this saying, which may not bear any relation whatsoever 
to speech proper, is the relation of contact, openness and proximity to the 
other that it signifies. Contact, exposure and proximity all suggest a tactile and 
visceral sensation of and vehicle for my responsibility to the other. I will return 
to this bodily aspect of the saying in the next chapter. Here, I am interested 
in the saying as that which refuses to let meaning congeal, which encourages 
movement and interruption over fixity and continuity, in ethics and in film.31 
The dynamic and flowing character of Denis’s work performs a kind of saying 
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that undoes the said. It works against our attempts to fix the characters into 
one frame or identity.
Denis’s cinema is a cinema of movement, of drifters and dancers, who come 
and go, touch and withdraw. In I Can’t Sleep, the film starts and ends with 
Daïga’s entry into and exit from the city via the motorway. In both instances 
she is shown driving, a cigarette hanging from between her lips; she hasn’t 
stood still long enough or said enough for us to have captured her in our gaze. 
Denis’s lack of traditional establishing shots contributes to this effect – we can 
never firmly fix the characters in a stable location.32 We are usually moving 
with them through the belly of the city, with few to no establishing shots to 
ground their action in clear time and space. For example, we deduce that we 
are in the 18th arrondissement of Paris because eventually we glimpse Sacre 
Coeur through the gaps between buildings, but we are never given a general 
montage of street signs or iconic landmarks to welcome us first to Paris and 
then to Montmartre. We are inside the spaces the characters inhabit and 
move with them, ceaselessly. Similarly, point-of-view shots from the driver’s 
seat of a moving train punctuate 35 Shots of Rum, No Fear No Die begins and 
ends with driving, the protagonist of The Intruder moves from the Jura to 
Switzerland, to Pusan and Tahiti, and shifts between reality and dreamscape, 
and Friday Night ends with Laure running through the streets unburdened 
and away from the scene of her one-night stand.
Perhaps the most powerful scene that illustrates the movement that char-
acterises Denis’s oeuvre is the final scene in Beau travail. Although the film’s 
narrative is extremely elliptical, through a series of shots we are led to believe 
that Galoup, the French legionnaire who narrates the film, is committing 
suicide. We see him in his room, presumably back in France. Galoup has 
effectively sentenced Sentain, a younger officer who was the object of his 
jealousy and desire, to death and it seems that as a result he has also forfeited 
his own place in the legion’s hierarchy and its controlled rhythms, which had 
sustained him. In the film’s penultimate scene, he holds a gun to his undulat-
ing stomach and we see a close-up of his tattoo, which bears the legionnaire’s 
motto, ‘Serve the good cause and die’, a vein throbbing in his muscular bicep. 
Yet instead of the frozen and static body of a dead legionnaire, in the final 
scene of the film we are transported to an anonymous discothèque. The wall 
is mirrored and Galoup stands alone, smoking a cigarette. The dance track 
‘Rhythm of the Night’ comes on and Galoup dances in a bacchanalian burst 
of self-expression and apparent freedom.33 Something from the most inac-
cessible depths of his character is revealed in this moment, while remaining 
inarticulable and unknowable. He exposes himself before the camera perhaps 
more so than in any moment that has preceded this scene. Yet in no way does 
this result in some kind of fixed understanding of who he is. In terms of both 
characterisation and narrative function, Galoup’s ecstatic wordless declaration 
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of existence refuses any definitional closure. After a partial run of credits we 
return to the scene to see an even more rapturous dance in which Galoup is 
literally bouncing off the walls, rolling freely on the ground, and reminding us 
that his singularity will always be in excess of the film’s structure. The credits 
cannot manage to contain him. Even when presumably dead, Denis’s elusive 
characters deny us mastery. They keep moving, dancing and ‘saying’ instead 
of allowing themselves to be ‘said’.34
The representation of the ethical thus becomes that which depends on ‘the 
saying without the said’ or a said that is constantly undone by the saying.35 
Like Nancy, who as discussed in the previous chapter argued for the interrup-
tion of myth (myths being narratives of totality, closure and a unified origin 
and destiny), the saying’s undoing of the said similarly works against grand 
narratives. The saying functions structurally akin to the interruption of myth, 
emphasising process over completion. By contrast, myth aligns with the said, 
suggesting a fixed and totalising account of the world. From a feminist per-
spective, this seems particularly relevant in relation to the need for more fluid 
alternatives to representational politics – especially as feminism and queer 
theory seek common ground, challenges to the very locatability and represent-
ability of subjectivity remain necessary (as do alternative models, such as that 
offered by Denis). Unlike Nancy’s, Levinas’s interruption – saying – comes 
from a transcendent outside to the ontological, rather than occurring within it. 
It is the intrusion of the absolutely other, who cannot be known and to whom 
we are ethically responsible, that breaks up our pretensions to wholeness. The 
other’s intrusion prevents us from getting too comfortable, too self-satisfied 
and self-sufficient, and from thinking that we know the story once and for all. 
The saying is a kind of literature (in Nancy’s sense of the word) that prevents 
meaning from congealing and keeps us open to the surprise of an unexpected 
encounter.36 To apply this imperative to film suggests that films should allow 
for interruptions that prevent narrative closure, that reach toward the impres-
sion or sensation of the other, rather than seeking to bring her into the full 
light of day.
I Can’t Sleep starts on an interruption. Two men fly in a helicopter above 
Paris, laughing heartily and unable to stop. Their laughter is unexplained and 
we never see them again. Lest one think that this functions as a kind of estab-
lishing shot, instead of a clear view of Paris from the sky, we are faced with a 
misty veil between the chopper and what lies below, a network of motorways 
that gives us little sense of a stable location. In fact the camera cuts down to 
the motorway, comes up behind and then around beside the car of Daïga, 
who is driving into Paris for the first time (Figures 3.1–3.3). It is as though 
we are suddenly in a car ourselves, changing lanes and moving forward. From 
helicopter to car we get a sense of the motion of life, of characters arriving or 
passing through, of the inability of the world to stand still so we can grasp it. 
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This is hardly the zombified painting of which Levinas writes. Characters 
here come and go – they may pass by each other unknowingly, they may even 
eventually touch, but they are in no way present to each other in the sense of 
full disclosure.
This scene that starts the movie serves no obvious narrative function and 
is very typical of Denis’s films. In interviews, Denis claims that many scenes 
in I Can’t Sleep were cut because of length concerns – often those that would 
Figure 3.1 The camera cuts down to the motorway . . .
Figure 3.2 . . . comes up behind . . .
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have added to character development.37 Instead, she chooses to preserve this 
brief but opaque moment in the final edit. We never see the helicopter men 
again. They are only two of the many strangers who appear and dissolve, 
interrupting any said by exposing us to yet another face. I Can’t Sleep con-
tinually interrupts one narrative thread with another. The camera shuffles 
between characters, never lingering for too long on any one before a differ-
ent story intrudes on the narrative. A scene in which Daïga and her landlord 
Ninon (Line Renaud) dance drunkenly to the song ‘A Whiter Shade of Pale’ 
is interrupted by Raphaël’s bloody face as he leaves the hotel where we see 
Camille sitting impassively on the stairs. Our gaze then shifts to a (indefinitely 
later) post-coital moment between Camille and the doctor, a friend who – it 
is implied – may be in on the murders. No words are exchanged and we cut 
to a scene in front of the hotel, where the doctor bums a cigarette from Daïga, 
followed by a scene of Daïga selling her car. The narrative moves constantly 
from character to character; scenes seem to interrupt scenes, always guided by 
tenuous and fragile links.38
Denis loves to end on interruptions as much as to start on them – scenes 
that remain enigmatic and unexplained with respect to the entirety of the film. 
At the end of her first film, Chocolat, the protagonist – who like Denis was 
raised in Africa – sees three black African men loading cargo onto planes.39 As 
the plane leaves Cameroon, the camera’s gaze remains on these three anony-
mous men for several minutes, framing them in long shot as they smoke ciga-
rettes, laugh and talk with one another in the rain. The protagonist flies out 
of our field of vision, but life continues away from her gaze, life that remains 
Figure 3.3 . . . and then around beside Daïga’s car.
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outside of the viewer’s comprehension and is uncontainable within the diegesis 
of the film. The Intruder ends on one of many scenes that remain enigmatic, 
even after multiple viewings. The film’s final moments show Béatrice Dalle, 
credited as the ‘queen of the northern hemisphere’, orgasmically riding her 
dog sled through the wintry forests of the Jura (Figure 3.4). The character’s 
history is unknown throughout the film and she plays a very marginal role, yet 
her expression of jouissance is the film’s final word. Denis always has a way of 
shifting our gaze to the periphery, to remind us of the limits of what we can 
see and understand or to interrupt any sense of a said with the saying, another 
body in movement, another untold story.
It would seem that from a Levinasian perspective, any attempt to represent 
the other would be in the realm of the said, and thus a betrayal of the ethical 
relation. I am suggesting that Denis shows us the possibility of a representa-
tion that maintains the saying over the said. This sayingness is a direct counter 
to the ideological fantasy offered by Hollywood cinema, of domination/ 
knowledge through sight and the illusion of a total and complete world offered 
on screen to a relatively autonomous spectator subject.
The representational difficulties raised by Levinas also apply to his own 
philosophical writing. In Otherwise than Being, he makes his first attempt to 
write in such a way that the text enacts the failure of language to fully grasp or 
comprehend the ethical in a totality. He is constantly trying to unsay the said, 
to reveal the ethical that ruptures through the ontological, as the space of rep-
resentation. Of his translation, translator Alphonso Lingis comments,
Figure 3.4 The ‘queen of the northern hemisphere’, orgasmically riding her dog sled through 
the wintry forests of the Jura.
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The very sentences of this book – thematic, synchronic time, systematic 
language, constantly making the verb to be intervene in phrases that 
profess to express what is antecedent to the work of being – can only be 
a continual transposition, and dissimulation, of the prethematic alterity, 
the diachronic time of the contact with the other, the non-presence of 
one term to another, which these phrases mean to put forth. What they 
mean to translate into a text is always betrayed, in a translation always 
unfaithful to the pre-text.40
In the original French, Levinas attempts to write his text avoiding the copula 
altogether, the copula that falsely places our interrelatedness in the realm of 
being. The problems of translation and betrayal identified by Lingis apply to 
all of Levinas’s work, which arguably itself betrays the ethical relation of which 
it speaks in its very attempt to bring it into the realm of the said, as a philo-
sophical text.41
The attempt to remain within the saying is perhaps what gives Levinas’s 
writing its literary quality. Megan Craig notes the very literary style with 
which Levinas explicates his own ideas, arguing that
Levinas’s style is integral to his ethics . . . To confront, rather than evade, 
the coincidence between trauma and ethics, between how Levinas writes 
and what he says, one might begin by focusing on Levinas’s distinctive 
imagery, approaching his texts with an openness typically reserved for a 
poem or a story that contains enigmatic, recurring motifs which require 
careful and ongoing analysis.42
Craig suggests that the process of reading Levinas’s texts, the work that they 
themselves demand of us as readers, is as much, if not more, a part of his 
ethics as is translating his writing into a more straightforward propositional 
content. His poetic and obscure writing style encourages an openness towards 
the unknown, a willingness to be surprised by what you do not know, and to 
let what faces you remain enigmatic, closer than before you started reading, 
but still infinitely otherworldly. I suggest that, similarly, other creative forms 
of expression, such as film, can aid us in cultivating an attitude of openness to 
alterity and of evoking wonder at the mystery of the others in our midst, a will-
ingness to unlearn our entrenched ideas and to open up a space for ‘knowing’ 
the unknowability of the other. Craig’s writing is incredibly helpful for think-
ing through what we might term a Levinasian poetics. She writes,
Ethics requires an ongoing vigilance and attention to the specificity of 
particular faces. Reading Levinas’s prose forces one to hold one’s atten-
tion to particularity and acclimate to the absence of ultimate definitions. 
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His texts are training grounds for hearing residual meanings and for 
reading in the absence of a definitive plot.43
Craig suggests here that we can mine Levinas’s style itself for a model of what 
it might mean to encourage an ethical attitude in a viewer, reader or listener. 
She writes further, ‘Levinas’s writing is not simply centered on the serious 
ethics of response and responsibility. It is also enmeshed in the serious aesthet-
ics of trying to show something unsayable.’44 Elliptical plots, attention to faces, 
residual meanings and ‘explanation without explanation’, to quote Denis, are 
all crucial to her cinema and the demand it places on the viewer. Her films 
encourage an attention to detail – one never knows if a face will resurface or 
disappear completely, or if it will materialise in another film altogether. Her 
films require the kind of patience and openness that are also necessary for 
reading Levinas’s philosophy, and in this way they point us towards his style 
itself as a model for film.
the erotics  of  ambiguity
In his early writings, Levinas was particularly interested in sexual difference as 
the prime exemplar of radical alterity, opening up the ethical encounter to the 
metaphor of the erotic.45 Many feminists have in fact found a productive point 
of intersection with Levinas in his early emphasis on sexual difference. While 
not wanting to completely distance myself from what may be useful in that 
notion, it is also problematic to assume difference based on an ontological cat-
egory, such as sex, when the whole thrust of Levinasian ethics argues against 
such ontologically based understandings of otherness. On this point, Levinas’s 
language is in tension with his own philosophy as he attempts to represent 
what is pre-thematic. Yet his discussion of the erotic as a space of relational 
ambiguity, when separated from a heterosexual matrix, is a useful place for 
thinking through the representational ethics I have been articulating. While 
Levinas maintained an ambivalence about the potential of the erotic as a means 
of access to, or way of thinking about, the ethical relation, his suggestion that 
the caress of two lovers might give us an intimation or a privileged example of 
the face-to-face is useful for thinking about how certain films can offer similar 
opportunities for something like the ethical, if not the ethical itself, to take 
place.46 He writes in Totality and Infinity that
The possibility of the Other appearing as an object of a need while retain-
ing his alterity, or again, the possibility of enjoying the Other, of placing 
oneself at the same time beneath and beyond discourse – this position 
with regard to the interlocutor which at the same time reaches him and 
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goes beyond him, this simultaneity of need and desire, of concupiscence 
and transcendence, tangency of the avowable and the unavowable, con-
stitutes the originality of the erotic which, in this sense, is the equivocal 
par excellence.47
Like the erotic, a film that inclines towards the other in its narrative language 
would try to remain equivocal. It would ‘explain without explaining’, touch 
without grasping, be an exposure in darkness, and a revelation that simultane-
ously preserves the other’s mystery. This exposure that is also a withdrawal 
is precisely what Denis’s films bring into play and is also a common motif in 
Nancy’s writing.48 Films that maintain otherness, for example by refusing 
to psychologise their characters and not relying on causal logic for narrative 
continuity, provide training grounds of sorts that teach us to look for the dif-
ference, to take on not-knowing as an assumed viewing position, and to expect 
the encounter to affect us, precisely because we are faced with what we do not 
have power over. Levinas writes of the erotic,
[Intersubjectivity] is brought about by eros, where in the proximity of 
another the distance is wholly maintained, a distance whose pathos is 
made up of this proximity and this duality of beings. What is presented 
as the failure of communication in love in fact constitutes the positive 
character of the relationship; this absence of the other is precisely his 
presence qua other.49
Here Levinas explicitly draws our attention to the positive value of failure, 
prefiguring Butler’s advocacy of images that fail. This positive failure opens up 
a space for a rereading of I Can’t Sleep. Take for example Martine Beugnet’s 
comment on the film: ‘The impossibility of communication lies at the very 
heart of the film. The characters speak little, and often don’t understand each 
other’s language. Dialogue proper (questions and answers, characters exchang-
ing information) and shots/counter-shots are non-existent, and the incessant 
ringing of the telephone is never answered.’50 Yet this failure of communica-
tion, when read alongside Levinas’s description of the erotic, takes on more 
positive connotations. The film, which very much foregrounds the disappear-
ance of traditional ties and connections in the modern cosmopolitan city, at the 
same time reveals the ephemeral and often overlooked links between us.
Camille’s drag performance brings many of these themes into play. He 
performs to a song by Jean-Louis Murat, entitled ‘Le lien défait’ – the undone 
link or bond. Denis says of the song that it
describes the theme of this film. The lyrics say, ‘The link is cut, there’s 
no more connection.’ I thought that this was the film’s central theme 
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because a society and a city work best when the links are tight. For me, 
life is a story of connections – without them society will self-destruct.51
As we have seen, the film is populated with connections in unexpected 
moments and places. Rather than being simply a film about modern aliena-
tion and social malaise (which undoubtedly is part of the story), I Can’t Sleep 
encourages us to keep a wakeful eye on the unexpected links that join people 
on the margins of the social mainstream (although these links are not neces-
sarily between or based on subjectivities). The failure of communication can 
be read positively as that which prevents us from colonising the other through 
our gaze and from assuming knowledge of what is presented to us on screen. 
Failure is thus itself ambiguous – it is confusing, and even scary, while also 
exposing the unknown that propels us towards the other and incites our desire 
for her.
In the drag scene this ambiguity is explicitly evoked. Camille, whose name 
itself is androgynous (as the detective says, ‘Camille? That’s a girl’s name’), 
neither dons a wig nor pads his chest. His body remains undoubtedly mas-
culine in physique if feminine in adornment and carriage. He wears a tight 
strapless velvet gown with long gloves and a hair band. His hair is short, he is 
barefoot, he wears lipstick and nail polish, but his masculine chest and back are 
visible, his nipples revealed as the dress inches down during his performance. 
His presentation is subtle, devoid of dramatic gesture and movement. It is 
completely free of any camp overtones and the audience seems as much the 
object of the gaze as does Camille. Shots of the audience watching place them 
in a more fixed position than do the shots of Camille, who seems to control 
rather than simply absorb the gaze. But the ambiguity of Camille goes beyond 
his gender, and additionally beyond his métissage, to the parallels established 
with other characters.
Throughout the film parallels between Daïga and Camille are suggested 
that undermine any easy assessments of good and bad characters. Both are 
pursued at various points by the police – Daïga is harassed and threatened 
upon her arrival into Paris because she is a woman and a foreigner. The police 
keep her under surveillance as they will later Camille, their gaze sutured to 
ours via a long tracking shot that ends with his arrest. Daïga is, like Camille, an 
object of sexual desire. She is also prone to violence. In one scene, where her 
impenetrable detachment is momentarily shattered, she violently rear-ends 
the car of the French theatre director whose amorous promises of an acting 
career brought her to France only to be left unfulfilled. In this scene her pow-
erlessness erupts in a spontaneous act of rage. Following the car wreck, it is 
suggested that Daïga has stolen the vehicle she drove from Lithuania. At the 
film’s end we see her driving another car out of the city, raising the spectre of 
theft once again. Like Camille, Daïga has no qualms about taking from others.
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In fact, in what is the most explicit parallel between the two characters, 
Daïga is shown stealing Camille’s money from his hotel room after he has been 
taken into custody. She stuffs her pants and shirt full of the money stolen from 
the dead victims, dirtying her hands with Camille’s violent crimes and directly 
benefiting from them. While this may suggest a lack of morality, I argue 
instead that this ambiguity is part of the ethics of Denis’s cinema. Everyone is 
given a full and complex humanity and good and evil are less relevant as terms 
for easy categorisation. In the tabloids, Paulin was referred to as the ‘monster 
of Montmartre’. Denis chooses a more difficult path in this film – Camille is 
neither pure monster nor a pure victim of, for example, homophobia or racism. 
Ambiguity ensures that we do not ‘other’ in such a way that it is ‘not us’ on 
the screen, but rather that we see the links that connect our various forms of 
violence and disregard. Rather than the easy comforts of disidentification, the 
viewer must wrestle with the messy complexity that she encounters on screen. 
Denis argues for the ambiguity of shadow when she says that
Cinema has this incredible way of making us feel what psychology can’t 
explain . . . You can read 15 books about serial killers, but that has 
nothing to do with the way you may look at people in the subway, or your 
own brother, or your mother, that mysterious element that makes you 
sense that what unites us, as human beings, is our opacity for each other. 
Cinema is made with light and shadow, but the beauty of light is that it 
delimits shadow. And that element of shadow is the part of cinema I’d 
like to continue exploring.52
This ambiguity proves to work in tandem with a Levinasian notion of abso-
lute alterity – categories fail and the difficult reality of the other remains. 
Cultivating an acceptance of difficulty, ambiguity and messiness has much 
larger cultural implications in a historical moment when we too often desire 
clarity and easy explanations, often as antidotes to the rapid changes, cultur-
ally, technologically and otherwise, that are part of the contemporary climate. 
Films like Denis’s offer us a different modality through which to approach the 
world, one that sees generative potential in the murkiness that lingers when we 
do justice to the singularity of the other.
The links of ambiguity are also present in other aspects of the film. Théo, 
rather than being a simple foil to Camille (the ‘good’ son/brother), is surly 
and difficult.53 He hears the woman in the apartment next door crying in what 
sounds like pain and the suggestion of domestic abuse is present throughout 
the film. Théo goes next door to intervene and at another point enters the 
apartment and sees handcuffs on the bed. It is unclear if the violence is part of 
his neighbours’ erotic role-playing or if the woman is in a dangerous situation. 
Denis never gives us an answer. Yet neither can we read Théo as the functional 
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and gentle neighbour next door. Théo and his wife Mona are constantly fight-
ing, even coming to blows at one point in the film. She leaves several times, 
refusing to indulge his plan to move to Martinique, and absconds with their 
child while Théo is playing in a concert. Just as Camille and Raphaël are in a 
violent relationship, there is a violence that permeates the links between Théo 
and his wife. The film disrupts every attempt at a simplistic interpretation – 
even the ‘good brother’ who is concerned about domestic violence occupies a 
place on the continuum of domestic dysfunction.
Another ambiguous continuum is created around the theme of women and 
ageing. Camille’s victims are elderly women and the film makes clear that they 
are vulnerable because society has abandoned them. The film’s first victim is 
dead for seven days before she is discovered, highlighting the isolation of the 
elderly. The cleaning lady who discovers her body laments, ‘No one cares 
about these old people.’ When Ninon tells her mother to go to bed, her mother 
speaks the film’s titular line. This very minor exchange similarly suggests that 
society wants its elderly out of sight and out of mind. While Ninon and Daïga 
drink and dance, her mother is expected to be ready to retire, to stay out of 
the life that keeps on going around her, even if she wants to keep her eyes 
open. The victim who survives and is able to describe the perpetrators does 
so because a delivery boy arrived immediately after she did. This moment of 
contact was crucial to her survival. Another victim happily welcomes Raphaël 
into her apartment, offering him coffee, clearly starved for conversation and 
asking for assistance with a small chore in her apartment because she has no 
one else. In this way, Denis peppers her film with references to the neglect and 
loneliness of the elderly. The film becomes as much about the way in which 
society deserts its elderly as it is about the sensationalist act of killing them. 
If anything, these women are the film’s broken link. Society is outraged about 
their deaths, but it itself abandons them as they age and lose their presumed 
aesthetic and reproductive value (as Ninon says, ‘[Men] still move me you 
know. It’s the way they look at me that’s changed’). Denis here asks us to 
encounter ourselves in the film – not only is a neat categorisation of Camille as 
a monster rendered difficult, but our own complicity with systems of ageism as 
they intersect with gender is brought face-to-face with the viewer. Here again, 
Denis pushes beyond Levinas to reveal the ethical implications of ambiguity. 
There is no reductive portrayal of elderly women as tout court sweet and loving 
victims (although those who fall into the hands of Camille are undoubtedly 
victims). Daïga’s great-aunt Mina is a miser and a (loveable) busybody, who 
immediately tries to dump the responsibility of Daïga onto other members of 
the Lithuanian diaspora, despite her ample resources and private apartment. 
Mina too is allowed both light and shadow.
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feminism and alterity aesthetics
Nikolaj Lübecker has argued that I Can’t Sleep represents a challenge to the 
Hegelian tradition in French thought that sees subjectivity as the product of 
the struggle for recognition, particularly in the film’s de-dramatisation of vio-
lence and the absence of typical intersubjective relations.54 While Lübecker is 
mainly concerned with the link between truth and violence that this valorises, 
his reading of the film as challenging a recognition-based model of subjectivity 
lays a foundation for my argument here. By turning to Levinas we see what I 
Can’t Sleep posits in lieu of a Hegelian recognition-based model. An aesthetic 
of alterity means that opacity takes precedence over recognition.
Arguing similarly against a recognition- or identity-based approach, Diane 
Perpich outlines a feminist politics based in Levinas’s account of the other. 
This would be a feminist alterity politics. Both identity politics and a politics 
of recognition rely on a notion of the subject that posits her in relation to an 
unmarked subject or, in the Levinasian lexicon, ‘the Same’. Identity politics 
typically defines significant categories of identity relative to the dominant 
subject group (usually, heterosexual middle-class white males). Similarly a 
politics of recognition demands recognition as like the other, again, typically 
a dominant subject group conferring recognition on marginalised or under- 
represented peoples. This latter approach may in fact encourage a downplay-
ing of difference, as difference could be seen as a basis for conflict rather than 
connection. Both of these strategies fall into the logic of relativising difference, 
ultimately diminishing the singularity of the other, be it through defining 
oneself as different in comparison to the other or by demanding recognition as 
like the other. Instead thinking of difference, after Levinas, as absolute alter-
ity may be a more fruitful option for feminist politics. Although my interest 
here is in representation and ethics, rather than politics, Perpich offers some 
compelling reasons why feminism should take Levinas seriously.55 She writes, 
‘Levinas is surely closest to feminism when he is exposing the ways in which 
conceptions of the unencumbered, autonomous subject fail to do justice to 
the ethical significance of human interdependence and to the moral necessity 
(rather than the mere desirability) of social cooperation in political as well 
as economic and social contexts.’56 A deconstructed and relational subject, 
whose singularity is uncategorisable (after Levinas), counters a politics based 
on equality or shared universal subjecthood (as in de Beauvoir, for example), 
which may not be the most productive goal for feminism.
Perpich is also critical of a politics based on recognition or identity because 
they rely on systems of representation, which are always open to co-optation. 
Once in the realm of the said or the ontological, we have little control over the 
representations we put forth into culture. It is the unrepresentability of the 
face that in fact allows singularity to emerge. Perpich argues that a feminist 
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politics of alterity conceives of group recognition in terms of the singularity of 
each member. She writes, ‘Levinas’s refusal to represent the other . . . far from 
causing or necessitating a chauvinistic indifference to particular differences . . . 
supports a conception of ethics and politics that demands institutional recog-
nition of (or, as appropriate, elimination of) group differences in the name of the 
singularity of each human being.’57 To modify Perpich, as I have shown above, 
Denis’s filmic argument suggests that there can be a representational practice 
of alterity – one not based on identity or recognition – that respects the very 
impossibility of capturing the other.
Applying Perpich’s claims to the realm of film suggests that singularity must 
prevail over identity. Denis’s films show us that this means that identity cat-
egories such as race or gender will never provide a sure footing through which 
to situate her characters. This is of course counter to the dominant narrative 
film tradition, which tends to rely on stereotypes or use markers of identity as a 
shorthand through which we can easily understand character and dialogue. By 
contrast, Camille’s maleness and blackness offer no automatic explanatory frame-
work for his behaviour, nor do they serve to guide viewer expectations. Similarly, 
Daïga’s gender and her vulnerability as linguistic and cultural outsider provide 
no clues as to how she will behave. She never smiles ingratiatingly or coquet-
tishly, is generally unapologetic for her communicative deficiencies, and doesn’t 
seem particularly grateful for the hospitality of others. She drinks tenants’ open 
bottles of wine while cleaning their rooms and smokes incessantly, never asking 
her host’s permission. The film 35 Shots of Rum provides a similar example of 
Denis’s refusal to turn identity categories into easy modes of (stereotypical) 
characterisation. In this more recent film, almost all of the central characters are 
black, but the story does not turn their racial ‘difference’ into its focus.58 The 
film reveals moments of their lives and relationships, granting them the right to 
an ordinary existence, just as the overwhelming majority of films about whites do 
not highlight their whiteness thematically. They are singular and each must be 
approached without preconceptions about what their race, gender or age means 
according to dominant cultural constructions. Although Denis’s films undoubt-
edly are concerned with issues of sexual difference and the legacy of colonialism, 
they expose singularities rather than seek out common identities.
In making her argument for a feminist Levinas, Perpich draws on Hannah 
Arendt’s concepts of whoness and whatness. Any list of representable whatness 
– or the features or characteristics that describe a person – cannot get at their 
singular whoness. Perpich argues, ‘Singularity – who one is – is always exces-
sive with respect to any characterization of what one is or of the groups with 
which one identifies or is identified.’59 Further,
But nor can my singularity be understood without recourse to socially, 
politically, and culturally salient facets of my experience. Singularity is 
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not meant to convey some abstract otherness or merely formal alterity, it 
is the concreteness of my life, my lived bodily experience.60
By way of example, I am not only or just a woman; that fact does not con-
clusively define or account for who I am. However, (in Perpich’s argument) 
you could not characterise me without including my femaleness or you would 
miss key aspects of what it means to be me. Similarly, Daïga’s femaleness is 
undeniably part of what she is (her beauty is often remarked upon in the film 
and cited as a reason she will do all right in Paris), but it never encapsulates or 
explains who she is. As I argue throughout this book, there is always a tension 
between the historically located categories through which our bodies are read 
or understood and their inability to account for who one is. Not only are these 
forms of identity insufficient, but they can also place very real limits on future 
possibilities. In her careful registering and dismantling of our identity-based 
assumptions, Denis points the way towards an aesthetic of alterity, as Perpich 
suggests an alterity politics for feminism.
As Perpich herself points out, Levinas’s philosophy in many ways prohibits 
the representation of the other. This may make an argument for a feminist 
representational strategy based on absolute alterity seem conceptually prob-
lematic. How can the other who cannot be known, whose reality lies outside 
my frame of vision, be ethically represented? This unrepresentability of the 
face motivates Judith Butler’s discussion of Levinas in Precarious Life. Butler 
argues, ‘For representation to convey the human, then, representation must 
not only fail, but it must show its failure. There is something unrepresentable 
that we nevertheless seek to represent, and that paradox must be retained 
in the representation we give.’61 Rather than eschewing representation alto-
gether, we should be aware of the necessary failure of our representations to 
capture the other in her singularity and consciously construct representations 
that do not seek to hide their own limits.62 While Denis does not employ more 
avant-garde strategies of alienation, for example revealing failure by radically 
divorcing soundtrack from image or creating a self-reflexive voice-over, she 
shows the limits of representation by her ‘failure’ to psychologise her char-
acters, her elliptical narrative structures, and her refusal to neatly and tidily 
define her characters according to available stereotypes and conventions. She 
shows us the generosity of images that ‘fail’.
conclusion
In a way that counters dominant Hollywood tendencies, Denis refuses any 
categorisation of her characters into good and evil. In this space of ambiguity, 
we are encouraged to be attentive to difference and to let the unknown remain 
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so. Denis reveals that ambiguity is the representational correlate of an ethics of 
absolute alterity. I have argued that Levinasian ethics help us to better under-
stand the complex way in which her films are experienced as ethical. This adds 
to the more apparent application of Nancy’s thinking to her work. But her films 
also show us the places in Levinas’s writing where we can begin to approach 
a feminist cinematic ethics more broadly. These include a Levinasian poetics 
– drawn from Levinas’s difficult writing style itself; his concept of the saying – 
as that which undoes the said; and, finally, the ambiguity of the erotic – as that 
which both exposes and obscures. A willingness to engage with complexity 
and relinquish mastery, a cinema of interruptions and movement, singularity 
before identity, and the aforementioned practice of ambiguity are all filmic 
correlates of these concepts. Levinas, when put into conversation with Denis 
(and guided by Perpich and Butler), opens up new possibilities for thinking 
through an ethical feminist representational practice – or, for short, an aes-
thetic of alterity. An emphasis on radical alterity as what relates us and renders 
us subjects is enacted in films such as I Can’t Sleep. The ethics are neither in 
the plot nor in the choices the characters make, but rather in how their alterity 
is offered to the spectator. This exposure creates an encounter that alters the 
viewer, should she accept the film’s invitation. Through our desire for their 
unknown (to return to the epigraph), we are revealed as in relation with them.
This encounter with the other may be present both on screen and in the 
relation between spectator and film. While the act of viewing is not ethical 
in an orthodox Levinasian sense, it stands in proximity to the ethical proper, 
encouraging us to look differently at the others in our midst. If the truth of 
the ethical cannot be disclosed properly speaking or represented in the sense 
of giving reason or proof, then the cinema can function as a possible space in 
which the encounter with alterity could be (re)enacted or intimated. Denis’s 
films stage multiple encounters with alterity, which, like the erotic, bring the 
other closer to me, while her interiority remains mysterious and unknowable at 
the film’s end. The way in which the viewer both can and cannot express what 
she has seen when she leaves the cinema, the very bodily – while simultane-
ously intangible – ordeal through which the viewer goes as she sits in her seat, 
bears traces of the ethical encounter.
The affective and visceral component of the face-to-face is another aspect of 
Levinasian ethics that is of interest from a feminist perspective. The following 
chapter turns to the body and bodily existence in Levinas and Nancy, putting 
their thought into contact with the bodies that move through Denis’s work.
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chapter 4
Troubling the Body:  
Trouble Every Day, Dance and the 
Non-Mythic Body
The previous chapters have worked towards developing a cinematic ethics of sense and aesthetic of alterity, through Nancy and Levinas respec-
tively. In this chapter, I focus on the body as it relates to the ethical and argue 
that Denis, Nancy and Levinas make important contributions to rethinking 
the body in terms that challenge dominant Western narratives. I also examine 
the ways in which Denis’s films reveal the notion of an autonomous bodily 
identity to be a Western construction that has relied on the colonisation or 
dehumanisation of certain bodies to maintain its privileged status.1
To do this I choose a difficult film: Trouble Every Day is a sophisticated 
engagement with the horror genre that addresses themes of bodily violence, 
vulnerability and non-immunity. Yet, because of its difficulty, the film is worth 
a sustained look. I have argued that Denis’s cinema reveals the insufficiency of 
dominant film language when it comes to fostering ethical modes of encounter. 
Here I turn specifically to genre, to examine how Trouble Every Day probes 
the limitations of generic modes in cultivating new practices of looking. Genre 
films tend to rely on conventions for making meaning that often foreclose the 
kinds of open ethical encounters that I have foregrounded throughout this 
project. By touching on but also moving away from the dominant tropes and 
formal and narrative conventions of the horror film, Trouble asks us to look 
differently, while drawing attention to our customary patterns of viewing. 
The film deals with a disease that compels those afflicted to deface and dis-
member their sexual partners. Rather than condoning or refusing to moralise 
regarding sexual violence, I read the film as highlighting a condition of bodily 
vulnerability that the Western subject has historically disavowed. In Trouble, 
Denis highlights our current moment as one of crisis for the Western subject 
– perhaps one that she is especially attuned to given her own biography.2 
This film in particular presents a challenge to the myth of the self- contained 
monadic modern body and therefore asks us to start from a place where we 
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recognise our shared dependency.3 However, as I argue in the final section of 
this chapter, where I turn to the motif of dance in Denis’s work, the flip side 
of this exposure to violence and outrage is the joy and beauty of our shared 
embodiment. The account of embodiment that I develop here shares concerns 
with postcolonial theory, disability studies and queer theory. Levinas, Nancy 
and Denis provide resources for thinking the ethical as embodied in a way that 
does not privilege gender, ability or other categories of identity.
Denis’s career evinces a sustained engagement with filming the body. This 
is perhaps most evident in her striking use of movement and dance, but is also 
apparent in her sensuous camerawork and soundscapes, which call affectively 
and sensorially on the body of the spectator. In the scholarly literature, Denis 
is often discussed in terms of her haptic or sensual engagement with the body, 
be it through Deleuzian, phenomenological or other frameworks.4 Well-noted 
features of her style include her capturing of bodies in motion, the unique 
approach to filming the body that she has developed (along with director of 
photography Agnès Godard), and the ways in which she uses sounds and 
images to evoke a variety of sensory experiences.
Ethics, as I formulate it in this project, entails remaining attentive and unre-
solved with respect to the meaning of our co-existence with all of the messiness 
that it entails. The body as the space of existence and thus of withness remains 
central to this ethic. The bodily relationship between film and viewer can 
evoke an ethical sensibility by reminding us of our mutual exposure. It does so 
through offering an encounter with the image that acts on us in a visceral way, 
which denies us a sense of autonomy and mastery over the image. Watching 
a film is an encounter in which we are exposed to the images before us, which 
alter us as the characters we see alter each other. Nancy reads the relation 
between viewer and image as one of exposure, rather than representation, 
where exposure is a kind of interruptive or non-appropriative contact between 
spectator and image. We are in touch with the film, as a body that compears, or 
co-appears, with us as viewers.5 This exposure is exaggerated in horror, where 
the viewer is open to extreme feelings of disgust, fear and shock. But in every 
case viewing film is a potential encounter with the unknown and a susceptibil-
ity to information, sound and image. Denis’s cinema in particular harnesses 
this facet of the cinematic experience to cultivate a mode of encounter that is 
bodily and ethical, or bodily because it is ethical.
Trouble Every Day asks us to think the body outside of representational 
approaches, such as those offered by semiotics or psychoanalysis – not to 
search for meaning outside of the body as it is. This does not mean that Denis 
negates the historical specificity of embodiment, but rather she reveals how the 
body works in excess of any referential system of meaning. It refuses knowl-
edge at the same time as it asserts its materially and historically located exist-
ence. In contrast to many genre films that draw out audience emotions through 
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well-known conventions, Denis’s alternative practice refuses her spectators 
the comforts of encountering the bodies on screen through pre-determined 
generic and cinematic codes. This means that as viewers we are open to a 
higher level of both risk and wonder, as each film is a singular and unforeseen 
encounter.
The effect of this vulnerability in viewing is to challenge the illusion of 
the spectator as unified subject, controlling or at least ultimately achieving 
cognitive mastery over the action she witnesses on screen. This relates to a 
major theme in this chapter, which is Denis’s critique of the myth of bodily 
immunity as a privileged and perhaps dying myth of Western modernity. I 
read the dismantling of identity as ethical according to the sense in which 
it relates to myth’s interruption, as advocated in Nancy’s writing. When we 
suspend the grand narratives that myth offers us, we reveal our finitude and 
non-identity, and our existence as shared beyond the borders of group identi-
ties.6 The impetus to resist fixed meaning, totality and closure in favour of 
openness, flux and fragmentation is evident in Denis’s work both at the level 
of the film’s narrative structure and at the level of the filming of the body 
itself. I play with this idea of interrupting myth by examining the body itself 
as a site of heavy cultural and philosophical mythologisation. Denis, Levinas 
and Nancy all provide deconstructive tools in this regard. Here again, Denis 
pushes us further than the philosophers in revealing the particularly Western 
privilege that is entailed in the myth of the body as a site of self-propriety 
and immunity. She does this in part by filming the body in fragments and, in 
Trouble specifically, by pushing to its limit the condition of human susceptibil-
ity that the film takes as its theme. The body troubles identity – it reveals that 
the self is never continuous and is a space of opening outward onto the world 
rather than inner containment and mastery. On screen, the body’s proximity 
can interrupt the potentially totalising narrative tendency of a film. Its expres-
sive capacity always exceeds the fixity of identity-based labels that would 
tell us what to make of this or that body in advance, for example ‘female’ or 
‘male’, ‘young’ or ‘disabled’. When cinema foregrounds rather than disavows 
our fragmented and susceptible bodily condition it works against myth, and 
troubles the certainties of identity in the name of which so many ethical and 
political injustices are committed.
immunity and exposure:  genre,  narrative  and 
spectator
In one of the final shots of Trouble Every Day we see an almost completely white 
image of a translucent shower curtain hanging in a bathroom. The vibrant red 
of one trickle of blood provides the only contrast to the pale  background as 
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it runs down the curtain. The blood running across the pure white image 
makes visible the intrusion of the body into and on film. The red line runs 
through an otherwise pure landscape – symbolising the inability of the central 
character, Shane Brown (Vincent Gallo), to fully cleanse the space, his mar-
riage and himself of the murderous desires that afflict him. It acts as a trace of 
what cannot be eradicated of Brown’s gruesome crime. He and June Brown 
(Tricia Vessey) are in Paris for their honeymoon. Unbeknownst to June, her 
new husband suffers from a mysterious disease, contracted in Guyana through 
experimental research with plant life. This illness turns sexual desire into 
destruction – arousal produces uncontrollable urges to bite and tear flesh and 
to sexualise blood as a fluid of play. Washing off the evidence of his recent kill, 
Shane leaves a trace of his act in the blood running down the shower curtain. 
The blood contradicts the illusion of immunity – of the space to contamina-
tion, of the characters to each other, and of the body to disease and desire.
Shane has also come to Paris in search of answers – the film chronicles his 
search for Dr Léo Sémeneau (Alex Descas), the head researcher in Guyana 
and a colleague of Shane’s from his previous life in Paris. Sémeneau’s wife has 
contracted the same disease (Coré, played by Béatrice Dalle). It is unclear how 
the disease was transmitted – it is said that Shane disobeyed Léo’s injunction 
against testing on humans. Reduced to inmate status in her own home, Coré 
seems to be at a much more advanced stage of illness. Léo locks her in the 
bedroom when he leaves for the day. Two neighbourhood boys are drawn to 
the seductive and mysterious woman trapped in the home: one of them will 
become her final victim. The film follows Coré during several of her ‘escapes’ 
as she hunts for prey on the outskirts of town, turning excitable truckers 
into mutilated corpses. Sémeneau, with Sisyphusian endurance, repeatedly 
tracks his wife down and brings her home, burying her victims and lovingly 
washing the gore from her face and shoulders (Figure 4.1). Notably, the 
only central character that is not white, Sémeneau has been exiled from the 
medical research community because of his controversial studies, which have 
introduced a foreign element that erodes the boundaries between animal and 
human, body and mind, desire and destruction. That is to say, the disease 
challenges the notion of the Western subject as bounded, rational and ‘civi-
lised’. This is despite the film’s suggestion that the greed for knowledge of the 
white American doctor is the true source of human contamination.
Trouble Every Day is Denis’s sole engagement with horror. It ‘troubles’ the 
generic limits of horror, specifically as it relates to thinking about embodi-
ment and subjectivity. As one of the three ‘body genres’ that Linda Williams 
identifies in her seminal essay, horror offers a useful framework for exploring 
Denis’s continued preoccupations with the body, particularly in relation to the 
spectator-film relation.7 The horror film displays bodies in fear (particularly 
female bodies) and calls on the body of the spectator to share in the anxiety, 
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tension and terror presented on screen.8 Trouble Every Day pushes the defini-
tion of a body genre to its limit, removing the psychological dimensions of 
horror to examine the pleasure and pain of non-identity that is embodiment. 
The film experiments with the threat of bodily invasion (or intrusion) so char-
acteristic of the genre, which has focused on deep-seated fears associated with 
the loss of self or the breakdown of identity. Several people are reported to 
have fainted at the film’s premiere at Cannes.9 This anecdote illustrates the 
bodily ways in which film can affect its spectators, and these visceral reactions 
are perhaps most extremely evoked by horror. Many other audience members 
booed or walked out of the same screening.10 The film was criticised as being 
too much and not enough at the same time; its gory excesses did not include 
the heightened tension and moments of shock that characterise much horror.11 
Devoid of the typical horror soundtrack that encourages extreme emotional 
responses, the film uses sensual slow music by Tindersticks throughout, refus-
ing sensationalism but evoking sensation. Some scholars, such as Tim Palmer, 
have taken up the film in terms of its representation of abject sexuality, placing 
it alongside other contemporary French films such as those of Bruno Dumont 
or Gaspar Noé to argue for a trend in tackling darker aspects of embodiment.12 
With respect to Denis’s work specifically, the film represents a limit case in her 
sustained exploration of the body, as many including Nancy have suggested.
By exploring the bounds of horror’s bodily preoccupations, Denis com-
ments on the limitations of genre which, like elements of the classic Hollywood 
style, tend to both shape and meet audience expectations, rather than ask the 
audience to look more closely or to see otherwise than the ways in which they 
Figure 4.1 Sémeneau lovingly washing the gore from Coré’s body.
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have been trained by conventional film language.13 By using a loose generic 
framework, Denis is able to draw attention to our habitual ways of making 
meaning, while challenging their efficacy, much as she locates subjects within 
particular identities and histories only to expose their limitations in under-
standing the singularity of each. While certain films may cause us to suffer 
sympathetically and cathartically, often according to well-worn generic con-
ventions, a counter cinema such as Denis’s offers an opportunity for a less con-
trolled encounter with the bodies exposed on screen. This is precisely because 
our generic expectations cannot provide a mental buffer of sorts, mitigating in 
advance our vulnerability to an encounter with what is unknown.
Contrary to many contemporary horror films (for example, Scream, 1996; 
Cabin in the Woods, 2011), Trouble Every Day never ironises its subject 
matter or pastiches the genre. It draws on various subgenres of horror 
including Gothic tropes such as the madwoman in the attic (Coré), Dracula 
and Frankenstein, with its focus on mad scientists and experiments with 
human life, and also more gory subgenres like the slasher film. It presents a 
complex mix of typically Denisian slow pacing and minimalist imagery with 
incredibly difficult scenes of gruesome sex, in which bodies are torn apart, 
chewed up and penetrated through newly created orifices. The film’s scenes 
of bodily destruction align it with a slasher/splatter film tradition, although 
here the slash is a bite and the splatter more a trickle or a smear, almost as if 
Denis had taken the genre’s scenes of slaughter, slowing down their frantic 
editing and asking the spectator to really look at the body in its ecstasy and 
agony. The body is here not only that which is torn apart and tortured, but 
also the instrument of torture itself: rather than a knife, chainsaw or any 
other implement it is the hands and mouth that perform the bloody deed. 
It evokes the vampire’s deadly kiss, but also gestures towards the cannibals 
and beasts that populate the genre. The body of the perpetrator is heavily 
implicated in the killing, itself infected with foreignness, as the mouth moves 
from an instrument of pleasure to an instrument of pain. This is a notable 
divergence from the typical slasher film killer, where the violence of killing 
usually acts as a substitute for an active sex drive.14 Here sex and violence are 
manifestly linked. In all of these ways, Denis pushes the genre to the limits of 
its engagement with the bodily. Because she does not sensationalise bodies, 
she is able to explore the body in ways that typically lie beyond the reach of 
horror.
Meditating solely on the body, the film refuses any element of character 
psychology/psychopathology, looking only to the physical as the source of 
malady and also keeping with Denis’s non-psychological approach to her 
subjects. Psychoanalytic frameworks have been particularly enduring within 
scholarly writing on the horror genre. For example, key texts on horror such 
as Barbara Creed’s The Monstrous-Feminine and Carol Clover’s Men, Women, 
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and Chainsaws focus on feminine abjection or the psychic drives and anxie-
ties that are manifested on screen. These readings often address a larger cul-
tural unconscious as it expresses its deepest (psychoanalytically interpreted) 
fears through the symptom of the horror film. Whereas Denis’s ‘preda-
tors’ refuse psychologisation, by contrast in what is perhaps the ur-slasher 
film, Hitchcock’s Psycho, the murderer effectively demands a psychoanalytic 
reading of his actions – a man who has introjected his overbearing mother.15 
As Carol Clover points out in her groundbreaking work on horror, the location 
of evil in a childhood incident or trauma is a convention of the genre, present 
in many less-regarded films than Psycho.16 The Hitchcock film is obviously 
referenced in the shower curtain image described above (albeit in the most 
paired-down and minimalist fashion). Notably, the shower scene in Trouble is 
centred not on a female victim but rather on the murderer cleansing his body 
of the woman’s blood, again gently nudging the history the film participates in 
and implicating the body of the killer to a much greater extent than is typical. 
Hitchcock is also cited in the character of June Brown – who despite her non-
blonde status visually quotes the archetypal Hitchcock woman, with her pixie 
haircut and well-tailored suits. Yet Denis turns away from any psychosexual 
or Oedipal explanation towards the threat of bodily contagion, dialling down 
the heavy suspense of Hitchcock to a slow-burning malaise. As Lisa Downing 
comments, ‘Trouble Every Day undercuts the necessity for such theories as 
Freudian psychoanalysis, by deconstructing the supposed underlying mean-
ings of the generic conventions, which are relocated at the surface of the 
filmic narrative’ – in other words, the film foregrounds the sexuality of its 
monsters.17 In Trouble the characters’ illness is resolutely not tied to some 
developmental trauma, innate sociopathy or insanity. The violence is one that 
literally infects the body. Coré is so reduced to her body that there is no possi-
bility of psychoanalysis. Diminished to pre-linguistic desires and despairs, she 
groans and grunts, but almost never speaks. When she finally does, she simply 
says she wants to die.18 Even the perpetrators are victims in the sense that they 
have been contaminated and suffer from their urges, and the actual victims 
give themselves over to their killers in a fury of desire that only belatedly turns 
to horror and non-consent. Just as Denis’s film sidesteps the psychoanalytic 
conventions of the genre, I offer a non-psychoanalytic reading of the body 
and spectatorship to suggest alternatives to more entrenched approaches 
to thinking through the viewer/film relation. The film touches on the 
limits of the genre, while opening beyond its conventional borders, echoing 
the narrative’s play with exposure and containment at the level of genre 
itself.
The film plays with themes of immunity and contagion as they relate to 
body and environment. The critique of the sovereign and bounded body 
present in the film is also found in Nancy and Levinas. But Denis relates 
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this post-phenomenological body to a history of colonialism, and racial and 
class privilege not present in the accounts of the two philosophers. The post-
phenomenological account of the body developed here overlaps with critical 
disability studies and queer theory because these modes of thought have also 
attempted to rethink discourses of bodily integrity. In A Body Worth Defending, 
Ed Cohen examines the emergence of biomedical discourses of immunity in 
the late nineteenth century, which came to replace models focused on the 
body’s contiguity with the environment. He asks how concepts taken from 
legal and political/military language came to dominate the contemporary 
biomedical field, constructing the body as a sovereign territory to be defended 
from outside forces. Importantly, in relation to Trouble Every Day’s colonial 
echoes, there are notable links between discourses of immunity or biological 
defence and the colonial project past and future. By locating the story in Paris, 
the film suggests the threat of the colonial other insidiously returning to the 
centre. As Susan Sontag notes in ‘AIDS and Its Metaphors’,
Part of the centuries-old conception of Europe as a privileged cultural 
entity is that it is a place which is colonized by lethal diseases coming 
from elsewhere. Europe is assumed to be by rights free of disease. (And 
Europeans have been astoundingly callous about the far more devastat-
ing extent to which they – as invaders, as colonists – have introduced 
their lethal diseases to the exotic, ‘primitive’ world: think of the ravages 
of smallpox, influenza and cholera on the aboriginal populations of the 
Americas and Australia.)19
Yet rather than reaffirming the need to shore up boundaries both national 
and bodily, the film works towards revealing that these borders were always 
already illusory.
The body in Trouble Every Day traverses many sanitised spaces from 
laboratories to aeroplanes to hotel washrooms. The upmarket hotel in which 
the Browns stay is ceaselessly cleaned by a legion of maids, one of whom will 
become Shane’s victim. In his searches, Shane visits labs whose cleanliness, 
blinding whiteness and bright lights suggest the desire for knowledge, reason 
and the full revelation of the body’s secrets. Ironically, the disease itself 
refuses visibility. This is brought into relief in a scene where Shane parodies a 
monster -figure for June at Notre Dame (Figure 4.2).
Shane’s play at a recognisable monstrosity hides the imperceptible sickness 
he carries within. The laboratories evoke the dream of the body as a contain-
able object, fully penetrable by the scientific gaze. Here, brains are objects to 
cut into pieces and classify, organic life is catalogued and refrigerated, and 
mysterious fluids are agitated by the rhythmic click of automated mixers. 
The darker side of Sémeneau’s experimental research and the deadly flows of 
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desire it unleashes are cleansed from these clinical spaces. In her reading of 
the film through Foucauldian ethics, Downing rightly points out that science 
has produced the illness in question. However, Western science has also been 
unwilling to name or even examine the sickness, complicating the claim that 
the disease is discursively brought into being. By focusing on the discursive 
production of subjects, we may overlook the ways in which Denis uses the 
materiality of the body to undermine medical and scientific discourses, dis-
courses that within the colonial context produce the Western body as rational 
and bounded and Western science as a narrative of progress. Because of the 
establishment’s refusal to acknowledge its own vulnerability, Léo’s home itself 
has become a lab of sorts – exiled from mainstream medical research, he now 
keeps his samples and medicines in the basement. A living ‘specimen’ for a 
disease without name, Coré is carefully locked in her room every morning, 
her sick body quarantined in the upper floor of the house. This containment 
is visually emphasised by an image of Coré peering through the bars of her 
cell-like room. Yet these efforts at containment are unsuccessful: Coré escapes 
regularly from her cell to find more victims. Her condition eludes medical 
classification, refusing containment in the realm of knowledge as well. In the 
case of the lab, the aeroplane and the hotel, these spaces of immunity are also 
spaces of economic and racial privilege which here become sites of crisis for the 
Western subject. Despite the attempts at securing, cleaning and standardising 
these spaces, they are penetrated by alterity.
An early scene in Trouble Every Day takes place in the anonymity of an aero-
plane as Shane and June fly to Paris. The grid of Denver’s lights appears below 
Figure 4.2 Shane parodies a monster-figure for June at Notre Dame.
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them, orderly and rational (‘It’s so geometrical, it’s like a computer chip,’ 
remarks June). The plane suggests a modern, safe and clean environment, 
reinforced by June’s soft white sweater with matching skirt, her tiny pearl 
earrings, the pristine glasses of champagne the couple hold, and the civilised 
tenderness of their interaction. The sound and framing work together to give 
a sense of the plane as a contained environment, but yet a space within which 
bodies are exposed to each other, sharing the recycled air and trapped in the 
area of the cabin. The first shot from outside the plane shows June and Shane 
peering out through the aeroplane window. The sounds of the aeroplane flying 
through the air and the two faces peeking through the small window suggest 
that the aeroplane is both protected from the outside and spatially contained 
– the quintessential controlled environment. This sense of containment is 
reinforced through slightly high angle shots within the cabin that emphasise 
the cramped spaces and the constant humming sound that accompanies flight. 
An image of sleeping passengers all in a row – businessmen in suits, some of 
whom wear eye-masks – further highlights the bodily proximity of the space. 
Shane studies the smooth, pale forearm of his wife and begins to kiss/bite it as 
he makes his way towards the elbow. Later, suffering from his unseen afflic-
tion, Shane retreats to the tiny aeroplane washroom to shake off his impulses. 
Visions intrude into the confined space as he sees his young wife, naked and 
peaceful, covered in a generous smearing of blood. This image remains striking 
given June’s childlike innocence throughout the film. Dressed in modest and 
tailored clothing, often in lighter colours with gloves to protect her hands, her 
skin is smooth and pale. Yet her husband’s fantasies intrude upon her purity, 
covering her snow-white body with (possibly infected) blood. Here in the con-
fined and regulated space of the aeroplane, desire and otherness intrude into 
an otherwise mundane scene, dramatically exposing the fallacy of immunity.
The attempts at sanitisation and containment extend from environmental 
to bodily spaces in the film. One of the more personalising gestures made by 
the chambermaid early in the film is to massage and wash her feet in the base-
ment sink after a day’s work. We also see several scenes of the maid and other 
staff preparing their bodies to work upstairs, changing and pulling up their 
hair – transitioning from individuals to standardised staff members in the 
building’s basement. The trickle of blood on the shower curtain belongs to 
a scene in which Shane showers to cleanse himself of the traces of his recent 
victim. Earlier in the film, a scene of Shane masturbating in the hotel bed 
is immediately followed by one of June running a bath, their juxtaposition 
highlighting the tensions in the film between purity and danger, immunity 
and infection. June, sweet and innocent, is shown in a slow pan as she soaks 
in the tub, after her husband, a victim of his sadistic sexual desires, writhes 
in pleasure and agony outside the door. He comes quietly into the bathroom 
and looks hungrily at his wife below him. Startling June, he asks, ‘Are you 
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frightened?’ We also see several scenes of Léo washing the human flesh and 
blood off Coré after her attacks, further highlighting the futility of sanitising 
the body from what is foreign within. The non-immunity extends beyond 
the two diseased characters to permeate most of the relations in the film. 
Victims are lured by desire to their perpetrators; a lab technician feels drawn 
to Shane’s plight, and June is propelled by the mystery of her husband. 
By emphasising the undeniable desire that flows between bodies, the film 
stresses the fact that susceptibility to one another is our general condition. 
It draws attention to moments of cleaning both body and environment, rein-
forcing the quest for immunity while simultaneously raising the spectre of 
invasion.
This exploration of bodily risk and openness shares many of the major 
concerns of Nancy’s bodily ontology. Nancy’s account of the body is perhaps 
best articulated in his work Corpus, but his shorter essay ‘L’Intrus’ highlights 
the themes of non-immunity and bodily risk. In ‘L’Intrus’ Nancy takes up his 
experiences of a heart transplant and of his battle with cancer to meditate on the 
ways in which the body is never a proper space of identity. Instead, the body 
is always imbued, inside and out, with what is foreign. Receiving the heart of 
another intensively illustrates the openness and dependence of the body on 
what is outside of it. Autoimmune failures gesture towards the body’s own 
inability to recognise a properly bounded self. The body’s condition is one of 
ongoing intrusion – with both the promise and the risk that that entails. This 
porous condition is a consequence of the fact that we are always with – we are 
born into a world where our bodies are already intimately connected to and 
open onto others. One could say the body is altered by alterity, where alteration 
is an ongoing process rather than a state. From womb to world the body takes 
in air, bacteria, new organs, plants, animals, minerals and bodily fluids from 
what is outside of itself. The body is an opening and extension, rather than a 
boundary and enclosure. Connecting this to ethics requires an awareness of the 
body as an ongoing process of sharing out amongst bodies – alive, inanimate, 
on film or in writing. An ethical encounter is one in which we are aware of our 
own non-coherence and reminded of our non-mastery with respect to what we 
see before us.
The lack of mastery suggested by Nancy’s use of the concept of exposure 
is meant to indicate an opening that does not return to the self. Levinas simi-
larly uses the language of exposure to highlight the bodily non-immunity of 
the ethical relation, or, put differently, the way in which the relation of ethical 
responsibility always already undoes the propriety of the body. The relation 
to the other is vulnerability and exposure to the other.20 In fact, Levinas often 
employs metaphors of maternity to suggest that ethical responsibility involves 
bearing the other within (in quite a bodily sense).21 Counter to a phenomeno-
logical model, then, the body is radically not my own. It is from the outset a 
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space infected by alterity. This bodily dimension takes on a valence of perse-
cution, pain and suffering in Levinas’s writing. Responsibility to the other is 
a kind of suffering because of the other. Greek mythology tells the story of the 
toxic blood of the centaur Nessus, rubbed into a tunic and given to Heracles 
unknowingly by his wife Deianeira. Deianeira thinks the blood is a potion that 
will renew Heracles’ love for her, but instead it causes his skin to burn inces-
santly. The compromised hero begs for his body to be burned on a pyre to stop 
the unbearable pain. Levinas draws on this story to describe ethical responsi-
bility: ‘The irremissible guilt with regard to the neighbor is like a Nessus tunic 
my skin would be.’22 This unceasing inflamed torture of the skin is Levinas’s 
metaphor for the trauma and painful tactility of ethical subjectivity. Here 
exposure sheds its potentially erotic valence to become pure pain.
Yet pain and pleasure are two intensities that reflect the reality of bodily 
exposure. The characterisation of responsibility in terms of suffering is a very 
real indicator of the power and impact that others have on our daily lives, 
mentally, bodily and emotionally. As Judith Butler writes, we are ‘undone’ 
by others, and this can be an extremely painful reality.23 Our mutual expo-
sure is a consequence of our co-existence. Levinas neglects the origin of the 
Nessus tunic in the myth, as a gift given in desperate passion by a lover who 
fears losing her beloved and is clueless that her actions will cause him pain. 
Translating into film, Denis reminds us that the erotic and painful dimensions 
of exposure are not so easily separated. This is because we affectively experi-
ence both desire and repulsion at various sensory levels throughout the film.
Trouble Every Day succeeds in playing along the continuum between the 
pleasurable and the painful dimensions of bodily togetherness. It reveals the 
body as a space of penetration, of attraction and sensation, and of receptivity 
to illness and to violence as much as to excitement and affection. The film’s 
opening credits are interlaced with images of an anonymous couple who kiss 
passionately, their faces obscured by darkness. The image seduces its viewers 
with these unknown characters who disappear after the credits, a lost thread 
never to be taken up again. This scene foregrounds the seduction of images 
and the desire for understanding and identification so intrinsic to film spec-
tatorship (we want to know who they are and how they fit into the narrative). 
Its erotic pull makes the viewer complicit, through desire, with the scenes of 
violence that she may later suffer through, extending the pleasure and pain 
of exposure to the viewer/film relation. The hungry kisses of the unknown 
pair and our desire to comprehend the image tie into the themes of lust and 
devouring that the film takes to their extremes. Rather than stabilising the 
spectator through mechanisms of identification, as does classical cinema, the 
film highlights the viewer’s vulnerability to the film as itself a risky encounter. 
The scene also illustrates the film’s own ‘exposure’, where again exposure is 
thought of as an interruptive contact: the image touches on a fleeting moment 
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only to withdraw from it, creating an opening within the film that does not go 
back to the film’s larger world.
The themes of immunity and risk gesture beyond the immediate narra-
tive of the film – the disease bears the trace of the French colonial past in 
its Guyanese origins, typical of Denis’s concern with France’s postcolonial 
history. Judith Mayne notes the connections between the film’s plot and dis-
courses about AIDS, and argues,
I believe that Trouble Every Day subtly but forcefully undermines many 
of the myths about AIDS. The deadly desire has virtually nothing to do 
with homosexuality in the film. And the curiosity and greed of the white, 
heterosexual man (Shane) is at the origin of the affliction.24
These references reiterate that the film’s interest in bodily vulnerability carries 
with it historical dimensions, along with a critique of race- and sexuality-based 
epidemiological discourses. Rather than otherness originating from a source 
that the Western body already recognises as other, that is to say from the non-
white body, the disease in Trouble challenges the assumption of who the other 
is. Both Shane and Coré are attractive middle-class white people, and Shane, 
at least, possesses a significant amount of mobility. It is in fact their seeming 
‘likeness’ that makes their prey so easily deceived. Denis troubles the Western 
body through her choice of perpetrators and victims, revealing newly vulner-
able Western subjects in her alienated anonymous landscapes.
body myths
In revealing the non-immunity of the subject, Trouble works to undermine 
(Western) myths about the body more generally by foregrounding the body in 
parts and filming it as an indistinct proximal surface rather than a unified and 
distant object. Throughout her work, Denis develops a new visual language for 
representing the body.25 As discussed in previous chapters, Denis’s interrup-
tion of cinematic mythology parallels Nancy’s advocacy of myth’s interruption 
– or the privileging of openness and fragmentation over the fixity of a singular 
meaning or explanatory framework. Working against the ideological con-
struction of the subject or a people, interruption offers in place of myth an 
awareness of singularity, relationality, ephemerality and finitude.26 Writing 
on Nancy, Marie-Eve Morin comments, ‘myth has the form of subjectivity 
(defined by Hegel as that which can include within itself its own contradic-
tions, that is, as “remainderless totality.”).’ 27 The dismantling of this mythic 
subjectivity necessitates a related troubling of dominant approaches to filming 
the body.
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Denis offers an alternative to the dominant film language that perpetuates 
certain myths about the body and its relation to subjectivity. Typically, in clas-
sical narrative film the spatial relationships on screen are configured according 
to a particular construction of the spectator’s body. As Noël Burch argues, 
‘The dominance of the Western mode of filmic representation was determined 
neither by ideological factors alone nor by sheer economic opportunism. 
Rather, it corresponds broadly to the mode of constitution of the Subject in 
our culture, and it developed into an ideological vehicle of unprecedented 
power.’28 The spectator’s body, then, supposedly echoed in institutionalised 
film language, is in fact an ideological rather than a natural body. It is the 
mythic-subject body, spatially unified, and both separated from and in pos-
session of what it sees. By contrast, Nancy’s description of the body in Corpus 
argues for a non-mythic body:
The body-place isn’t full or empty, since it doesn’t have an outside or 
an inside, any more than it has parts, a totality, functions, or finality. It’s 
acephalic and aphallic in every sense, as it were. Yet it is a skin, variously 
folded, refolded, unfolded, multiplied, invaginated, exogastrulated, ori-
ficed, evasive, invaded, stretched, relaxed, excited, distressed, tied, 
untied. In these and thousands of other ways, the body makes room for 
existence (no ‘a priori forms of intuition’ here, no ‘table of categories’: 
the transcendental resides in an indefinite modification and spacious 
modulation of skin).29
Here we see both a rejection of idealist accounts of mind/body (‘no “a priori 
forms of intuition” here’ etc.) and also the refusal to think the body teleologi-
cally or in terms of a normative completeness. Trouble Every Day foregrounds 
this refusal of meaning in favour of sensation and affect – or, in other words, 
it highlights ‘the indefinite modification of skin’ and the openness of the body 
over its bounded permanence. Just as the body on screen is susceptible to and 
infected by alterity, so Trouble offers a relation of exposure between the bodies 
of film and viewer. The film is a body opening onto the viewer and, although 
not all films operationalise this potential, it can participate in cultivating an 
ethical sensibility by reminding us of our mutual bodily vulnerability and of 
the limits of control.30
This notion of bodily vulnerability is highlighted in Levinas’s affective 
account of ethical subjectivity. Levinas works against the myth of the skin as 
boundary between self and other, emphasising the embodiedness of ethics, 
while disinvesting the skin of any connotations of propriety or own-ness. He 
writes that the ethical subject must be ‘capable . . . of giving his skin’.31 The 
closeness of skin works against totality or myth:
troubling the body  131
[Proximity] is more determinate than the relations that are ordered into 
a totality. Signifyingness, the one-for-the-other, exposedness of self to 
another, it is immediacy in caresses and in the contact of saying. It is the 
immediacy of a skin and a face, a skin which is always a modification of a 
face, a face that is weighted down with a skin.32
The use of his concept of ‘saying’, which I elucidated in the previous chapter, is 
that which refuses the ‘said’, or a fixed representation, in favour of movement 
and non-finality. Here the saying is linked to proximity. Applied to cinema, 
proximity as skin/materiality of the filmed image (also pellicule in French), 
like the saying, interrupts narrative progression in favour of an exposure to 
the non-identitarian body. Denis privileges the proximity of the body over 
traditional forms of filmic storytelling. Her camera tends to explore the body 
as a tactile landscape rather than seek a clear visual picture that would locate 
a figure in a stable ground. Thinking about the ways in which the immediacy 
of a body breaks up totality within the world of film brings to mind Laura 
Mulvey’s well-noted observation that the spectacle of the female body tends 
to work in tension with a film’s narrative development.33 Mulvey is of course 
offering a psychoanalytic reading of classical Hollywood cinema. Because 
Denis offers a counter cinema, the psychoanalytic reading becomes less opera-
tive.34 In fact, her filming of the male body is perhaps most exemplary in its 
challenge to classical cinema, and thus demands frameworks of analysis other 
than those offered by psychoanalysis or semiotics. Yet Mulvey’s point that 
the body breaks up the linear narrative impulse is still very relevant to my 
analysis of the function of the body in Denis’s oeuvre, which tends to focus on 
the corporeal in ways that most definitively privilege exposure over narrative 
development. The tension between linear progression and spectacle in film 
is perhaps most pronounced in the musical genre, and while not musicals in 
any traditional sense of the word, Denis’s films are marked by the spectacle of 
bodies dancing. Dancing bodies present alterities and let the bodily encounter 
between viewer and characters take priority over narrative progression and 
meaning. Although Trouble Every Day (perhaps appropriately) does not itself 
contain any dance scenes, its focus on the body shares in the larger Denisian 
impulse to eschew classical narrative in favour of an affectively charged 
encounter with the body on film.
Thinking through this aesthetic of exposure as an encounter with alterity 
opens up a way to address the bodily impact that films can have on us. For 
Levinas, the skin can never contain subjectivity. Because I am as the result of 
the pre-ontological ethical encounter with the other, my body in some sense 
contains the other. The face-to-face ‘signifies in the form of one-penetrated-
by-the-other’.35 The other is in me, is in my skin. This is why Levinas’s 
account of ethical subjectivity makes repeated reference to the skin as not quite 
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fitting, or as being too tight for the subject. The skin must make room for both 
myself and the other-in-me. He writes in Otherwise than Being, ‘In responsi-
bility as one assigned or elected from the outside . . . the subject is accused in 
its skin, too tight for its skin.’36 The skin of both film and the spectator bear 
the trace of encounter.37 Film offers opportunities for encountering that may 
alter us and which may scare or haunt us, causing chills that run along and 
even below the skin’s surface. June’s otherwise unblemished skin bears two 
marks in Trouble Every Day: first, a bite mark on the shoulder, and second, a 
cut on her lip. The first is given to her in pleasure and the second is the result 
of a struggle. Both are the traces of a relation and highlight the body’s fragile 
exposure. For Levinas, our skin becomes a space of shared ethical relation, one 
that, like the traces on June’s lip and shoulder, bears the risk and pleasure of 
our co-existence.
While both Nancy and Levinas speak abstractly of the body as ‘indefinite 
modification and spacious modulation of skin’ or as shared with the other for 
whom I am responsible, Denis reminds us that the skin is also always raced – 
that is, it is shaped by a relational world in which skin is read, experienced and 
felt in the context of complex histories of geopolitical encounters. This harks 
back to the discussion of the short film Vers Nancy in Chapter 2. In that film, 
which takes up many of the themes of Nancy’s philosophy, it is the medium of 
film that is best equipped to generate an affective or pre-cognitive understand-
ing of the ways in which the skin, young or old, black or white, is not in prac-
tice an uninscribed surface through which to theorise ethical subjectification. 
When Descas enters the train carriage, his black skin registers a difference that 
affectively underscores the conversation about foreignness between Nancy and 
Samardzija, herself a foreigner. His intrusion generates unspoken questions 
about citizenship, colonialism, assimilation and race that concretise the abstrac-
tion of the dialogue into the encounters of real bodies. Bringing an understand-
ing of the historicity of the skin to the text enriches our readings of both Levinas 
and Nancy and insists on the materiality of the body of which they write.
The body in Trouble interrupts the Western ‘mythology’ around embodi-
ment, specifically the myth of the body as a sovereign territory protected and 
contained by the skin. Denis inscribes these problematics both on the film as 
a kind of skin (challenging the false barrier between image and audience) and 
on the skin of her character.38 The skin may seem the most obvious boundary 
of embodied selfhood, but it is a porous container. For Denis, Levinas and 
Nancy the skin refuses to be the demarcation of a discrete identity. The marks 
that June bears on her skin become a kind of non-linguistic bodily writing. 
This notion of the skin as bearing a pre-cognitive significance is captured in 
Nancy’s concept of ‘expeausition’, his highlighting of skin (peau) and exposure 
in the concept of exposition.39 Expeausition deconstructs the notion of a split 
or hierarchy between mind and body.40 Rather than exposition referring to 
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a ‘comprehensive description and explanation’ of an idea or theory, ex-peau-
sition collapses the distinction between the sensible and intelligible, rethinking 
exposition as simply the opening of a skin onto the world, without a return 
to self.41 The word itself suggests a movement outside – ex-position. This is 
not exposition in the sense of filling in the details or making legible. To have 
a meaning is to be open to co-optation by myth; rather, the body is meaning 
for Nancy. Similarly, the body in Trouble Every Day troubles any attempt 
at a reading based in semiotics or symbolic structures. This is perhaps most 
graphically illustrated in the scene where Coré paints the wall with the blood 
of her victim – an abstract image that insists on the materiality of the body as 
it both carries particular histories of colonial and other forms of violence and 
also exceeds discursive containment (Figure 4.3).
To further strip the body of myth, Trouble Every Day rejects any larger 
narratives that would give the body a meaning or purpose outside of itself. 
Religious discourses that valorise a less carnal body are absent from the film; 
Notre Dame merely provides a photogenic backdrop for the American hon-
eymooners. Scientists endlessly study the brain, but are silent in the face of 
Coré and Shane’s illness. Though the two perpetrators ravage and probe deep 
into the body of their victims and search their blood for satisfaction, the body 
refuses to be possessed or to yield up any deeper truth. In this respect, the 
body in Trouble Every Day rejects language or any deeper signification. In 
doing so it reveals that the body itself contains no inherent reason or madness, 
good or evil, and that these attributes are produced through historically located 
encounters rather than being the essential properties of particular bodies.
Figure 4.3 Coré paints the wall with the blood of her victim.
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Denis highlights the body as a material force – its sensation, attraction and 
revulsion towards and with other bodies. In one scene Shane enters his hotel 
room after the chambermaid has left. She has lingered in his suite after clean-
ing, lying on the made-up bed and smoking a cigarette before she leaves. Shane 
approaches the depression her body has left on the mattress and smells the area 
where her sex would have lingered. This scene prefigures Shane’s later oral 
dismemberment of the woman’s clitoris and labia in the basement. The only 
truth of the body here is its material vulnerability, its susceptibility to other 
bodies. In place of a referential meaning we have the circulation of bodies as 
they draw each other across distances, resisting language but proliferating sen-
sation, smell, taste and distinctive motion.
Just as the disease afflicting Coré and Shane seems to undo any simple 
distinction between mind and body (it is a physical condition that infects the 
brain and affects one’s desires), so Nancy’s concept of sense (sens) collapses 
any meaningful distinction between the sensible and intelligible. As discussed 
in the second chapter, sens connotes direction, suggesting a movement or 
process. It also indicates the bodily sensorium – touching, smelling, hearing, 
tasting and so on – but not a sensorium that would be integrated into a unified 
(mythic) body. In his book on Nancy, Ian James elaborates, ‘Prior to any tra-
ditional distinction between mind and body, ideality and materiality, and prior 
to cognition per se, there is the passage of sense as a bodily event, as an opening 
up of meaningful spaces and a meaningful world in which such distinctions as 
mind/body, ideality/materiality can be made or be thinkable as such.’42 In all 
of its valences, the body as sense suggests the process of meaning – meaning as 
that which is never fixed, never possessed, but that is constantly kept open to 
the questioning that is so key to an ethics. Trouble Every Day, in its rejection 
of discourses of science and religion as they would give a meaning to the body 
outside of the body as it is, open and vulnerable, giving and taking, shares in 
this impulse to expose the body outside of representational or explanatory 
systems. This shift away from a representational body, or the body as having 
meaning, and towards the body as sense, or as being meaning, would neces-
sitate a new way of approaching the body in front of the camera’s lens. This 
is one perspective through which we can contextualise the innovative ways in 
which Denis films the body.
We have seen how Trouble Every Day ‘troubles’ the body, both the bodies 
on screen and that of the viewer herself. The film refuses the body’s discursive 
containment, undoes the notion of the skin as a container for subjectivity, and 
rejects a hierarchical and unified notion of the body. Because Denis does not 
take bodily identity as self-evident, the camera moves away from shooting the 
body as a totality or an object of visual mastery. Trouble Every Day exposes 
the body in fragments, yet in a way that highlights the tactility and singular-
ity of the body rather than offering it as a fetishised object. Perhaps the most 
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memorable instances of this are the repeated shots of the maid’s neck, which 
we follow down the hall of the hotel throughout the film (Figure 4.4). This 
focus on fragments is characteristic of Denis and Godard’s work together, 
which obsessively captures glimpses of parts, often backs and hands, ears and 
feet, in an almost impressionistic mode (for example, an ear in The Intruder, 
Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.4 The maid’s neck.
Figure 4.5 The camera obsessively captures glimpses of parts, often backs and hands, ears and 
feet (The Intruder).
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These fragments are often framed in unconventional ways, using choker 
close-ups and employing shakier handheld camerawork that offers a fleeting 
impression. Godard employs the camera as a body in movement with other 
bodies, better capturing the tactile and sensory experience of sharing space 
with another body. For instance, an early sequence in the film The Intruder 
shows the lead character, Louis, at peace in the natural environment that sur-
rounds his home in the Jura Mountains. We are given a brief glimpse of his 
naked backside, atypically framed, as he walks through the forest (Figure 4.6). 
He is depicted as at one with his surroundings, roaming nude, lounging with 
his dogs under trees, and swimming in the lake. Something happens to his 
heart as he is swimming – once ashore we see a close-up of his hand grasping 
the earth (Figure 4.7). Several frames later we see another shot of his hand 
covering the traitorous organ (Figure 4.8). This series of shots demonstrates 
the suggestive power of the part without using dialogue or more codified 
visual language (for example, the facial close-up as an indicator of character 
psychology). They create a sensory connection that privileges the affective 
content of the scene over the narrative (although, yes, we can infer that a heart 
attack has occurred and that Louis is very comfortable in his environment, 
both elements of narrative and characterisation). These fragmented glimpses 
ask us to encounter the body outside of any preconceived systems of meaning 
that would tell us in advance what to make of this or that body (for example, 
based on gender or age).43 They make the body strange and extraordinary, as if 
to expose its singularity in this combination of glances, in this particular light, 
Figure 4.6 A brief glimpse of Louis’s naked backside, atypically framed, as he walks through 
the forest.
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doing this specific activity. The body in fragments foregrounds an ephemeral 
yet sensual encounter with singularity.
Nancy suggests this collection of parts in his discussion of the body as partes 
extra partes. Nancy theorises the body as a corpus rather than corps, a collection 
of parts rather than a unified organism. It is without head or tail (acephalic and 
Figure 4.7 Something happens to his heart as he is swimming – once ashore we see a close-up 
of his hand grasping the earth.
Figure 4.8 Several frames later we see another shot of his hand covering the traitorous organ.
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aphallic), its sexed-ness exceeds binary sex and it lacks an organising principle, 
telos or intelligible purpose. In many ways, Nancy offers an account of the body 
sympathetic to a queer theoretical perspective – sexuality and sex are plural 
not only between bodies but also within bodies; becoming and fragmentation 
replace a notion of fixed and unified identity. This queer ontological perspec-
tive is also evident in his essay ‘The “There Is” of the Sexual Relation’.44 In 
this text, Nancy further emphasises the ways in which sense privileges acts 
over sexed and sexual identities and highlights the proliferation of desires 
that exists before and beyond any notion of sexual difference. Likewise, queer 
theory has challenged identitarian notions of sex or sexuality in favour of con-
tingently produced and negotiated desires and acts. Nancy writes,
Sex is not just its own difference but also, each time, the properly infi-
nite process of its own differentiation. I am each time a certain degree 
of composition and differentiation between man and woman, homosexual 
man and heterosexual man, homosexual woman and heterosexual woman and 
according to the various combinations that open up to each other as well 
as close themselves off from each other, that touch and penetrate each 
other.45
As has been demonstrated in previous chapters, Denis’s films themselves are 
corpi – working against closure and fixity at the level of narrative and charac-
ter – but here we see how this refusal of totality (or myth) reaches down to 
the level of the depiction of the body itself.46 In contrast to psychoanalytic 
or semiotic frameworks, approaching the body through Nancy allows us to 
see how the body can act in excess of signifiers such as sexual difference and 
beyond the level of narrative. The body’s performative potential as it appears 
on screen is not fully encapsulated by our categorisations and representational 
systems. Just as the ethics elaborated in this project refuse closure, so the body 
as the space from which ethics is refuses a static unity and thus troubles rather 
than reifies notions of identity.
Additionally, in contrast to a psychoanalytic model, rather than the part 
standing in fetishistically for something else, the body in fragments simply is 
the condition of the body. This is key to Denis’s fragmentary glimpses, which 
offer an alternative filmic representation to classical narrative cinema. These 
fragments are what make each body this specific body, or, put differently, what 
make each body singular in and across time. This fragmented account of the 
body has no negative connotations for Nancy – just as intrusion carries both 
risk and potentiality, the fragmented body is simply our condition, one to be 
celebrated as it gestures towards our singularity and adaptability, our rela-
tionality and connectedness. When we shift our understanding of the ethical 
to a respect for singularity, a refusal to fix the other into any one framework, 
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and an attentiveness to our ever-shifting relationality, we open ourselves up to 
thinking beyond the categories that discriminate or label based on race, gender 
or other visual markers of identity, such as ability. This makes it difficult to 
determine in advance what any one person can or will do, or what kind of rela-
tions might occur between specific bodies. This capacity to think beyond the 
confines of identity categories and to cultivate a respect for difference puts this 
approach in agreement with a feminist perspective. Denis challenges us not 
only to think the body differently, but to see it differently, disturbing domi-
nant and codified ways of looking. The body’s singularity as it is exposed each 
time, in each unique part, privileges a non-identitarian being, altered in her 
encounter with her environment and with other bodies.
This post-phenomenological reading of the body dovetails with major cur-
rents in critical disability studies, which has long challenged dominant con-
structions of the body as whole, sovereign and bounded. Before moving on to 
examine another facet of how Denis films the body I’d like to take a moment 
to think about the ways in which adding voices from disability studies enriches 
our discussion of cinematic ethics. This is a potential not fully explored in 
Denis’s work thus far but is suggested by her approach to her subject matter. 
Although disability and film scholarship tends to look at disability as it appears 
thematically in films, here I am suggesting that rather than the content of the 
film per se, the way in which we are encouraged to encounter and relate to 
bodies on screen, narratively and formally, is sympathetic to a perspective that 
makes room for differently abled bodies. Just as her work does not have to treat 
women or ‘women’s issues’ explicitly to evoke a feminist gaze, so questions of 
ability are opened up by the way in which we are asked to approach others on 
screen. The filmic ethics here suggests that no body can be encapsulated by our 
expectations – bodily identity is not stable, nor are bodies read the same way 
in every context. Nancy and Denis contribute to challenging notions of abled-
ness that are used to marginalise certain bodies by foregrounding the body as 
a varying collection of parts.47 Denis to date has not specifically dealt themati-
cally with physical or intellectual ‘disabilities’ in her films; however, useful 
parallels are available in her concern with diasporic bodies and ageing bodies 
(notably in I Can’t Sleep). Daïga’s character in I Can’t Sleep explores the situa-
tional disability of being unable to converse fluently in the dominant language, 
but, as discussed in the previous chapter, she does not present herself as needy, 
apologetic or even deserving of sympathy on that account. This demonstrates 
the insufficiency of categories with respect to human singularity and the ways 
in which limitations are contextual rather than essential.
Disability theorists have highlighted the ways in which the projection of 
contagion and vulnerability onto the ‘disabled other’ is a disavowal of the 
unmarked subject’s own dependence and openness to alteration by the other. 
Although not diseased per se, the disabled body is often treated as if it were 
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contagious.48 In this respect, the film evokes issues related to ‘disphobia’ 
just as Mayne suggests it elliptically refers to discourses around AIDS. The 
 supposedly neutral body against which bodies labelled ‘disabled’ are held up 
and found lacking tends to be white and male, linking women, non-white 
and differently abled bodies in terms of their bodily difference or ‘otherness’. 
Challenging binary notions such as that between same/other and abled/disa-
bled, disability activists and scholars have advocated strategies such as using 
the term ‘temporarily able-bodied’ to name those bodies typically seen as able 
and to emphasise that disability is not necessarily a permanent state but some-
thing we move into and out of to different degrees throughout our lives. The 
overlap between disability studies’ attempt to think the body as something in 
process rather than static and queer paradigms that seek to reclaim the body 
from normative notions of wholeness and identity has been noted by many dis-
ability theorists.49 Nancy and Denis are useful contributors to this open ‘body’ 
of ideas – clearing paths that challenge the monadic modern body and may be 
useful to critical disability studies and queer theory.
The modern account of the body is underpinned by many discourses from 
biomedical and military to philosophical concepts of personhood, leading up 
through phenomenology. As Ed Cohen notes, ‘[M]odern bioscience’s invest-
ment in the self-interiorizing and defensive organism betrays its unacknowl-
edged debt to modern philosophies of personhood.’50 In this light we can see 
how the Nancean body – open, dependent, technological and other to itself – 
follows necessarily from the ways in which Nancy reconsiders the subject after 
phenomenology. By altering our philosophical concepts and moving towards a 
more porous and connective model of ‘personhood’, a less bounded and defen-
sive account of the material body comes into relief. As Margrit Shildrick writes 
apropos our conceptions of the body, ‘although the transcendent split between 
mind and body may be problematised by our phenomenological experience 
of being-in-the-world, we do still see our bodies almost as though they were 
suits of armour protecting a core self.’51 Nancy makes a critical intervention 
within the philosophical tradition here, challenging the notion of a stable and 
true inner self in favour of surfaces touching one another, parts combining 
with other parts – both technological and otherwise – and altering bodies in 
their course. The rethinking of the body is a move away from identity as the 
foundation of being and towards a processual and dynamic notion of the body 
plural. If disability is culturally related to brokenness, dependence, necessary 
co-existence and techo/biological intermeshing, then in a Nancean framework 
there is no difference between this ‘other’ body and the reality of each body – 
each bodily configuration enacts each time singularity rather than stabilising a 
universalising category. Denis’s method of shooting the body in parts suggests 
that the body shares itself out more when the look relinquishes its power of 
understanding through assuming a meaningful whole.
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Trouble Every Day highlights our general dis-ease with respect to our lack of 
bodily sovereignty by foregrounding our susceptibility throughout the film. It 
therefore challenges the notion of personhood constructed by the kinds of bio-
medical discourses Cohen discusses. Shildrick similarly writes, ‘At the begin-
ning of a new millennium in which evermore detailed biomedical accounts of 
the body are passing into lay usage and in which we are invited to marvel at the 
capacities of biomedical technologies to remake the body, reminders of uncon-
trolled corporeal vulnerability are highly unwelcome.’52 Trouble works to chal-
lenge the ways in which ‘normative categories of ontology and epistemology’ 
are secured by ‘the notion of the diseased, the unclean or the contaminated’.53 
It also highlights the ways in which corporeal difference equals institutional 
invisibility. Moving away from sovereignty, instead it suggests we rethink our 
co-existence in terms of connection, a generalisable susceptibility and a non-
normative core/corps. By refusing the sense of the body as identity, Denis is 
able to film bodies in an exploratory way, one that moves away from the body 
as a coherent totality and therefore does not start with maleness or femaleness, 
or other binary categories, as its point of departure.
In one of the more gruesome scenes in the film, Coré has sex with and 
mutilates/kills a neighbour boy who, infatuated with her, has broken into her 
home. The camera pans very slowly across human skin, but it is impossible to 
tell whose skin it is or what we are looking at (Figure 4.9). Tufts of hair that 
could be a woman’s pubic area, a belly button or an armpit fill the screen. Flesh 
is exposed such that it is made strange to the eye – a landscape or a palpitating 
organism that is encountered without a sense of visual mastery or possession.54 
Figure 4.9 The camera pans very slowly across human skin, but it is impossible to tell whose 
skin it is or what we are looking at.
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The viewer is exposed to an image that does not allow an easy perspective.55 
This means that she must remain open to the image as it is slowly revealed in 
all its viscerality. While operating alongside horror’s fascination with the body 
in ecstasy and agony, in pieces and torn apart, Denis employs her unique visual 
style. Because the gaze here is resolutely non-appropriative, she profoundly 
alters the conventions of horror, rendering her spectators as vulnerable to 
intrusion as the characters. Additionally, the film avoids a sado-pornographic 
depiction because it refuses to represent the body as an object of visual mastery 
(voyeuristically) or fetishism.
This mode of filming is also evident in the film’s other sex scenes. Shane 
and June make love in their hotel room (Figures 4.10 and 4.11), but we are 
given only mobile and fleeting glances that close in on skin and hands as they 
explore and penetrate, rendering the gaze unsure of its own footing. Friday 
Night offers another example of this fragmentary and decentred style of 
shooting love scenes. When the two central characters – Vincent and Laure 
– finally have sex, we are not shown a medium shot of their bodies entwined 
and undressing each other, or a close-up of their faces kissing passionately. 
Rather we are exposed to this hand, as it touches the textured bedspread of the 
hotel, these hands clutching gently for the first time behind this nape of a neck, 
then this hand exploring this foot in close-up, rendering the image difficult 
to discern and inaugurating a series of more-difficult-to-master shots of these 
singular bodies touching and entwining (Figures 4.12 and 4.13). Instead of 
making love a feeling possessed by a ‘subject’, this mode of filming shows how 
Figure 4.10 Shane and June make love in their hotel room but we are given only mobile and 
fleeting glances . . .
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desire flows and is produced through the encounter of bodies. It gives love a 
performative dimension rather than assuming it as a thing that we can always 
recognise and know. This approach opens up the body to an exploratory gaze 
that captures the sensuous singularity of these bodies at this particular moment, 
as they alter each other through their mutual exposure.
Figure 4.11 . . . that close in on skin and hands as they explore and penetrate, rendering the 
gaze unsure of its own footing.
Figure 4.12 We are exposed to this hand exploring this foot in close-up, rendering the image 
difficult to discern . . .
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The lack of visual mastery in these scenes challenges a phenomenologi-
cal approach, which tends to fall back on a transcendent consciousness. Like 
Denis, contra the phenomenological tradition, Nancy does not posit a self-
identical spectator.56 Denis’s films are constructed, narratively and visually, 
in such a way that we are denied the satisfaction of resolution and under-
standing. In a post-phenomenological manner, the spectator finds herself 
affectively contaminated by an image that denies full intelligibility. Affective 
and pre-cognitive relations of exposure attune the spectator to her own onto-
logical non-immunity, in a world in which all encounters are contact with the 
unknown. Despite the human vulnerability that this reworking of the subject 
and the body entails, if it is in fact our condition as beings, then the recogni-
tion of this fragility to one another as it pertains to all, including the Western 
and able-bodied subject, is a starting place from which to think more ethically 
about our actions in the world.
Shildrick’s writing shares concerns with my own work here – connecting a 
generalised bodily vulnerability to a reconceptualisation of ethics but within 
a disability studies context. As she writes, ‘Far from being a simple matter of 
prudent protection, what is at stake in our vulnerability to non-self factors is an 
ethics of relationship.’57 Barbara E. Gibson likewise sees a connection between 
notions of the person, ethics and biomedical constructions of the bounded 
body. She argues for a reconceptualisation of dependency or vulnerability as 
connectivity: ‘connectivity suggests a radically altered ethics that is no longer 
premised on the rights of the generalized autonomous subject. Instead it 
Figure 4.13 . . . and inaugurating a series of more-difficult-to-master shots of these singular 
bodies touching and entwining.
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compels the becoming-self to appreciate and acknowledge difference by rec-
ognizing its own vulnerabilities and dependencies.’58 The narratives of people 
categorised as disabled reveal this connectivity and bodily malleability through 
their statements that various pieces of technology, service animals and/or aids 
feel like parts of themselves. For Gibson, disability is a privileged experience 
expressing our connectivity and ongoing connection making as part of human 
becoming. Nancy shifts our language towards singular plurality as his own 
term for becoming or for the ‘with-ness’, openness and constant alteration of 
what is thought of as the subject or existent.
Denis’s larger project of dismantling identity as a useful signifier of char-
acter, her use of the fragment, and the way in which she films sex scenes all 
critique the dominant notion of the defensive body. Keeping in line with the 
thematic of encounters as shaping a singular plural subject and applying it to 
new ways of thinking embodiment, we can see how labels such as disability or 
race are produced through encounters between bodies, rather than properties 
held by stable selves. We can also highlight the insufficiency of a label such 
as ‘female’ or ‘disabled’ to account for the other’s singularity or even to tell 
us what that body can do. The concept of the body that operates in Nancy 
and in Denis’s work demands a reworking of ethics that overlaps with critical 
disability studies. Key to this is questioning the vilification of vulnerability 
and dependence and recognising these terms as a necessary reality of existing 
in a world with others. By understanding vulnerability as a generalised onto-
logical condition, as does Trouble Every Day and as do theorists such as Price, 
Shildrick and Gibson, less effort will be made to shore up the illusion of the 
bounded self by displacing vulnerability onto ‘others’, whether these others be 
racially othered or othered in terms of age or ability according to a standard/
neutral body that is implicitly white and male.59 Can we rethink vulnerability 
as a condition of self-becoming, after Shildrick?60 In generalising our suscep-
tibility to one another we shift away from defence as a paradigm for the body 
and towards connectivity – albeit one that, after Nancy, is always interruptive. 
Whereas Shildrick and Price use a Derridean/Butlerian model focusing on 
the body’s discursive construction and performativity, and Gibson looks to 
Deleuze and Guattari for models of becoming that conceptualise the body as a 
connectivity machine, I submit a Nancean contribution. Nancy’s focus on the 
body as always in process, always becoming with bodies, human, animal and 
mineral, and as a collection of parts amongst parts can add to this ‘toolbox’ of 
philosophical resources for rethinking the body outside of binaries of healthy/
sick, abled/disabled and integrated/broken.
Although I am offering some of Nancy’s and Denis’s insights as ways of 
adding to a conception of the body that aligns with the concerns of critical 
disability studies, I would note here that Levinas also makes vulnerability the 
property of the ethical subject. This ‘subject’ is the product of an encounter or 
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a relation that renders her vulnerable and weak before the other to whom she is 
responsible. This reversal – the ethical subject is not the neutral party who aids 
those who are in need or vulnerable per se, but is herself vulnerable and open 
to outrage – is part of why his philosophy provokes such strong feelings in his 
readers. I return to this aspect of his writing in the Coda, where I discuss our 
vulnerability to texts and the affective reorientations they demand of us. The 
next and final section will turn to Levinas for additional conceptual resources 
for developing an affect-based post-phenomenological account of film specta-
torship. I turn to Denis’s use of dance, going beyond the parameters of Trouble 
Every Day to offer a counter to the suffering so prominent in her exploration of 
the horror genre and to look instead at the potential joy and wonder of bodies 
exposed in movement. Dance functions as a kind of ‘saying’ – an affective and 
ephemeral encounter with the other.
embodying the encounter
I have been working towards a post-phenomenological account of embodiment, 
to which, as I elaborate here, Levinas can also contribute. I go into some detail 
in this section to explore his relationship to vision and the body, because the 
bodily dimension of his thought is somewhat overlooked in Levinas scholar-
ship.61 In fact, he has even been read as emphasising vision at the expense of the 
bodily, a perspective which is countered in particular by a close reading of his 
final major work on ethics, Otherwise than Being.62 In his emphasis on the bodily, 
tactile way in which the ethical is intimated, Levinas in fact critiques vision as a 
disembodied tool of a transcendental consciousness, which aligns with feminist 
critiques of the vision-centred history of philosophy. This perspective con-
ceives of sight, or the phenomenological apperception of an object, as that 
which requires distance or separation from what is viewed, a distance which 
also encourages a mastery of the other/object. Because of this, vision is not the 
‘sense’ of the ethical for Levinas. He writes, ‘Sight, by reason of its distance and 
its totalizing embrace, imitates or prefigures the “impartiality” of the intellect 
and its refusal to hold to what the immediacy of the sensible would dispose, or 
what it would constitute.’63 He similarly moves away from the representational 
or semiotic and towards the viscerality of encountering the other, or, put in 
other words, of being-with. The ethical encounter signifies in highly somatic 
ways and Levinas works hard to avoid language that connects this intimation 
to any notion of sight as mastery or possession. Terms like ‘knowing’, ‘cogni-
tion’ and ‘experience’ are always associated with the ontological in Levinas, 
and with the realm of light, enlightenment, vision and totality. Once I know 
something I have assimilated it to my own consciousness or worldview, thus I 
have repressed the alterity of the other and reduced it to my own understand-
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ing. For Levinas, ethics takes place in darkness, in the space of not knowing, 
not mastering, and being vulnerable and exposed to the call of the other. In his 
emphasis on contact and proximity over language and visual mastery he argues 
that contact is ‘a way of signifying quite different from that which connects 
exposition to sight’.64 Here we see Levinas reworking the meaning of significa-
tion away from a representational schema and towards the idea of sensibility. 
In more current theoretical language, signification for Levinas is affect, where 
affect denotes the bodily sensations that precede any linguistic designators of 
emotion (such as happiness or fear). Signification is sensation, proximity and 
contact. This bears a strong affinity to the ethical approach of Denis, who gives 
precedence to the exposure of the body in all its strangeness over visual and 
narrative clarity. Her work illustrates how even within an (audio)visual medium 
such as film, contact prevails over cognition or representation.
There are moments in Otherwise than Being where Levinas opens the pos-
sibility of reworking the visual in a suggestive way. As articulated in the quota-
tions above, vision ‘announces’ contact and exposure. He argues furthermore 
that the functions of sight ‘may not be exhausted in openness and cognition’,65 
‘openness’ and ‘cognition’ being words that stand in for the phenomenological 
tradition that he is writing against. Levinas refigures vision in haptic terms. The 
eyes are most useful as indicators when they act like organs of touch. He writes, 
‘Sight is, to be sure, an openness and consciousness, and all sensibility, opening 
as a consciousness, is called vision; but even in its subordination to cognition 
sight maintains contact and proximity. The visible caresses the eye. One sees and 
one hears like one touches.’66 Here the auditory is connected to vision and touch 
in a way that implies their interchangeability. What is significant is not the 
sense itself but how it senses, what alterities it leaves unthematised and remains 
exposed to, the way in which it touches on the other. This suggests the vital 
possibility that we may be able to see otherwise, or to disrupt our conventional 
patterns of looking to be open, even in an ethical sense, to what is unexpectedly 
other. As argued, Denis and Godard shift the codified terms of viewing such 
that we are placed in a kind of affective proximity to the bodies on screen, rather 
than looking at them from a perspective of distance and mastery.
This approaches a form of haptic spectatorship. In the sense that the image 
bears a highly tactile charge, it touches from across a distance. Touch trou-
bles the bodily separation that enables one to totalise what is seen. Levinas 
writes that ‘Sensibility must be interpreted as touch first of all’67 and that 
‘To approach is to touch the neighbor, beyond the data apprehended at a dis-
tance in cognition, that is, to approach the other’.68 This contact in proxim-
ity touches on the other without fusion; it retains the otherness of the other 
without reducing her to the Same. In language that comes surprisingly close 
to Nancy’s model of interruptive touch, Levinas clarifies: ‘To be in contact 
is neither to invest the other and annul his alterity, nor to suppress myself in 
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the other. In contact itself the touching and the touched separate, as though 
the touched moved off, was always already other, did not have anything in 
common with me.’69 Referring back to alterity aesthetics, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, this is a touch that cannot grasp, refusing the comforts of 
categorisation. Levinas often refers to the encounter with the other as a caress, 
but because this interaction takes place in an ethical sphere that is prior to the 
ontological, it figures as a trace.70 As a trace, the contact is present only in its 
absence; it is revealed only as it withdraws and is therefore beyond my reach. 
This tactile trace is the residue of the ethical encounter, one that is echoed in 
the bodily interaction between viewer and film.
This bodily encounter is intimated in the tension, anxiety and horror of 
Trouble Every Day, reminding us of our susceptibility and co-existence. As a 
counter to the pain of exposure that has predominantly figured in this chapter, 
the role of dance in Denis’s oeuvre more pleasurably showcases the bodily 
impact that the image has on the spectator. Dance reveals the more joyous 
and often erotic side of exposure in contrast to the darkness of the horror 
genre. Furthermore, a turn to dance is necessary in relation to some of the 
larger implications of this study. The so-called ‘death of the subject’ or decon-
struction of subjectivity need not be a cause for despair or a sign of nihilism. 
Importantly for feminism, which has a deep investment in the dismantling of 
the subject but also a troubled relation with the practical political need to assert 
the reality of the category ‘women’, it is crucial to emphasise the affirmative, 
generative and creative possibilities that the opening of the subject can offer. 
Dance thus provides a needed counterpoint to the discussion above, as it is 
exemplary of the kinds of bodily creativity that a rethinking of relationality 
and subjectivity enables. As opposed to Trouble Every Day, which takes some 
of Denis’s bodily preoccupations to their extreme limits, dance is perhaps the 
most paradigmatic motif of her work, which showcases the elusive singular-
ity that her films address. This can be thought of in terms of the affective 
trace of the encounter with the other – a bodily reminder of relationality and 
responsibility. It is an encounter that works in a pre-cognitive way. In lieu 
of dialogue or explanatory images we are offered a body in motion, exposing 
its ineffable uniqueness to us. Denis’s use of dance connects to her powerful 
use of music and interest in filming bodies more generally. We saw this in the 
previous chapter, which discussed the familial dance scene in I Can’t Sleep and 
Galoup’s post-mortem discothèque romp in Beau travail.71
US Go Home, a film Denis made for a French television series, features 
many dance scenes, specifically of teenagers dancing at a party. In an early 
scene, Alain, the elder of the two teen siblings that the film centres on, plays a 
record of the Animals’ song ‘Hey Gyp’. He absent-mindedly sings along and 
lights a cigarette, then jumps on his bed and begins to move his arms, dancing 
back and forth, while singing and smoking his cigarette unselfconsciously. As 
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the song grows increasingly frenzied, he sings and moves with corresponding 
abandon, giving himself over to the sexual and expressive affect of the music 
(Figure 4.14). Previously, Alain has appeared sullen and distant, coldly reject-
ing his sister’s pleas to accompany her to a party and reading Seneca aloud in 
bed, railing against the pleasures of the body – sexual or otherwise. The linger-
ing and delightful scene of Alain dancing to his record (which lasts the entire 
duration of the song, almost four minutes, and is shot in one take) evokes the 
tensions attendant on the ephemeral stage of adolescence – in it we witness both 
his irreducible singularity and the unspoken desires and capacities of his body. 
This scene is exemplary of the way that Denis uses dance not just to supplement 
narrative but also in place of it. The body interrupts narrative and operates in 
excess of articulable meanings. Like the fragmented and non-appropriable 
body discussed above, proximity ruptures myth through the exposure of the 
dancing body. The spectacle of the dance reveals a non-thematisable element 
of character that refuses to be pinned down, providing a bodily encounter with 
alterity. The moment when the body engages with music can never be exactly 
repeated, thus expressing the sensations of a unique and fleeting moment in 
time. The bodily relationship with film that is intensified in the horror genre is 
similarly concentrated through Denis’s particular use of dance.72
In the more recent 35 Shots of Rum, a pivotal sequence revolves around a 
dance scene in a small bar. The four main characters – a father and his daugh-
ter, who have a close and domestic co-existence, and two neighbours, one who 
has feelings for the daughter and a second who has a romantic past with the 
father – are all en route to a concert when their car breaks down in the pouring 
Figure 4.14 Alain dancing to ‘Hey Gyp’ in US Go Home.
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rain. As they seek shelter after their plans have fallen apart, a bar owner 
reopens her tavern for them. The father dances with his former love interest; 
their comfortable intimacy is palpable. The Commodores’ song ‘Nightshift’ 
comes on as the father and daughter dance – again their bodies express their 
closeness and the affection they have for each other (Figure 4.15). As the song 
plays on we see the young male neighbour cut in on the father and the immedi-
ate shift in the body language of the new couple (Figure 4.16). As they dance, 
their sexual attraction moves from tentative to explicit, as he undoes her hair 
and eventually they kiss. The father responds by reaching out to the bar owner 
as she delivers a late-night meal – their attraction is similarly palpable as we see 
their bodies move together (Figure 4.17), before the scene cuts to the dejected 
face of the father’s former flame, who throughout the film has continued to 
carry a torch for him. The scene is central in the sense that key decisions seem 
to be made through body movement – the daughter and neighbour establish 
their romantic relationship; she is preparing for her wedding at the end of the 
film (presumably to him, although typically for Denis we never see the groom, 
so the film refuses clear answers). The father has also definitively rejected his 
former girlfriend, while still asserting his own sexuality and ability to find 
pleasure in life outside of his daughter, whom he knows he will have to let 
go. Yet this synopsis of inferable consequences hardly captures the scene’s 
affective power. The bodies express so much that is not reducible to language 
or a list of character attributes. Dancing reveals singularities or alterities and 
affectively impacts the viewer. This of course connects to the alterity aesthetics 
previously discussed, while adding in the bodily dimension of this encounter 
Figure 4.15 The Commodores’ song ‘Nightshift’ comes on in 35 Shots of Rum, as the father 
and daughter dance.
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with the other. Put into the Levinasian terms introduced in the previous 
chapter, dance functions as a kind of ‘saying’ – an ungraspable movement that 
refuses to be fixed into representation, or ‘said’. Translated into the language 
of this chapter, it engages the body in a refusal of myth, showing how the body 
exceeds its own narrative containment and interrupts the linear progression of 
the film to expose a singular being in motion.
Figure 4.16 The neighbour cuts in and we register an immediate shift in the body language of 
the new couple.
Figure 4.17 The father finds his own romance on the dance floor.
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As I’ve argued throughout this book, we can see in Denis’s work the 
attempt to move beyond identities that are fully encapsulated by the terms 
of the system and to challenge the sovereign subject. To return to Wendy 
Brown’s writing on the perils of identity-based modes of organising, which 
was referenced in the introductory chapter, Brown advocates ‘the partial dis-
solution of sovereignty into desire’ in place of identity politics. Denis’s images 
move away from the complete and psychologised body-person and towards 
sensual audio-visualscapes of desire. Instead of dialogue, we are given a dance. 
In place of communication, we are offered creative forces that challenge us to 
encounter the world differently. As Brown says,
If every ‘I am’ is something of a resolution of desire into fixed and sover-
eign identity, then this project might involve not only learning to speak 
but to read ‘I am’ this way, as in motion, as temporal, as not-I, as decon-
structable according to a genealogy of want rather than as fixed interests 
or experiences.73
We can add to view ‘I am’ in this way to describe the flowing progression of 
bodies on screen in Denis’s cinema. Brown’s argument resonates with Tamsin 
Lorraine’s comment:
If what feminists are trying to do is pursue the consistency of thought 
components in order to destabilize old identities and perspectives and 
stabilize more promising identities and perspectives in keeping with the 
life flows of becoming-other than we are, then feminist theory is more 
about creating ways of skillfully evolving with life rather than getting a 
static representation of reality ‘right.’74
By reopening bodies to desire and failing to account fully for them in the mind 
of the spectator, Denis’s work encourages us to reopen ourselves to a future 
that can’t be known or anticipated through our current categories, even if 
it must also always be shaped in part by the histories that have come before 
us. She asks us to see ‘I am’ as in motion, temporal and singular each time 
differently.
Although Levinas’s ‘face-to-face’ encounter may sound deceptively visual, 
it is in fact intimated in various somatic ways. The other ‘excites’ simply by 
virtue of her proximity.75 The psyche ‘pants and shivers’,76 multiple references 
are made to trembling at the presence of the other, and proximity is sensed 
as a restlessness.77 The subject shudders in the ethical encounter; Levinas 
describes the ‘shudder of subjectivity’78 and the modality of an obsession as ‘a 
shuddering of the human quite different from cognition’.79 These references to 
trembling, shivering and shuddering and the aforementioned focus on bodily 
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pain take on a horrific valence when read alongside a film like Trouble Every 
Day. Perhaps this is because the film refuses a transcendence that Levinas 
relies on to give meaning to being – the suggestion of infinity or God as that 
which ultimately supports his ethical system. In this sense Denis diverges 
from Levinas, yet Denis participates in the attempt to evoke the ephemeral 
in her work, to avoid fixing things into frozen images, and to reveal a world 
where bodies move each other. But in the limit case that is Trouble Every Day, 
there is no redemption or meaning to be found outside of the diegetic world. 
Bodies are key to the ethics of Denis’s cinema, as they are to Levinasian ethics. 
Yet, counter to the pain of exposure, Denis’s oeuvre also gestures towards 
the unique power of bodies on screen to offer us more pleasurable affective 
encounters that are bodily reminders of the ethical relation. One of the key 
ways in which she does this is through her distinctive use of dance, facilitat-
ing encounters with the spectator, bodily in every sense, and impacting us in 
a place beyond the thematisable. Even in the horrific tale that is Trouble Every 
Day, there are moments of care between strangers – a lab technician offering 
to help Shane because she feels concern for him, a former landlady of Shane’s 
offering company to a lonely and abandoned June, and a valet sheltering June, 
despondent, from the pouring rain and convincing her to come back in from 
the cold.
conclusion
Whereas Levinas and Nancy primarily give an account of the body that applies 
to our existence outside of the cinema, films offer their own perspectives on 
embodiment – sometimes reinforcing our illusions of coherent subjectivity, 
and bodily and visual mastery, and other times challenging them and asking 
us to look and feel differently. Denis presents us with an ethical filmmaking 
practice, attentive to bodily singularity and privileging exposure over closure. 
Going further than the philosophers, her films acknowledge the historical and 
geographical dimensions of embodiment, even if they challenge the value of 
identity categories as a lens through which to understand the image. They thus 
attune us to a more general condition and establish a space of sensitisation to 
the bodily non-immunity key to the concept of the ethical I have elaborated.
The body is central to an account of ethical spectatorship – the subject is 
constituted with and the body’s porousness and vulnerability is a constant 
reminder of this relationality. Denis’s films evoke encounters that attune the 
viewer to this shared bodily condition, undermining illusions of autonomy 
from the external world. Trouble Every Day is a particularly difficult case study 
because it does not shy away from the risk inherent in challenging notions of 
the bounded subject. Despite the danger, the recognition of our  susceptibility 
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to one another may be a place from which we can act in ways that better 
acknowledge mutual risk, and that also make visible the joy and beauty of our 
shared messy world that offers no meaning outside itself.
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Our disposition towards the world – the mode in which we encounter it, the stories we tell ourselves about who we are within it, and how we share this 
world with others – shapes and is shaped by our affective attachments. It has 
been my aim to offer a generative set of thoughts by putting Denis, Levinas, 
Nancy and others into a conversation that I have argued offers one useful way 
to think about the ethical in relation to cinema. This is by no means the one 
‘true’ path or the sole means to shift our sensibilities. I have made explicit the 
metaphysical imaginaries that inspire what I have termed a feminist cinematic 
ethics – part of which has been an ethics of sense and another part an aesthetic 
of alterity. These film-based ways of approaching the world both reflect and 
attune us to a shared vulnerability and responsibility.
The way in which affect shapes the encounter with a film or a philosophical 
text is central to what has been discussed. Shifts in thought or ways of perceiv-
ing often occur through an author’s rhetorical strategies or the affective reso-
nances that a text carries for a given reader, or a film for a given viewer. The 
notion of ‘affective reorientation’ which I borrow from Christopher Janaway’s 
writing on Nietzsche is useful in this regard.1 Through his reading of the 
German philosopher, Janaway emphasises the affective forces that shape our 
moral judgements, often unreflectively. The notion of affective reorientation 
further highlights our susceptibility and exposedness – to written texts and to 
films, both of which play a role in shaping the modes in which we encounter 
others. Denis, Levinas and Nancy all challenge our affective orientations in the 
attempt to ask us to think differently about the world.
Levinas’s hyperbolic, almost sadistic demand for infinite and unending 
responsibility may be alienating or compelling to the reader. The rhetorical 
style and difficulty of his texts challenge the Western reader who is perhaps 
used to thinking of ethics in terms of cultivating virtues or developing strate-
gies for judging between competing claims. Levinas makes ethics feel much 
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riskier. Instead the reader is offered a traumatised and inadequate-to-the-task 
notion of a self always in debt to the other. The notion of affective reorientation 
helps us to see this as a strategy for radically challenging a deeply entrenched 
notion of the (rational and autonomous) self that can assimilate the other into a 
given representational framework and then decide how responsible one ought 
to be towards this other. Instead, Levinas’s work forces us to ask what it might 
mean to start from a different sensibility.
Nancy, for his part, takes up many tenets associated with poststructuralism 
and postmodernity – the need to rethink community in the wake of its seeming 
loss, the deconstruction of the subject, and the rejection of grand narratives or 
foundational logics. Yet, perhaps contrary to the reader’s expectations, these 
themes are not the cause of pessimism or a general cultural deflation. These 
challenges and opportunities are met with joy and creative openness in his 
writing. In this way he turns what would be the West’s own funeral dirge into 
an affirmation of new opportunities to understand our being-together-in-the-
world differently and more ethically. This is an affective reorientation of a dif-
ferent kind from Levinas’s, but it is no less powerful in terms of its potential 
consequences for how we orient ourselves in the world.
To some extent, I have used both Levinas and Nancy as storytellers – 
 creators of ethical imaginaries. I am not claiming the status of truth for either, 
but the stories they tell, like Denis’s multisensory films, enable us to see the 
world in a particular way. This framework seems useful, generative and even 
hopeful to me at this particular historical moment, when, despite the supposed 
loss of metanarratives, political and social discourses seem nonetheless to lean 
affectively towards the reductive and categorical. The affective reorienta-
tion and ethical sensibility they ask of us may not offer a roadmap for politics 
but it may be the backdrop through which we can better ask questions of the 
political.
Finally, Denis’s films, as I have argued throughout this project, work against 
our expectations for cinema. We learn to drift through her films, to allow the 
sensory and affective to take precedence over cognition or comprehension, and 
let others remain in their opacity. While for some viewers this could result in 
frustration, displeasure, boredom or confusion, I argue that her films offer an 
opportunity for an affective reorientation to cinema viewing and, through the 
film, to the world beyond the cinematic frame.
note
1. Christopher Janaway, Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche’s Genealogy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007).
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